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ABSTRACT 
Using Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN-5) as 
sample countries, this thesis contributes to the empirical analyses of three gaps in existing 
literature. The initial analysis addresses a knowledge gap in the measurement of financial 
stability. Existing measures of financial stability could not simultaneously: (1) reflect 
stability at a systemic scale; (2) reflect stability with little lag, and (3) incorporate 
information on the financial structure of the economy. Financial Stress Indices (FSI) are 
constructed to address these deficiencies. The FSIs are constructed using indicators of 
stress and weighted using the liability side of the financial structure of the sample 
economies. The indicators and weights of the FSIs span four major market segments - the 
equity market, banking system, domestic bond market and foreign finance market. Using 
data from 1997-2013, the results reveal three periods of higher financial stress. The most 
severe episode in terms of magnitude and duration was the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-
1998). This is followed by the US technology bubble burst (tech bust) (2000-2001) and 
the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (2007-2009). Interestingly, higher stress levels 
were seen during the tech bust compared to the GFC in all countries, except Singapore. 
The FSIs are subsequently modelled as a panel model to investigate the sources of 
financial stress in the ASEAN-5 economies. The methodology and model specification 
extends from the Early Warning System (EWS) literature by: (1) including more external 
variables to better capture the open-economy aspect; (2) including a measure of regional 
financial contagion; (3) analysing the entire financial cycle instead of just crisis periods, 
and; (4) using an instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity concerns. The 
results show that: US financial stress and regional financial contagion are significant 
common determinants. For country-specific variables, only bank credit emerged as 
consistently significant. A positive bank credit gap portends higher financial stress. 
Analysis of the sources of financial stress within individual markets reveals the 
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importance of the banking system and equity markets for financial stress elsewhere. 
Country-specific Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models for each ASEAN-5 
economy are then estimated to analyse the impact of financial stress on the economy and 
the relationship between monetary policy and financial stress. The SVAR models are 
adapted to be suited for small-open economies, by including more external variables and 
in the model structure, where the external variables affect the domestic variables, but not 
vice versa. The models incorporate FSIs to reflect financial stress in the global 
environment and ASEAN-5 economies. The findings show that higher financial stress 
leads to tighter domestic credit conditions and lower economic activity in all five 
countries. The impact on the real economy displays an initial rapid decline followed by a 
gradual dissipation. In Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, the central banks reduce 
policy interest rates (IRs) when financial stress increases, although there is substantial 
cross-country variation in the magnitude and time dynamics. Lower policy IRs are found 
to have little significant effects in lowering financial stress, but are still effective in 
stimulating economic activity through other channels. 
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ABSTRAK 
Berdasarkan data dari Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore dan Thailand 
(ASEAN-5), tesis ini menyumbangkan tiga aspek dari segi analisa empirik yang 
ditimbulkan dari Kegawatan Ekonomi Sedunia (GFC) pada tahun 2007-2009. Tesis ini 
bertujuan memberi hasil penyelidikan yang baru dari segi kes ekonomi yang kecil, 
terutamanya kerana terdapatnya kekurangan tinjauan dalam kajian literatur. Bab 3 
memberi tinjauan dari segi ukuran metrik kepada stabiliti kewangan.  Indek Financial 
Stress dibina (FSI) berdasarkan penunjuk tegangan yang diperolehi dari pemberat dari 
empat pasaran, iaitu pasaran ekuti, sistem perbankan, pasaran bon domestik dan pasaran 
kewangan asing. Bab 4 menganggarkan satu model panel berdasarkan FSI untuk 
mengkaji punca tegangan kewangan dalam ekonomi ASEAN-5 ini. Panel yang 
ditubuhkan merangkumi kajian sistem ‘Early Warning’ (EWS) yang dapat memerangkapi 
sifat empirik yang umum. Keputusan empirik yang umum ini menunjukkan bahawa 
kedua-dua variabel luaran (KDNK dunia yang lebih tinggi, tegangan kewangan di US, 
dan penularan kewangan di serantau) serta variabel dalaman (keadaan kredit yang 
semakin longgar dan aktiviti ekonomi yang bertambah perlahan) menyumbangkan 
tegangan pasaran kewangan yang lebih tinggi di ekonomi ASEAN-5. Bab 5 
menggunakan pendekatan ‘structural vector autoregression’ (SVAR) untuk menganalisa 
impak tegangan kewangan dalam ekonomi, serta hubungan di antara tegangan ekonomi 
dan polisi monetari dalam ekonomi ASEAN-5. Keputusan empirik yang diperolehi 
mencadangkan bahawa pertambahan dalam tegangan kewangan akan menyebabkan 
keadaan kredit yang bertambah tegang serta aktiviti ekonomi yang semakin lembab di 
kelima-lima ekonomi serantau ASEAN. Didapati juga bank pusat dari tiga buah negara 
utama ini, iaitu Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, mempunyai tendensi polisi untuk 
mengurangkan kadar bunga apabila tegangan kewangan bertambah (walaupun wujudnya 
perbezaan variasi bersilang dari segi magnitud dan dinamik masa). Polisi kadar bunga 
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yang lebih rendah didapati tidak memberi sebarang kesan yang signifikan terhadap 
pengurangan tegangan kewangan. Walau bagaimanapun, polisi bunga a-la rendah ini 
adalah efektif dalam merangsangkan aktiviti ekonomi dari resesi melalui saluran 
transmisi yang lain. 
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 :  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Financial crises are events that demonstrate how interlinked financial markets are with 
the real economy. Economic contractions are deeper and recoveries take longer during 
business cycle downturns that are associated with financial crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009, 2014). It is therefore pertinent to have a robust framework to monitor financial 
stability conditions and knowledge of the available policy options to restore growth and 
financial stability during crisis periods. 
However, financial crisis and financial (in)stability are often seen as binary events in the 
financial crisis literature. Specifically, the literature on identifying Early Warning 
Indicators (EWIs) of financial crisis is premised first on viewing financial market 
conditions as either stable or in crisis, and subsequently identifying the indicators that 
foreshadow an impending financial crisis. There is an inherent gap in the measurement 
of financial stability conditions between the states of “no crisis” and “crisis”. It is hence 
difficult to fully grasp the severity of an impending financial crisis as it starts as an 
isolated event within a specific asset market to when it becomes a systemic crisis event. 
Consequently, it is also difficult to comprehend the eventual effects of the crisis on the 
real economy and, hence, the necessary policy actions to restore macroeconomic stability.   
This limitation was highlighted during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. 
Take for example, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) outlook for the global 
economy during this period. Figure 1.1 illustrates that the IMF’s forecast of global growth 
for 2009 in 2008 was only for a moderate slowdown, but still positive. This was even 
after Lehmann Brothers investment bank failed in September 2008, which sent the crisis 
into a substantially more intense phase. When the IMF released their global forecasts the 
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following month, in October 2008, the scale of the crisis’ impact on the real economy 
was still not yet appreciated. This is seen in the large errors in forecasts made in 2008. It 
was only in 2009 itself that the agency substantially revised downward growth forecasts 
that were close to the actual figures. 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (Various Issues) 
Figure 1.1: IMF’s Forecast of 2009 Gross Domestic Product Growth 
 
The main reason for this uncertainty during the GFC and financial crises in general is that 
there is a lack of high frequency indicators that reflect the escalation of the crisis from its 
nascent stage, when it is still isolated to individual asset markets to when it becomes a 
systemic event. This makes it difficult to monitor the progression of the financial crisis 
in real time. Among the available indicators are individual asset prices and the aggregate 
balance sheets of economic agents. However, asset prices reflect stress only in specific 
market segments, while aggregate balance sheet information is often highly lagged since 
reporting standards only require collection at pre-specified periods at low frequency (e.g. 
usually quarterly or annually). 
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In a “crisis” and “no crisis” paradigm, there is a risk that policymakers are jolted into 
policy action only after a crisis is triggered. In addition, the uncertainty over financial 
stability conditions cascades to uncertainty in growth forecasts and the formulation of 
policy responses. This leads to effective policy actions being hampered by a lack of clarity 
in terms of: (1) whether a change in policy is warranted given the effects that the financial 
crisis is anticipated to have on macroeconomic stability (growth and inflation), and; (2) 
uncertainty over the effectiveness of specific policy instruments given the stress in 
financial markets. 
These aspects of policy uncertainty were openly and explicitly expressed by major central 
banks during the GFC period. The first type of uncertainty is echoed in the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) press statement on 2nd October 2008, when they decided to leave 
their monetary policy stance unchanged: 
“…it needs to be stressed that we face an extraordinarily high degree of 
uncertainty, in large part stemming from the recent intensification of the financial 
market turmoil. This complicates any assessment of the near to medium-term 
economic prospects.” (European Central Bank, 2008)  
This judgment reflects the view that as the GFC entered an intense phase (after Lehmann 
Brother’s failed on 15th September 2008), the ECB’s monetary policy consideration was 
complicated by difficulties in assessing growth prospects due to uncertainties over the 
impact of the financial crisis. There was thus an indication of policy paralysis that is 
attributable to the uncertainty over economic prospects. 
The second aspect of uncertainty was echoed by the United States (US) Federal Reserve 
Bank’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) as they deliberated on monetary policy 
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in 2008 amid the crisis. The following is an excerpt taken from the minutes from the 
meeting held in October 2008: 
“Some members were concerned that the effectiveness of cuts in the target federal 
funds rate may have been diminished by the financial dislocations...” (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008)  
Even after the US Federal Reserve Bank began easing monetary policy by this meeting, 
there was disagreement among members over the effectiveness of the interest rate 
changes on the real economy, primarily because of different beliefs over changes in the 
monetary transmission mechanism brought about by the financial crisis. 
1.2 Research Problem 
As the previous section highlights, there is currently a knowledge gap in the measurement 
of financial stability conditions on a continuous scale. This drawback in turn limits 
analyses of other issues that are pertinent for the assessment of macro-financial 
vulnerabilities and the appropriate monetary policy responses during crisis periods. 
Specifically, this thesis attempts to address the following three drawbacks in existing 
literature: 
I. The measurement of financial crises in existing financial crisis studies take on a 
binary nature - crisis or no crisis. There are two adverse consequences of this 
approach. First, this measurement approach does not allow the monitoring of 
financial stability conditions from when stress initially emerges within individual 
asset markets, to when it becomes a systemic financial crisis. Second, this 
measurement approach results in studies that do not account for periods that are 
marked by higher stress in financial markets, but without systemic failures of 
financial institutions, currency runs or sovereign debt defaults. While not fitting 
the traditional definition of crises, such episodes are nonetheless significant if they 
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had large adverse macroeconomic effects (Borio & Lowe, 2002), and hence 
deserve more attention. 
II. The established empirical commonalities from EWI studies implicitly assumes 
that crisis periods are different from normal periods, while being silent on the 
possibility that changes in financial stability conditions may result from large 
movements in the explanatory variables. While it is relatively clear what the early 
warning indicators of financial crises are, less clear is what drives the remaining 
parts of the financial cycle.  
III. The lack of a continuous measure of financial stability has largely constrained 
time series analysis of the impact of adverse financial shocks on: 1. Economic 
activity and its transmission mechanism, and: 2. how monetary policy 
transmission is affected by episodes of financial instability. This is especially true 
for economies with a low frequency of historical incidences of financial crises. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this study are to: 
I. Measure financial stability conditions on a continuous scale. This is achieved by 
constructing an index called the Financial Stress Index (FSI) that is capable of 
reflecting financial stress as it emerges from low levels within individual asset 
markets, to high levels as financial stress spreads across asset markets and become 
systemic events. This later stage is what current literature often recognises as a 
financial crisis. 
II. Identify the sources of financial stress throughout the entire financial cycle. This 
helps to shed light on the factors that determine financial stress beyond just 
financial crisis periods. 
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III. Estimate the dynamic impact of financial stress on the real economy, the 
transmission channels and how monetary policy effectiveness changes relative to 
financial stability conditions.  
To the extent that there has been a resurgence of interest in these issues especially since 
the GFC episode, studies that attempt to address them have focused largely on developed 
economies, where the GFC played centre stage and have eschewed emerging and small-
open economies. Undoubtedly, the findings from studies of large developed economies 
do not automatically apply to emerging and small-open economies. This is because the 
latter economies tend to have less developed financial markets and different institutions 
as well as regulatory structures. They also tend to be more vulnerable to sudden reversals 
in capital flows and external developments. For emerging and small-open economies, a 
modelling strategy that is distinct from the approach applied on developed economies is 
hence needed to address the aforementioned issues. 
This thesis uses 5 small-open economies from Asia for the empirical analysis - Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN-5). This sample is chosen 
among the other small-open economies primarily for three reasons. Firstly, the ASEAN-
5 economies experienced their own financial crisis over a decade earlier in 1997 and 
underwent significant structural reforms thereafter in efforts to improve the resilience of 
its financial markets and economies. When comparing systemic financial stability 
conditions across time and countries, this event provides a useful benchmark of relative 
severity and changes in resilience during subsequent financial episodes such as the 
technology bubble burst in the United States in 2000-2001 and the GFC in 2007-2009. 
Secondly, these 5 economies possess diverse economic structures. For instance, 
Singapore is a newly industrialised country with developed and open financial markets, 
while Malaysia and Indonesia are commodity rich economies who export both food and 
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fuel. This diversity can help pin down whether the derived empirical findings to the 
questions posed are country-specific or robust to differences in economic and financial 
market structures. Finally, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, for the questions 
posed in this thesis, there is relatively less literature for the selected sample. This is 
attributable in part to limitations in data availability. There is, in general, less publically 
available data for emerging economies that span a sufficiently long time period that 
contains a rich enough set of events to analyse these issues. With the AFC, the technology 
bubble burst, the recent GFC and subsequent euro debt crisis, the ASEAN-5 economies 
have recently experienced a sufficiently rich variety of domestic and external financial 
shocks over the last two decades to facilitate a meaningful analysis of the various facets 
of financial stability, macro-financial vulnerabilities and how financial stability 
conditions affect monetary policy transmission. 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 conducts a review of the existing literature. This review sets a historical 
context of the current state of literature and then traces the evolution of relevant sub-fields 
to their current stage of development. Finally, the research problems that this thesis 
attempts to address are highlighted.  
In Chapter 3, a methodology is developed to measure financial stress on a continuous 
scale. These measures are presented as indices called, Financial Stress Indices (FSIs), and 
reflect stress in specific asset markets and at the overall systemic level. Low and high 
values reflect, respectively, buoyancy and distress in financial markets. The overall FSI 
for each country is a weighted-average of its market-specific FSIs, with weights that 
reflect the relative share of financing sourced from the individual market segments. 
Specifically, the shares reflect the significance of each represented market segment in 
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providing financing to economic agents. This is done to tailor the FSIs to the differing 
financial structures across the sample countries and their evolution over time. The FSIs 
are then used to analyse facets of financial episodes in the region from 1997-2013. This 
includes the frequency, duration and magnitude of higher stress episodes, and the 
contribution of stress from individual asset markets to overall financial stress during such 
episodes. The FSIs provide the basis and starting point for the analyses conducted in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 determines the sources of financial stress in the ASEAN-5 economies using a 
panel data methodology. The panel model is constructed with the FSIs modelled as a 
function of common global and regional variables, and a set of county-specific 
vulnerability indicators that EWI studies have traditionally focused on. Two notable 
contributions are made in this chapter: First, the analysis uses an instrumental variable 
approach to control for endogeneity arising from two-way causality between financial 
stress and the domestic variables (e.g. GDP, current account balances, fiscal balances and 
international reserves). Second, the panel analysis is subsequently conducted on the 
market-specific FSIs (representing stress in the banking system, equities, foreign 
exchange and bond market), to investigate if the sources of financial stress are similar 
across asset markets and to give insight to how financial stress spreads across asset 
markets. 
In Chapter 5, the FSIs are embedded in an open-economy Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) model for each ASEAN-5 economy to analyse the transmission 
of financial stress to the real economy and how financial stress affects the transmission 
of monetary policy. The model structure explicitly incorporates a small-open economy 
assumption, in which global variables affect the country-specific variables, but not vice 
versa. Impulse response functions from the estimated SVAR models are used to 
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characterise the speed and depth of the economic downturn in response to adverse 
financial shocks. This methodology is also utilised to give insight to the roles of credit 
and the exchange rate in the transmission of financial stress. Finally, impulse response 
analysis is used to quantify the role of financial stress in altering the transmission of 
monetary policy to the real economy.    
The final chapter, Chapter 6, concludes with a summary of the main findings of this 
thesis. The policy implications are then drawn from the findings especially when viewed 
from a broader context. This includes areas of policy-oriented surveillance, regional 
cooperation and the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the chapter discusses some 
potentially fruitful avenues for further research going forward. 
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 :  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 was, in some aspects, a teachable 
moment to the limitations of existing macroeconomic models’ usefulness for macro-
financial surveillance and policy guidance. For central banks, in the two decades or so 
prior to the GFC, the conduct of monetary policy was guided predominantly through the 
lens of a “Taylor Rule”, in which the policy instrument, usually a short-term interest rate, 
is modelled as a function of inflation and output. This simplistic paradigm became widely 
accepted since being introduced because using it for policy guidance seemed to yield 
successful results as business cycle fluctuations and inflation moderated during the 1980s 
till the early 2000s. Indeed, many attributed the improved macroeconomic stability to the 
better management of monetary policies. 
Since the GFC, these views have been largely reversed by policymakers and academics 
alike, and have been articulated particularly forcefully in Blanchflower (2009), Bean, 
Paustian, Penalver, and Taylor (2010) and Solow (2008). To illustrate, Blanchflower 
(2009) lamented the following in March 2009 in the midst of the GFC: 
“As a monetary policy maker I have found the ‘cutting edge’ of current 
macroeconomic research totally inadequate in helping to resolve the problems 
we currently face.”  
This chapter starts by reviewing the pre-GFC ideology and the limitations to this approach 
that were highlighted by the GFC episode. The review begins with a brief historical 
narrative of how macroeconomic models evolved to the state just prior to the GFC 
episode. The main narrative put forth is that before the GFC, financial markets and 
financial factors were largely ignored or featured with limited scope in models that were 
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used for policy analysis. Post-GFC, the debate shifted focus to how to measure these 
financial factors and how to incorporate them into standard macroeconomic models, so 
that they can be more useful for surveillance and policy analysis. A sound understanding 
of the evolution of macroeconomic models from a historical perspective is necessary, as 
it indicates the directions that were taken in the past that were not fruitful and thus should 
be avoided going forward. 
This literature review then notes the absence of measures of financial instability in 
mainstream models. It is plausible that its absence may be attributable to the observation 
that episodes of elevated financial stress are relatively infrequent and hence it was okay 
to exclude it from the models. However, this perception has largely changed post-GFC. 
From an analytical perspective, a major hurdle for its exclusion is due to the lack of 
explicit measures of financial instability. Subsequently, the review traces the progression 
of three lines of literatures up to their current stage of development. These literatures 
pertain to: 1. The measurement of financial stability conditions; 2. An explanation of the 
determinants of financial stability throughout the financial cycle, and; 3. The real 
economic effects of adverse financial shocks and how monetary policy transmission is 
affected by financial (in)stability. The limitations in current knowledge are established 
and are the bases for the analyses in the remainder of this thesis.   
The remaining sections proceed as follows: Section 2.2 provides a historical context of 
how financial factors featured in past macroeconomic models. Section 2.3 discusses the 
advent of Taylor Rules, its incorporation into models for policy analyses, how it was 
expanded over time and notes that measures of financial stability were missing from such 
models. Section 2.4 details the current knowledge on measuring financial stability. 
Section 2.5 presents the literature that give insight to the sources of financial stability. 
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Section 2.6 then details the interactions among financial stability, real economic activity 
and monetary policy. The last section concludes. 
2.2 A Historical Context of how Financial Factors Feature Models for Monetary 
Policy Analysis 
2.2.1 From Large Scale Models to Monetary Rules 
Before looking at how models should progress in the post-GFC era, it is instructive to 
first look back at modelling efforts of how financial factors featured in models for 
monetary policy analysis from a historical context. This is to gain an understanding of 
what the previous efforts were, how successful they were during that era and why they 
became outdated.   
Among the first frameworks that were developed and used by major central banks for 
monetary policy analysis were large-scale econometric models such as the MIT-FRB and 
Brookings models, which were used during the 1960s and 1970s (Brayton, Levin, Lyon, 
& Williams, 1997). These models consisted of many equations that attempted to account 
for the various channels through which policy shifts would affect the real economy. For 
instance, over 60 equations in the MTT-FRB model were constructed and estimated to 
capture intricate features of the US economy, including the behaviour of the central bank, 
state and local governments, commercial banks, the household and business sectors and 
“a detailed treatment of the financial sector” (Rasche & Shapiro, 1968). The main goal 
was to have a detailed analytical framework that was not only capable of quantifying the 
impact of policy shifts on the real economy, but also how they were transmitted.  
These frameworks started to fall out of favour in the mid-1970s for two reasons: Firstly, 
the simulation results were unstable and forecasts were unrealistic (Gramlich, 2004). 
Secondly, Lucas (1976) argued that the estimated parameters were not suitable for policy 
inference. A crucial assumption in these models was that the estimated parameters were 
invariant to policy changes, for it enabled the conduct of counterfactual simulations to 
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estimate the impact of hypothetical policy shifts. However, Lucas (1976) pointed out that 
because firms and consumers were forward looking, their responses would vary 
systematically with policy shifts. This implied that the estimated fixed coefficients were 
in fact not fixed, and were thus not valid for policy inference. This line of reasoning is 
now known as the “Lucas Critique”.      
Following the failure of large-scale econometric models in the 1970s, attention then 
turned to frameworks that advocated a targeted rule-based approach to conduct monetary 
policy. Though this school of thought, known as monetarism, gained prominence in the 
1970s, studies done in the previous two decades provided much of the underlying 
foundations.  
To begin, empirical findings diminished previously held views over the potency of 
monetary policy, from a multiplier of between four and five to about one (De Long, 2000). 
Although there was evidence of the short-run non-neutrality of money, it was pointed out 
that using monetary policy as a stabilisation tool would likely exacerbate instead of 
smooth economic fluctuations because of the uncertain multiplier and lag effects 
(Friedman & Shwartz, 1963). These findings supported a rule as opposed to discretion 
approach to conducting monetary policy. 
The monetarist framework gained widespread credibility when the associated researchers 
correctly predicted that the Phillips curve relationship, a downward sloping curve that 
characterised a negative correlation between inflation and unemployment, would not hold 
over the long-run. It was previously thought that a central bank’s decision simply 
involved conducting monetary policy by deciding among pairs of unemployment and 
inflation (i.e. a desire to lower the unemployment rate would come at the cost of higher 
inflation) (Samuelson & Solow, 1960). This was disputed by Phelps (1967) and Friedman 
(1968), who postulated that the trade-off would only hold in the short-run and that the 
   14 
long-run Phillips curve was in fact vertical. Their hypothesis implied that repeated 
attempts to stimulate aggregate demand through expansionary monetary policy would 
only lead to higher inflation with no decrease in unemployment. This proved correct when 
the oil price shocks in the 1970s led to both high unemployment and inflation. This event 
marked a turning point for institutional acceptance of the monetarist framework, as the 
Federal Reserve and Bank of England adopted fixed targets of the money stock as a policy 
rule during the mid-late 1970s (De Long, 2000). 
2.2.2 From Monetary Rules to Interest Rate Rules 
However, inflation and unemployment continued to increase in response to the oil price 
shocks under this new framework of fixed targeting of the money stock. In addition, this 
policy led to volatile interest rates, which was regarded as detrimental to economic 
activity and hence unemployment. These events eventually led Paul Volker, then 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, to unofficially abandon the monetarist regime in 
favour of a discretionary approach in 1979 by using the Federal Funds rate (short-term 
interest rate) as the policy variable. Inflation eventually subsided after the Federal Funds 
rate was kept high for a sustained period. 
Following the failure of the monetarist framework, attention turned to formulating other 
simple and robust interest rate rules. A key result of this effort was the following 
expression:  
! = 	 !∗ + &'(∗ +	&)*∗                (Equation 2.1) 
i and i* are the nominal and natural (equilibrium) interest rate. π* is the inflation gap 
(inflation - targeted inflation), and y* is the output gap (output - potential output). This 
rule relates changes in the nominal short-term interest rate to changes in inflation and 
output. For instance, a nominal interest rate increase is expected to lead to lower inflation 
and output. Although initially introduced and discussed by (Bryant, Hooper, & Mann, 
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1993), the formula’s applicability for policy was demonstrated clearly by Taylor (1993), 
when he proposed the following equation using historical data from the United States as 
a guide: 
! = 	2 + 0.5(∗ + 	0.5*∗                           (Equation 2.2) 
This rule came to be known as the “Taylor rule”. The Taylor rule’s simplicity in intuition, 
ease in application and ability to closely fit the historical movements among the Federal 
Funds Rate, output and inflation in the United States, has since provided a foundation in 
thinking about the practice of monetary policy globally. Nonetheless, Taylor rules were 
only single equations which described the output-inflation tradeoff, and were not cohesive 
macroeconomic frameworks for application by central banks for policy inference. They 
were also often fitted retrospectively using statistical models and still could not account 
for structural changes in the economy, thus also making them vulnerable to the Lucas 
Critique. Since the monetarist regime was abandoned and due to the lack of a better 
alternative, major central banks such as the Federal Reserve Bank continued using their 
large-scale macro-econometric models (later ones incorporated versions of the Taylor 
rule) to forecast and conduct policy simulations. However, they were used as guides 
without full confidence (Gali & Gertler, 2007). 
2.3 The Taylor Rule in Macroeconomic Models 
The widespread acceptance of Taylor rules led to renewed efforts to embed it into more 
complete models that were more useful compared to existing large-scale macro-
econometric models for policy analysis. These efforts can be categorised as falling 
broadly into two main groups, whose progression occurred in parallel with each other: 
New Keynesian models (NKMs) and Vector Autoregression (VAR) based models.  
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2.3.1 New Keynesian Models 
NKMs are Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models and were initially 
developed in Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). The core 
of this framework is its general equilibrium structure similar to that of a Real Business 
Cycle1 (RBC) model, thus making it immune to the Lucas Critique. A key point of 
departure from RBC models is that the introduction of an explicit price setting mechanism 
and nominal rigidities meant that monetary policy was non-neutral in the short-run and 
could thus influence aggregate output and prices.  
The following key equations emerge from the benchmark model (Clarida et al., 1999): 
*/∗ 	= 		 01 +	02(E/*/52∗ ) +	07 !/ −	9/(/52 −	 !∗ +	:)	/	            (Equation 2.3) 
(/ 	= 	;1 +	;2*/∗ +	;7(E/(/52) + :'	/              (Equation 2.4) 
!/ 		= 		 <1 + 1 − 	> . <2(/ +	<7*/∗ + 	>. <?!/@2 +	:A	/            (Equation 2.5) 
The residuals εy t, επ t and εi t follow a particular process (often AR(1)) and are interpretable 
as shocks. E is expectations, y* is the output gap, π is inflation, i is the nominal interest 
rate and !∗ is the natural interest rate. Equation 2.3 is interpretable as a dynamic I-S 
equation. Equation 2.4 is an aggregate supply equation known as the New Keynesian 
Philips Curve, which differs from its traditional counterpart because inflation here is 
forward looking and the trade-off is between output and inflation, as opposed to 
employment as previously formulated. Equation 2.5 is an interest rate rule similar to the 
Taylor rule. ρ is a smoothing parameter that ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects the lag effect 
                                                
1 RBC models are DSGE models that attempt to explain business cycle fluctuations. These models posit that business cycles are 
efficient and generated by technology shocks as opposed to monetary factors, and are equilibrium models in the sense that prices 
adjust instantly in response to the shocks. This feature of RBC models, that markets always clear, meant there is no role for monetary 
policy in this framework.     
   17 
of past interest rate changes. A key feature of NKMs is that the key equilibrium 
relationships result from dynamic optimisation problems by representative economic 
agents. The model is then calibrated to the data for policy inference.  
The reference model characterised by equations (2.3)-(2.5) has since been extended. 
Perhaps the most natural extension was to develop an open-economy equivalent (De 
Paoli, 2009; Galí & Monacelli, 2005), in which the exchange rate, trade, the terms of trade 
and international financial markets are incorporated. Another extension is to add a 
backward looking variable for inflation (Gali & Gertler, 1999). This feature incorporates 
the intuition that economic agents set prices by observing past values. Other features have 
been added to the reference framework, although the two previously mentioned is the 
most widely accepted and validated. 
2.3.2 Vector Autoregression Models 
NKMs are fully specified models based on constructions of utility maximising behaviour 
of economic agents, which are then calibrated for policy analysis. Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) models reflect a different approach. Instead of starting with a theoretical model, 
VAR models start with data and seek to impose as few assumptions as needed to 
econometrically estimate the macroeconomic relationships. 
The main econometric issue in monetary policy analysis is how to account for the 
endogenous relationships between the policy instrument and inflation and output. 
Movements in the policy instrument are likely largely influenced by inflation and output, 
which themselves are also influenced by changes in monetary policy. Hence, simple 
correlations or reduced form regressions are almost certainly mis-specified and not 
suitable for statistical inference. Instead, it is necessary to identify “autonomous” 
monetary policy shocks and estimate how the variables of interest, usually inflation or 
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output, respond to these shocks. This led to the development of the Vector Autogression 
(VAR) methodology. 
Pioneered by Sims (1980), the underlying motivation was to reduce the number of 
restrictions that were necessary to structurally identify the parameters in large-scale 
macro-econometric models that were prevalent among central banks, such as the 
previously mentioned MIT-FRB model. His main contention was that a large number of 
the “a priori” restrictions were not sufficiently guided by theory. The following assertion 
was made in his seminal paper: 
“Many, perhaps most, of the exogenous variables in the FRB-MIT model…are 
treated as exogenous by default rather than as a result of there being good reason 
to believe them strictly exogenous. Some are treated as exogenous only because 
seriously explaining them would require an extensive modelling effort in areas 
away from the main interests of the model builders.” (Sims, 1980) 
In essence, VARs are multivariate counterparts to AR models. The latter is a single 
variable model in which it is a function of its lagged values. In comparison, VAR models 
are multivariate models where each variable is a function of its own lags and those of the 
other variables in the system. To derive the desired “shocks” that can be used to analyse 
the effects of policy, it is necessary to place assumptions, most commonly, on the 
contemporaneous relationships as suggested by Sims (1986), Bernanke (1986) and 
Blanchard and Watson (1984), or on assumptions of whether the shocks have long- or 
short-run effects (Blanchard & Quah, 1989). By placing these restrictions to identify the 
corresponding underlying structural models from the reduced-form VAR models, the 
resulting models have come to be known as Structural VARs (SVAR). 
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Many variants of VAR and SVAR models have since been developed. Similar to the 
progression of NKMs, a line of literature has pursued the development of VAR and SVAR 
models that are specifically structured for open-economies. These variants have 
necessitated the inclusion of additional variables that are of high relevance to open-
economies, such as the exchange rate, foreign interest rates, the global price level and 
external demand (in addition to the domestic ones). Selected references of more recent 
open economy VAR-based models include Cushman and Zha (1997), Kim and Roubini 
(2000), Genberg (2005) and Maćkowiak (2007). 
2.3.3 Incorporating Financial Factors into Models with Taylor Rules 
Over time, studies of monetary policy, in particular those that aim to analyse the role of 
financial markets in the transmission of monetary policy, have gradually incorporated 
other financial factors into the aforementioned macroeconomic models.  
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) extend the 
benchmark New Keynesian Model (NKM) to introduce a feature where the net worth of 
borrowers and imperfections in credit markets are central in determining output 
fluctuations and, hence, the behaviour of monetary policy. Within the NKM paradigm, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999;2001) and Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) 
(CGLW) analyse the potential welfare gains from central bank responses to equity prices. 
More recently, Christiano, Ilut, Motto & Rostagno (2010) calibrate a NKM and find that 
there are welfare benefits from expanding the standard Taylor rule to include credit. 
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) analyse the welfare benefits of adding credit and credit 
spreads to the Taylor rule. Simulations from their calibrated NKM indicate that there are 
welfare benefits from augmenting the Taylor rule to include credit spreads and, to a 
smaller extent, credit as well. More recent NKM-based studies, especially those after the 
GFC, also assess the role of housing market interactions on the business cycle and related 
monetary policy issues (Iacoviello & Neri, 2010; Paries & Notarpietro, 2008). 
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The development of VAR-based models in incorporating additional features of financial 
markets has also progressed in similar vein. While the majority of earlier studies on 
monetary policy analysis were premised on identification schemes around the simplified 
Taylor rule, it became common for studies to feature a richer presentation of financial 
markets through the inclusion of money, credit and asset prices (equity and property) in 
the model. This is reflected in the more recent VAR based studies, for instance, by 
Morsink and Bayoumi (2001), Bloom (2009), Bean et al. (2010) and Raghavan, 
Athanasopoulos, and Silvapulle (2009), to name a select few. 
2.3.4 Financial Stability and Crises in Macroeconomic Models 
Despite these advances in theory and empirical methodologies, one aspect of NKMs, 
VAR-based models and other macro models that has received insufficient attention is 
how financial stability conditions and financial crises are measured and integrated into 
the macro models.  
A reflection of the significant consequence of this shortcoming is that the forecasts 
generated by standard macro models during major financial episodes, such as the GFC, 
suffer from high forecast errors. This is highlighted in admissions of the inadequacy of 
existing forecasting methodologies by large institutions such as the OECD (2014), the 
Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank (Alessi, Ghysels, Onorante, Peach, 
& Potter, 2014) and the Bank of England (Stockton, 2012) during the GFC episode. In 
these “post-mortem” studies, the two key attributable factors cited were the failure of 
macro models to appropriately account for financial market conditions and the size of the 
feedback loops between financial conditions and the real economy (Alessi et al., 2014). 
Another reflection of inadequate incorporation of financial stability conditions in macro 
models was the lack of guidance on how monetary policy effectiveness was affected by 
the financial crisis. This led to both sides of the policy divide being taken with a lack of 
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convincing empirical evidence. For example, Mishkin (2009) argues that monetary policy 
was effective, indeed more so during crisis periods, because it lowers the chances of 
adverse feedback loops between deteriorating financial market conditions and real 
economic activity. In contrast, Bouis, Rawdanowicz, Renne, Watanabe, and Christensen 
(2013) postulate that monetary stimulus did not provide noticeable improvements to GDP 
growth because of a breakdown in the credit channel and the decline in the natural interest 
rate. The lower nominal interest rates from monetary policy easing thus did not translate 
to higher growth. Bech, Gambacorta, and Kharroubi (2014) also claim that lowering key 
policy interest rates during financial crises does not lead to higher growth, mainly because 
of a breakdown in the monetary transmission mechanism. These conclusions are arrived 
at largely through qualitative argument, reduced-form Taylor rule estimations with 
constant and time-varying natural interest rates, or pairwise correlations during crises and 
normal periods. 
Thus, before the GFC, there was a relative dearth of efforts to measure financial stability 
conditions explicitly, analyse how they influence aggregate growth dynamics and, 
importantly, how higher instability in financial markets affect monetary policy 
transmission and effectiveness. At best, financial crisis periods, which are special cases 
of financial stability conditions as it reflects unusually high levels of financial instability, 
are included as dummy variables. These shortcomings in current knowledge serve as the 
main motivation for this thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter explores three strands of literature to their current stages of 
development and highlights research opportunities that this thesis attempts to contribute 
to. A key underlying motivation of this research is to provide insight and tools that policy 
institutions such as central banks can use for policy guidance and macro-financial 
surveillance. The first literature explored pertains to how financial stability can be 
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measured in relatively high frequency (monthly or higher), so that such as indicators can 
be used to monitor financial stability conditions continuously as crises progress in 
severity, and from when they initially emerge in individual asset markets to when they 
become systemic. The second literature explored pertains to current knowledge of what 
drives financial stability cycles and the identification of early warning signals of 
impending financial crises. This knowledge informs as to what developments in the real 
sector and financial markets to monitor closely for financial stability surveillance and 
crises prevention efforts. The final line of literature that is explored for further 
development pertains to the macroeconomic effects of changes in financial stability 
conditions and how monetary policy transmission and effectiveness is affected during 
periods of financial instability. 
2.4 Measuring Financial Stability: The Financial Stress Index 
2.4.1 The Early Warning Indicators of Financial Crisis 
A precursor to appropriately incorporating financial stability conditions into mainstream 
macroeconomic models is the measurement of these conditions. The development of 
Financial Stress Indices (FSIs) reflects these efforts. FSIs were only recently developed, 
mainly after the GFC, as a complement to the literature on the Early Warning Indicators 
(EWIs) of financial crises. Broadly, EWI studies focus on predicting the onset of crises 
and discerning their determinants. However, they often treat the crisis variable as binary 
events - crisis or no crisis - and were concerned mainly with specific types of crises, such 
as balance of payments, sovereign debt or bank crises (Borio & Drehmann, 2009; Illing 
& Liu, 2006). This ignored historical evidence that financial crises often involved more 
than one market, which Laeven and Valencia (2008) find to be an unreasonable 
assumption2. For instance, the authors categorise financial crises as banking, currency or 
                                                
2 An except is Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), as they analyse the interactions between balance of payments and banking crises.  
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sovereign debt crisis and find that 42% of banking crises from 1970-2007 involved a 
crisis in at least one other category. Thus, though informative, the EWI literature was 
unhelpful for gauging the relative intensity of crises in the overall financial system, while 
incidents that were isolated to securities markets were often ignored. In addition, “near 
miss” episodes, when the degree of financial stress was not severe enough to be classified 
as crises, but were nonetheless widely acknowledged to have had macroeconomic 
consequences, are often ignored in this line of inquiry (Borio & Lowe, 2002). 
2.4.2 Current Financial Stress Indexes 
The development of FSIs reflects an attempt to address these limitations, especially after 
the GFC period. They are composite indices constructed from asset prices, which provide 
a synthetic measure of stress across the entire financial system and within specific asset 
markets. FSIs complement the EWI literature in that they can be used to identify 
incidences of financial crises, by defining crises as periods when the FSIs exceed pre-
determined thresholds. The markets that are covered in existing FSIs vary across studies, 
but often encompass the equity market, bond market, banking sector and foreign 
exchange market. Influential studies that construct FSIs are Illing and Liu (2006) for 
Canada, Hakkio and Keeton (2009) for the United States, Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Lall 
(2011) and Melvin and Taylor (2009) for 17 advanced economies and Balakrishnan, 
Danninger, Elekdag, and Tytell (2011) for 26 emerging economies. More have since been 
developed in other papers, for instance, by Yiu, Ho, and Jin (2010), Duca and Peltonen 
(2011), Tng, Kwek, and Sheng (2012) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014)3. 
                                                
3 Existing FSI studies have focused primarily on the empirical methodology to construct their respective indices. There is nonetheless 
an interpretation about the causes and consequences of movements in the FSI that can be drawn from asset pricing and macro-finance 
theories. The link to asset price theory stems from the fact that FSIs are constructed from asset prices. Conceptually, the price of a 
financial asset corresponds to the expected discounted payoff that the asset is expected to generate over time. In this formulation of 
the asset price, the discount factor is dependent on the risk-free rate of return and the risk premium of the asset. Importantly, the risk 
premium reflects aggregate macroeconomic risks that imply a correlation between asset prices and the business cycle – riskier assets 
have a higher tendency to perform badly amidst averse macroeconomic conditions. Indeed, financial assets (whose prices are often 
referred to as the “marginal value of wealth”) play crucial roles in the interpretation of key equilibrium conditions in dynamic 
macroeconomic models, such as the savings investment equation, the marginal rates of substitution to the marginal rate of 
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Constructing the index involves decisions of which variables and weighting method to 
use. The choice of variables depends on the characteristics of financial markets specific 
to the country of interest. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) points out that emerging markets 
tend to be susceptible to volatile currency movements from swings in capital flows, and 
thus pay more attention to reflect this aspect of stress by including a variable constructed 
from the exchange rate and foreign reserves in their emerging market FSIs. Meanwhile, 
Cardarelli et al. (2011) and Hakkio and Keeton (2009) include more securities market 
variables such as corporate bond spreads in their advanced economy FSIs. 
As for the weighting methods, there are three main options. The first and most popular is 
the variance-equal weights approach adopted from the currency crisis literature. This 
method is applied in Cardarelli et al. (2011), Melvin and Taylor (2009) and Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011). Here, the variables are standardised and added to obtain the overall FSI. 
This approach equalises the volatilities and weights of all the variables to prevent 
individual variables from dominating variation in the overall FSI. The second method 
derives weights by conducting principal component analysis on the variables. This is 
applied in Hakkio and Keaton’s (2009) FSI for the United States. This method involves 
deriving the weights such that the FSI accounts for as much of the total variation in the 
individual variables as possible. This implicitly assumes that financial stress is the 
common factor driving the co-movement among all the variables in the index. The final 
weighting method, suggested by Illing and Liu (2006), involves assigning weights that 
are proportionate to the size of financing of the stress measure’s representative markets. 
This approach is the most appealing as it establishes a direct link between financial stress 
                                                
transformation condition and how consumption and investment is allocated across time and states (Cochrane, 2005). In what follows 
in the remainder of this chapter and thesis, the review of existing studies and related discussions pertaining to the causes, linkages and 
consequences of financial stress are premised upon the concept that higher macroeconomic risk is associated with higher financial 
stress. A comprehensive review of these theoretical foundations and related discussions from the macro-finance literature can be found 
in Cochrane (2005), Cochrane (2008) and Cochrane (2016). 
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and the financial structure of the economy. For example, in this weighting scheme, 
financial stress in an economy where financing is dominated by bank credit is more 
sensitive to bank specific shocks relative to other shocks. Table 2.1 presents a summary 
of the variables, weighting schemes and samples in selected influential studies. 
2.4.3 Building on Existing FSIs for ASEAN-5 Economies 
Chapter 3 constructs FSIs for the ASEAN-5 economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand from 2007-20013. While this sample has already 
been covered in existing studies, for instance by Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Park and 
Mercado Jr (2014), there are contributions in the methodology. First, these studies have 
not explicitly measured stress in domestic debt markets, with the closest related coverage 
being stress in the sovereign debt market. Second, existing ASEAN-5 studies weight their 
indicators to construct the overall systemic FSI using either equal variance weights or 
through Principal Component Analysis (PCA). These weighting methodologies are not 
derived based on the characteristics of the sample economies’ real sector or financial 
markets. Having variance equal weights prevents movements by any individual indicator 
from dominating movements in the aggregate index, while the intuition from PCA-based 
indices are premised on an unobserved common factor that underpin the associated linear 
combination of the individual variables that capture the highest variation among the 
variables. The latter case is normally justified on the basis of herd behavior in markets 
and financial contagion, instead of economic fundamentals. Importantly, none of the FSIs 
have applied the most economically intuitive weighting method of constructing weights 
based on the financial structure of the economy. That is, the indicators that reflect stress 
in markets of larger significance in providing financing to the economic agents are given 
proportionately larger weights. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of FSIs from Early Studies 
Study Variables Weighting 
Scheme 
Sample 
Country 
Illing and Liu4 
(2006) 
Banking sector beta, exchange rate volatility-
loss (CMAX), covered Canada-U.S 90-day 
treasury spread, bid-ask spread on 90-day 
Canadian treasury bills, inverted term spread 
(average of 5 and 10-yr minus 90 day), stock 
market volatility-loss (CMAX) 
 
Credit, 
variance 
equal, 
principal 
component 
Canada 
Balakrishnan, 
Danninger, 
Elekdag and 
Tytell (2011) 
Banking sector beta, TED-spread (3-month 
labor minus 3-month treasury yield), inverted 
term spread, corporate bond spread, stock 
market returns (year-on-year change), stock 
market volatility (GARCH), real exchange 
rate volatility (m-o-m percent change) 
 
Variance 
equal 
17 
advanced 
countries 
Cardarelli, 
Elekdag and 
Lall (2010) 
Banking Sector beta, stock market returns (y-
o-y change), stock market volatility 
(GARCH), sovereign debt spread, exchange 
market pressure index (changes in exchange 
rate and reserves) 
 
Variance 
equal 
27 
emerging 
countries 
Hakkio and 
Keaton (2009) 
TED-spread, 2-year swap spread, off-the-
run/on-the-run 10-yr spread, Aaa/10-yr 
treasury spread, Baa/Aaa spread, high-yield 
bond/Baa spread, Consumer ABS/5-yr 
treasury spread, Negative value of correlation 
between stock and treasury returns, Implied 
volatility of overall stock prices (VIX), 
idiosyncratic volatility of bank stock prices, 
cross-dispersion of bank stock returns 
 
Principal 
component 
United 
States  
Melvin and 
Taylor (2009) 
Banking sector beta, TED spread, inverted 
term spread, corporate bond spread, time 
varying stock volatility, time varying real 
exchange rate volatility 
Variance 
equal 
17 
advanced 
economies  
 
                                                
4 The authors consider many variants for similar variables in their study. The ones listed are from their selected best performing 
variant, the “standard-variable credit-weighted” index.   
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2.5 The Sources of Financial Stress 
For policy institutions that utilise indices such as the FSIs for macroeconomic level 
surveillance of financial markets, a natural question that arises is “what drives movements 
in the FSI”. Put differently, what are the determinants underlying the changes in financial 
stability conditions. 
2.5.1 Early Warning Indicators of Financial Crisis 
Figure 2.1 presents a schematic of the factors that can cause movements in financial stress 
in open economies.  
 
  
Figure 2.1: Schematic of the Determinants of Financial Stress 
 
First, accumulated financial imbalances and structural vulnerabilities in the domestic 
economy tend to be precursors of financial crisis. Typical signs of such imbalances and 
vulnerabilities include high leverage, high asset prices, larger current account deficits, 
larger capital inflows and overvalued exchange rates5. A key finding is that financial 
                                                
5 Early influential studies in this strand include B Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, Dumas, and Weber (1995) and, Kaminsky, Lizondo, 
and Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004). See Frankel and Saravelos (2012) and 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) for recent discussions and further references on the early warning literature. Alessi and Detken (2011) 
is an exception as they also include global measures of liquidity in their assessment of early warning indicators.   
Exogenous external 
disturbances 
Domestic financial 
imbalances; Structural 
deficiencies 
Regional financial 
contagion 
Financial 
stress of 
small-open 
economy 
Trade & financial linkages 
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crises have a higher probability of occurring just after the boom phase of the business 
cycle against the backdrop of worsening macroeconomic fundamentals, with 
credit/monetary conditions looser on the eve of crises. A typical scenario depicts an over-
heating real economy financed by foreign credit and capital (portfolio and direct 
investment) inflows, as well as high domestic credit and asset prices during the boom 
phase. Real economic activity subsequently peaks and starts to moderate. An event then 
triggers a “sudden stop” in capital inflows causing the current account deficit to be 
unsustainable. This development, together with a credit crunch in domestic financial 
institutions and falling asset prices, causes real economic activity to slow substantially, 
usually due to a large prolonged investment slump to restore the internal-external 
balance6. 
2.5.2 Spillovers from External Financial Episodes 
In addition to domestic financial imbalances, financial cycles in small-open economies, 
such as the sample used in this thesis, are also influenced by external developments 
especially from major financial centres. In cases when financial shocks originate 
externally, the degree of spillover to other markets depends in part on trade and financial 
linkages between the economies7. A higher integration to the origin of the financial shock 
potentially increases the degree of stress transmission. Financial spillovers can also occur 
from non-fundamental reasons, such as herd behaviour among market participants. 
2.5.2.1 Trade Linkages 
The trade channel in driving financial spillovers has been extensively studied in existing 
literature. Chui, Hall, and Taylor (2004) and Balakrishnan et al. (2011) note that when 
                                                
6 See Reinhart and Tashiro (2013) for a discussion of the role of investment as an adjustment mechanism and its prolonged drag post-
financial crisis. See Calvo (1998) for an initial detailed description of sudden stops.   
7 See Cheung, Tam, and Szeto (2009)  for a review of the contagion literature. 
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trade shocks occur, the spillover effects in financial markets can occur before the real 
economy effects are visible. This is because the financial market effects reflect changing 
expectations by market participants of the real economy effects, while the direct effect of 
lower trade on growth occurs with a lag. The trade channel operates in two ways: First, 
an adverse external demand shock reduces the external economy’s income, which lowers 
its import demand and hence adversely affects its trade partners. Second, the trade channel 
may operate indirectly through competition with common export markets. For example, 
an exchange rate depreciation increases the economy’s export competitiveness relative to 
its competing exporters to common export destinations. Barry Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz (1996), Glick and Rose (1999), Forbes (2002) and Forbes (2004) find the 
significance for direct and indirect trade linkages. 
2.5.2.2 Financial Linkages 
Financial spillovers may also occur through linkages in financial markets, of which there 
are three major channels - bank, portfolio and direct investment. Essentially, a financial 
crisis in an economy causes a reduction in the supply of credit and capital to its destination 
economies. Garber and Grilli (1989), Valdes (1997) and Allen and Gale (2000) analyse 
international financial spillovers when financial institutions (e.g. banks and hedge funds) 
face liquidity shortages during crises. In efforts to raise liquidity within a short time span, 
many financial institutions are forced to sell assets from other countries at the same time. 
This triggers capital outflows in both portfolio securities and direct investments, and 
depresses asset prices and economic activity in the host countries. Similarly, banks facing 
crises are likely to reduce their exposures to higher risk loans, including loans to other 
countries. Another channel is through portfolio rebalancing by financial market 
participants where funds, especially leveraged funds, sell assets from other markets to 
raise liquidity to meet margin calls if the value of their collateral is sufficiently adversely 
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affected. In these scenarios, the participants often choose to reduce their portfolio risk 
exposures to emerging economies. 
2.5.2.3 Other Explanations 
Although trade and financial linkages have been studied extensively, they are insufficient 
to fully explain the propensity for financial crises to spread, as crises often trigger crises 
elsewhere despite weak trade and financial linkages (Cheung et al., 2009). For instance, 
Rose and Spiegel (2011) focus on the recent GFC episode and fail to find systematic 
evidence that trade and financial linkages between the US economy, the origin of the 
GFC, and other economies explain how the crisis spread from the US to elsewhere. 
One explanation is that in addition to trade and financial linkages, financial spillovers 
also result from behavioural aspects among financial market participants. In an 
environment of asymmetric information in which some investors possess more private 
information than others, it is optimal for less informed investors to follow those who are 
perceived to be better informed. The process in which expectations formation changes 
during the buildup of a financial crisis, when an increasing number of less informed 
investors start following a few “better informed” economic agents gives rise to herd 
behaviour in financial markets. 
The dynamics of financial spillovers arising from herd behaviour is perhaps best analysed 
through the lens of financial networks. This theory views financial markets as a vast and 
complex network, with individual institutions and markets connected at the regional and 
global scale. Haldane (2009) describes 3 properties of financial networks and their 
implications for financial stability: First, the health of the overall network, or systemic 
financial stability, exhibits a tipping point property that makes the system robust yet 
fragile. Risk in financial markets are adequately diversified when the level of connectivity 
between nodes of the network are below a threshold. When the level of connectivity 
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increases above the threshold, the impact of financial shocks is transmitted across nodes 
with positive feedback. In addition, the probability of adverse second round effects of the 
initial shock increases, thus threatening to set off a vicious cycle of stress transmission 
within the network. This causes eventual losses that are disproportionately large 
compared to the size of the initial shock. These dynamics are uncovered in the banking 
sector in simulation exercises conducted by Gai and Kapadia (2010). The second property 
is that the health of financial networks is robust to “random” shocks, but susceptible to 
targeted attacks. Finally, nodes within networks are organised into clusters, with key 
nodes within clusters that are connected to other clusters. 
Several implications emerge from these properties when ASEAN-5 financial markets are 
viewed as a cluster (henceforth, ASEAN cluster) within the global financial network8. 
The first is that the size of financial shocks and their origin (whether they originate from 
within or outside the cluster) are not the only determinants of the health of the ASEAN 
cluster. It also matters whether the cluster’s nodes are subjected to repeated adverse 
shocks, or targeted attacks. Furthermore, shocks that originate from outside the cluster 
are transmitted to the region through countries and asset markets that are most connected 
to the source of the shock. 
These implications seem to match the ASEAN-5 economies’ recent experiences in 
financial markets. Though the trigger of the AFC was arguably smaller than the GFC9, 
financial crises databases (for example, by Laeven and Valencia (2008)) indicate that 
there was substantially more instability in ASEAN-5 financial markets during  the AFC. 
                                                
8 Besides geographical similarities, this cluster is justified on grounds that the countries comprise a trading bloc via the ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (AFTA).     
9 Commonly agreed on triggers for the Asian Crisis and Global Crisis are, respectively, the devaluation of the Thai Baht and collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in the US.   
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This is likely because subsequent financial shocks during the AFC were targeted to nodes 
within the ASEAN cluster, whereas shocks during the GFC occurred outside the cluster 
and were not targeted directly to ASEAN financial markets.  
2.5.3 Regional Contagion 
The presence of herd behaviour and financial networks suggest strongly that financial 
stress can manifest through contagion at the regional level. Park and Mercado Jr (2014) 
find significant regional effects in the transmission of financial stress in emerging 
economies. This may be attributable to the regional economies sharing common creditors 
or being viewed as having similar macroeconomic risk profiles. Thus, shocks that trigger 
deleveraging by financial institutions, asset sell-offs and portfolio rebalancing by funds 
have regional, as opposed to country-specific effects. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 
(2003) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) study the financial crises in Latin American 
and Asian economies during the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, which episodes were 
contagious to other economies and why some crises were contagious and some were not. 
They find that financial crises tend to spread to other economies who shared a leveraged 
common creditor, including commercial banks, hedge funds and mutual funds. This is 
consistent with Frankel and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler 
(2004) who find that mutual funds were common actors in propagating the financial crises 
triggered by the currency devaluation in Mexico in 1994, which subsequently spread to 
Argentina and Brazil. Meanwhile, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2001) find that commercial banks were common creditors to the affected 
countries during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), as well as the subsequent Mexican and 
Russian crises for the latter study. Thus, regional financial contagion can arise when the 
source of the financial disturbance comes from a major financial centre, such as the GFC, 
or from an economy within the region, such as the AFC for the Asian economies. 
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2.5.4 Recent Investigations of Financial Spillovers using FSIs 
Prior to the development of FSIs, empirical studies in the EWI literature relied on 
identifying crisis episodes measured in binary nature - crisis or no crisis - which was 
identified using an event driven methodology. For example, Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
date the onset of banking crisis to be when there is “significant signs of financial distress 
in the banking system” and “significant banking policy intervention measures in response 
to significant losses in the banking system.” As mentioned earlier, a consequence of this 
event driven method of identifying financial episodes is that it misses periods marked by 
higher stress in financial markets but without systemic failures of financial institutions, 
currency runs or sovereign debt defaults. While not fitting the traditional definition of 
crises, such episodes are nonetheless significant if they had large adverse macroeconomic 
effects (Borio & Lowe, 2002). For instance, the US technology bubble burst in 2000-2001 
had adverse macroeconomic effects domestically and thus to the US economy’s 
trade/financial partners, but it is not considered a financial crisis in most financial crisis 
databases10.  
Another justification for focusing only on significant crisis episodes is that the 
determinants may differ compared to the “normal” phase of the financial cycle. This 
strategy is intuitive, as it seems reasonable to assume that the behaviour of economic 
agents differs during crisis periods. However, it raises the question of whether escalations 
of financial instability are attributable to significant movements in its determinants that 
are also able to explain financial stability conditions at normal levels. In addition, dating 
and identifying financial crises in the traditional manner limits country-level analysis of 
                                                
10 See Laeven and Valencia (2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for recent examples of databases of banking, debt and currency 
crisis.   
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financial spillovers in countries where crises have been rare, but still experience adverse 
financial episodes over time (Misina & Tkacz, 2009). 
To address these issues, recent studies have relied on FSIs to detect early warning 
indicators and uncover the drivers of financial stress. Studies by Balakrishnan et al. 
(2011), Misina and Tkacz (2009), Duca and Peltonen (2011) and Park and Mercado Jr 
(2014) are representative of these efforts. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) construct FSIs for 26 
emerging economies to investigate the transmission of financial stress from advanced to 
emerging economies. Using aggregated measures of financial stress in the advanced and 
emerging economies, they estimate a panel model of emerging market FSIs. Their panel 
model includes an advanced economy FSI, a set of common global determinants, 
financial stress in other emerging economies, trade and financial openness, and three 
variables that capture country-specific vulnerabilities to financial crisis, namely, the 
current account balance, fiscal balance and the level of foreign reserves. The authors find 
that common global financial and economic conditions play an important role in driving 
financial stress in emerging economies. Park and Mercado Jr (2014) extend Balakrishnan 
et al.’s (2011) panel analysis, by adding variables to capture regional and non-regional 
sources of financial stress in emerging economies. In addition to concurring with findings 
from Balakrishnan et al. (2011), the authors find the significance of financial stress from 
regional and non-regional emerging markets in influencing financial stress in emerging 
markets. 
Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014) find clear evidence of financial 
spillovers from advanced to emerging economies, while controlling for some domestic 
structural vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, these studies do not consider the role of economic 
and financial market imbalances that the early warning literature finds to be important 
precursors of financial crisis. Misina and Tkacz (2009) estimate linear and non-linear 
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threshold models to investigate if fast growth in asset prices and credit precede incidences 
of financial stress in Canada. An innovation of their study compared to Borio and Lowe 
(2002) is their use of an FSI, instead of a binary dependent variable11. Misina and Tkacz 
(2009) estimate their models using different permutations of credit and asset price 
measures. Their findings are consistent with Borio and Lowe (2002). Business credit 
appears as a reliable predictor of future financial stress in both linear and non-linear 
models12. Meanwhile, Duca and Peltonen (2011) use FSIs to evaluate the importance of 
external and domestic conditions in twenty-eight advanced and emerging economies. The 
authors identify periods when the FSI exceed the 90th percentile as “systemic events” and 
construct a binary variable to identify when such “systemic events” occurred. Using this 
as their dependent variable, the authors estimate discrete choice (logit) models with the 
domestic variables, foreign variables and both. A key result of their study is that the 
specification with the highest out-of-sample predictive power of high financial stress 
events includes both country-specific and common external variables. 
The studies by Balakrishnan et al. (2011), Misina and Tkacz (2009), Duca and Peltonen 
(2011) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014) have provided greater insight to what the drivers 
of financial stress are. Nonetheless, an area of concern is that many of the explanatory 
variables are likely to be endogenous with financial stress, with causality running in both 
directions. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014) attempt to reduce 
these concerns by lagging their variables by one year. In Chapter 4, the FSIs that are 
constructed in Chapter 3 are used to investigate the sources of financial stress in the 
                                                
11 In their assessment, Borio and Lowe (2002) measure credit conditions with total credit as a ratio of GDP. Misina and Tkacz (2009) 
consider a wider range of credit measures – growth of household credit, business credit and the ratio of total credit to GDP. There are 
more similarities in the definition of asset prices, except the latter study also include gold prices in Canadian dollars. 
12 See Cardarelli et al. (2011) and Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2010) for stylized features of the behaviour of credit, asset prices 
and financial crisis historically across a wide range of countries.  
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ASEAN-5 economies using a panel data methodology. This chapter pays particular 
attention to the potentially endogenous relationship between financial stress and its 
determinants. It explores in depth the extent of two-way causality and uses an 
instrumental variable methodology to control for endogeneity in the panel model of 
financial stress. 
2.6 Financial Stress, Real Economic Activity and Monetary Policy 
2.6.1 How Financial Stress Affects Real Economic Activity 
When financial instability escalates, among the most immediate concerns by the private 
sector and policy institutions alike are: How will economic activity be affected? As 
alluded to earlier, existing studies have yet to incorporate explicit measures of financial 
stability into mainstream macro models. Instead, two main methodological approaches 
are commonly taken in this context. 
The first approach centres on analysing stylised features of financial crises. This 
methodology entails identifying periods when financial crisis occurred13 and observing 
the behaviour of macroeconomic and financial aggregates before, during, and after the 
episode. Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008a) and Claessens et al. (2010) are selected recent studies in this vein. Claessens et 
al. (2010) compare macroeconomic conditions in 21 OECD countries during recessions 
associated with credit contractions, housing market busts and financial crises with other 
recessions14. Output losses during recessions that are associated with financial crises, 
credit contractions or housing busts are larger and take a longer time to recover when 
compared with other recessions. For instance, the average duration of recessions from 
                                                
13 This is usually done through referencing of existing studies or if they exceed thresholds in the magnitude of decline in asset prices 
such as equity or property. 
14 They define credit contractions and housing busts as declines that fall into the top quartile of their sample, and financial crises as 
episodes associated with substantial disruptions in the normal functioning of financial markets.   
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financial crises is approximately 2 quarters longer than recessions not associated with a 
financial episode. Hong et al. (2010) analyses the experiences of 21 Asian countries and 
find that recessions are more likely to occur and tend to be more severe in the face of 
large credit contractions and equity market declines. 
The second approach involves cross-section econometric estimations. Rather than 
measure financial conditions directly, these studies seek to account for the response of 
economic activity to indicators of macroeconomic and financial market vulnerabilities. 
Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack, and Walsh (2009), Blanchard, Das, and Faruqee (2010) and 
Kondor and Staehr (2011) are selected representative studies in this tradition. Blanchard 
et al. (2010) use this approach to estimate the impact of the GFC in 29 emerging markets. 
In their empirical model, they separate trade and financial channels. For trade, the authors 
use the share of exports to capture trade exposure and trade-weighted GDP growth. To 
isolate the impact of the crisis, they implicitly assume the crisis to be an “unexpected 
event.” This is done by adjusting the GDP variables on the left and right hand of their 
models by actual growth net of pre-crisis forecasts, as this transformation nets out the 
economic fundamentals that determined the pre-crisis path of GDP growth. Kondor and 
Staehr (2011) closely follow this methodology to analyse the experiences of the European 
Union countries during the GFC. Their estimations include more variables to capture a 
richer set of vulnerabilities such as fiscal health in addition to the trade and financial 
channels. In all of these papers, the time-frame of the estimations are isolated to the crisis 
period as an attempt to capture only the impact of the crisis15.  
                                                
15 The crisis period is taken to be 2009 in Berkmen et al. (2009), 2008-Q4 to 2009-Q1 in Blanchard et al. (2010) and 2008-Q3 to 
2009-Q3 in Kondor and Staehr (2011). 
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2.6.1.1 The Transmission Channels 
Despite the lack of an explicit measure of financial stability to infer the growth effects 
from adverse financial stability episodes, existing macroeconomic models nonetheless do 
shed some light on the transmission channels.  
(a) Access to Bank Credit 
A main channel in which financial stress affects real economic activity is through access 
to financing. Higher financial stress can lead to lower access to financing by firms and 
households as the economic outlook deteriorates and asset prices decline. This occurs 
through several mechanisms. From borrowers’ perspective, the financial accelerator 
mechanism posits that the external finance premium16 increases when an adverse 
financial shock leads to a decline in net worth as asset prices fall and the economic outlook 
deteriorates (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; Garber & Grilli, 1989). This happens because 
lenders perceive investments as riskier and have lower expected profits. The higher cost 
of funds then reduces access to desired financing and causes a decline in spending that is 
more persistent compared to the size of the initial shock. Meanwhile, the bank capital and 
bank lending channels emphasise the role of lenders. Adverse financial shocks erode 
banks’ capital base through lower profits, losses on existing loans and other assets on 
their balance sheets. This forces them to reduce lending (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992; 
Kashyap & Stein, 1995; Van Den Heuvel, 2002). This leads firms to reduce capital 
expenditures and households to reduce spending17. 
                                                
16 Defined as the difference in cost of financing an investment between internally and externally sourced funds.   
17 See Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) and Mendoza and Terrones (2008) for other selected examples of empirical studies 
that address the relationship between credit and real economy.  
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(b) Access to Equity Finance 
In equity markets, the Tobin’s q mechanism depicts how financial stress affects the cost 
of equity and suppresses economic activity (Tobin, 1969). This mechanism establishes a 
positive link between equity prices and capital investments by relating the market value 
of firms to the replacement cost of capital goods. Since equity prices decline during high 
stress episodes, the market value of firms relative to their cost of capital goods also 
declines. Firms therefore need to issue more equity relative to periods when their market 
value is higher. This depresses fund raising in equity markets and leads to a decline in 
investment expenditure. 
(c) Uncertainty 
Financial stress is also transmitted to the economy through higher uncertainty in financial 
markets and the economic outlook. Bloom (2009) studies the transmission of uncertainty 
through a reduced-form VAR model and a structural firm-level model of investment. 
Firms hire and invest when business conditions are above a certain level and fire and 
disinvest when business conditions are below a threshold. There is a range of business 
conditions where firms find it optimal to take no action. This region of inaction increases 
with the level of uncertainty. He finds a sharp fall, a rebound and an overshoot in 
employment, output and productivity18, and explains that hiring and investment initially 
fall rapidly as firms hold back on planned projects and adopt a wait-and-see approach. 
Lower employment and investment by higher productivity firms then cause a fall in 
productivity. As the uncertainty dissipates, firms react to pent-up demand for capital and 
labour, causing an overshoot in investment, employment and productivity. Consumer 
spending is also affected by uncertainty, as consumers delay spending amid uncertain 
                                                
18 For instance, industrial production falls rapidly for 4 months, rebounds after 7 months and subsequently overshoots before its effects 
gradually dissipates approximately 3 years after the uncertainty shock. 
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employment and wealth statuses. Lee, Rabanal, and Sandri (2010) estimate a three 
variable VAR and find that higher uncertainty leads to a hump-shaped decline in 
household wealth and consumption over approximately 2 years. Carrière-Swallow and 
Céspedes (2013) analyse the impact of uncertainty shocks on investment and private 
consumption in developed and emerging markets using a VAR model. The authors find 
notable differences between developed and emerging economies. In developed 
economies, they find that investment displays a similar dynamic as Bloom (2009). 
However, the response of investment in emerging economies is larger and there is no 
subsequent overshoot. For private consumption, the authors find that the impact in 
emerging economies is larger compared to developed economies. 
2.6.2 The Role of Monetary Policy and How Monetary Policy Transmission 
Changes during Episodes of Financial Instability 
Monetary policy is one of the major policy instruments that can influence real economic 
activity and prices in the short-run. Thus, when financial stress episodes escalate and 
growth starts to moderate, attention is often turned to the role of monetary policy to 
restore macroeconomic stability. What is the role of monetary policy when financial stress 
increases and the real economy slows? There is no conceptual agreement yet on whether 
a monetary policy regime that best promotes price and output stability should respond to 
financial stability. The question of whether financial factors should enter the monetary 
policy reaction function is still being debated19. 
One literature analyses the desirability for monetary policy to respond to asset prices and 
credit through NKMs. In a NKM with equity market cycles, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 
2001) find that a monetary policy rule based on inflation targeting is optimal for 
                                                
19 See Baxa, Horváth, and Vašíček (2013) for a more extensive review of this literature.  
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stabilising inflation and output This arises because stock market booms lead to stronger 
demand and higher inflation. It is therefore sufficient to consider the inflation forecast 
alone to set monetary policy once the informational content of asset prices in predicting 
inflation is incorporated20. Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) (CGLW) 
find, in contrast, that it is optimal for central banks to include equity prices in their policy 
reaction function. A key departure in the underlying assumptions from Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999, 2001) is that the central bank has information on whether the equity prices 
are driven by fundamentals and the timing of the bubble burst. More recently, Christiano 
et al. (2010) find that there are welfare gains from expanding the Taylor rule within a 
NKM to include credit. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) analyse the benefits of adding credit 
and credit spreads to the Taylor rule within a NKM. They show that there are economic 
benefits to augmenting the Taylor Rule with credit spreads and, to a smaller extent, credit 
as well. 
One of the highlighted pitfalls of a monetary policy approach that responds only to 
inflation is that past experiences reveal that asset price booms are not always inflationary. 
This is pointed out, among many others, by Borio and Lowe (2002), Bordo and Wheelock 
(2004) and Christiano et al. (2010). For example, Borio and Lowe (2002) find three 
stylised features of financial imbalances - rapid asset price increases, fast credit 
expansions and above average capital accumulation. The authors also provide evidence 
from many financial crises that inflation does not systematically increase during the build-
up to financial crises or unwinding of lending booms, but are deflationary thereafter. This 
feature induces an asymmetry among the financial cycle, inflation and monetary policy. 
Specifically, monetary policy stays unchanged during the build-up of financial 
                                                
20 Despite their strong stance against systematic reactions to asset prices, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) caveat that this does not preclude 
short-term monetary policy interventions during periods of financial instability.  
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imbalances because there is no inflation, but is loosened aggressively after the onset of 
the crisis due to deflationary pressures. The major pitfall is that because the monetary 
policy stance was not tightened earlier in the financial cycle, there is subsequently less 
space in how much monetary easing the central bank can do, at least in its conventional 
instrument. Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004) thus advocate explicit consideration of 
financial imbalances when setting monetary policy. 
Despite the lack of intellectual consensus, there is evidence that many central banks do 
respond to financial factors in practice. A survey of over ninety central banks in both 
advanced and emerging economies reveal a significant positive correlation between 
monetary policy and financial stability concerns, including financial sector solvency, 
credit rationing and asset price volatility (Roger & Sterne, 2000). Studies have also 
estimated the monetary policy reaction functions of central banks to search for indications 
of explicit attention to financial factors. Borio and Lowe (2004) estimate several 
permutations of the monetary policy reaction functions for the United States, Germany, 
Australia and Japan. They start with a standard Taylor rule specification and gradually 
add three measures of financial imbalances - the credit gap, equity price gap and a dummy 
variable capturing banking sector stress. Their results reflect variations in the reaction 
functions across countries. The German central bank paid little attention to financial 
imbalances in its monetary policy decisions. In Australia, the equity and credit gaps are 
jointly significant predictors of monetary policy movements. In Japan, there is evidence 
that monetary policy responds asymmetrically to credit and equity gaps, more when the 
gaps are negative. In the United States, the study also finds evidence that the Federal 
Reserve responds asymmetrically to financial imbalances. Policy interest rates are more 
responsive to negative credit and equity gaps than positive gaps. 
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More recently, Baxa et al. (2013) test the significance of financial stress in interest rate 
decisions using a time-varying specification of monetary policy in five advanced 
economies (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Sweden). The authors 
find that central banks tend to be unresponsive to financial stress at low and normal levels, 
but often ease their policy rates in response to higher financial stress, in particular, to 
equity and bank related financial stress. 
2.6.3 Utilising FSIs to Measure Interactions in the Real Economy, Financial 
Instability and Monetary Policy  
Since the development of FSIs began after the GFC episode, studies have started to 
incorporate FSIs into VAR-based models predominantly to assess how financial stress 
influences monetary policy behaviour and effectiveness, and to assess the various 
linkages between financial stress and the real economy. Representative studies are Li and 
St-Amant (2010), Davig and Hakkio (2010), Hollo, Kremer and Duca (2012), Mallick 
and Sousa (2013), Roye (2011), Afonso, Baxa, and Slavík (2011), Park and Mercado Jr 
(2014) and Kremer (2015). Although the specific FSIs used in these studies differ, all 
reflect stress in financial markets through a combination of declining and volatile asset 
prices and higher bond yields/spreads.  
Li and St-Amant (2010) estimate a threshold VAR for Canada with a FSI, GDP growth, 
inflation and the real overnight policy rate. Their goal is to analyse the role of financial 
stress as a source of non-linearity among the other macro-relationships. They find that 
when they characterise the economy as being in two possible states - low and high stress 
- monetary policy changes increase the likelihood of transitioning between these states. 
They also find that monetary policy is more effective in the high-stress regime.  
Davig and Hakkio (2010) estimate a broadly similar regime switching model for the US 
economy, using a FSI and an index of economic activity. The authors find that in the low-
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stress regime, the impact of higher financial stress in lowering economic activity is 
modest. However, the impact increases substantially when the regime switches into the 
high-stress (distressed) regime. Hollo et al. (2012) construct a FSI, called the Composite 
Indicator of Systemic Stress in their paper, for the euro area. They then estimate a 
threshold VAR model with the FSI and growth of industrial production, using the FSI as 
their threshold variable. In line with Davig and Hakkio (2010), they find that industrial 
production experiences a much larger decline to financial stress shocks in the high stress 
regime compared to the low stress regime. 
Mallick and Sousa (2013) estimate a Bayesian Structural VAR and a VAR model with 
sign restrictions, and find that higher financial stress leads to lower output and a decline 
in the monetary policy interest rate. Roye (2011) estimate Bayesian VAR models for 
Germany and Euro Area using the FSI, GDP, inflation and a short-term interest rate as 
variables. He finds that higher financial stress leads to a decline in output and inflation.  
Most existing studies in this literature have tended to focus on either the US economy or 
Euro Area economies. This is not surprising given that recent episodes of financial stress 
originated from those areas in the form of the GFC and the later euro debt crisis. More 
recent studies covering Asian and other emerging economies, such as Tng (2013) and 
Park and Mercado Jr (2014), estimate VAR models to analyse financial spillovers from 
advanced to emerging economies. Thus far, none of the analyses have focused on the 
interactions between financial stress, the real economy and monetary policy. Chapter 5 
explores these inter-linkages further for the case of the ASEAN-5 economies from an 
estimated SVAR model with an open-economy structure. Specifically, this analysis 
focuses on the impact of financial stress on the real economy, how this transmission 
occurs and, finally, how financial stress alters monetary policy transmission. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In the effort to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability, having the appropriate 
surveillance tools and a sound understanding of the linkages within financial markets and 
between financial markets and the real economy are of upmost importance. To restore 
financial and macroeconomic stability during times of elevated financial stress, 
knowledge of how policy effectiveness changes is critical.  
This survey chronicles the modelling efforts that have taken place from a historical 
perspective. Knowledge of past efforts is pertinent to understand why macro models have 
evolved to their current state and so that past modelling mistakes are not made again. As 
illustrated in this survey, despite the voluminous efforts in these broad fields, there are 
areas that can benefit from further analysis. In particular, the incorporation of a measure 
of financial stress into macro models seems like a fruitful path going forward to better 
understand the effects of financial instability on macroeconomic stability and how major 
policy instruments’ effectiveness change during such periods. This survey identifies three 
specific knowledge gaps that this thesis pursues. 
The first area pertains to the measurement of financial stress. The second area of inquiry 
pertains to the sources of financial stress across the entire financial cycle, instead of just 
crisis periods. The final area of inquiry is in the linkages among financial stress, real 
economic activity and the transmission of monetary policy.  
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 :  THE MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL STRESS IN ASEAN-5 
ECONOMIES21 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a methodology to measure financial stability conditions by 
constructing indices reflecting stress in specific asset market segments and at the systemic 
level for the ASEAN-5 economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Called Financial Stress Indices (FSIs), the indices are a natural extension from 
the approach most commonly used in financial crisis studies, in which the crisis variable 
is binary in nature - “crisis” or “no crisis”. By presenting financial stress on a continuous 
scale in index form, the FSIs can be used to measure the relative severity of past crises 
and as a benchmark for emerging crises.      
Individual indicators of financial stress are constructed from asset prices to build a set of 
market-specific FSIs to gauge stability conditions in the banking sector, equity market, 
foreign exchange market, domestic bond market. The market-specific FSIs are then 
weighted according to the markets’ relative importance as a source of finance to the 
economy. Low and high values reflect, respectively, buoyancy and distress in financial 
markets. Periods with values above a pre-defined threshold are defined as periods of 
financial stress. Compared to existing ASEAN-5 FSIs, most notably from Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014), the FSIs constructed here incorporate an 
additional indicator of stress from the domestic bond market and a new weighting 
methodology that weights the stress indicators proportional to the financing size of the 
matching asset market.  
                                                
21 The main findings from this chapter has been published as Tng et al. (2012). 
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To present the results, the FSIs are used to document and compare stylised facts of 
financial episodes in the region. This includes the frequency, duration and magnitude of 
stress episodes, and the contribution of individual market segments to overall financial 
stress during such episodes. The FSIs are subsequently used to examine how historical 
financial episodes unfold across markets and countries from a regional perspective. This 
is done by analysing the extent of clustering in the peaks of the FSIs and the proportion 
of countries under financial stress in each of the markets at any point in time. By matching 
periods when the peaks cluster and the onset of financial stress to well-known financial 
events, stress episodes are identified as regional and global episodes. 
The remaining paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the methodology and 
describes how episodes of financial stress are identified. Section 3.3 presents the results, 
including stylised statistics of financial stress episodes and a discussion of the features of 
identified episodes from country-specific, regional and global perspectives. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
FSIs are constructed for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
(ASEAN-5). The sample period ranges from January 1997 to December 2013. This period 
covers notable regional and global episodes such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 
1997, the U.S. technology bubble burst (tech bust) in 2000 and the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) in 2007. 
The FSIs are in monthly frequency. S&P Emerging Market Indices (S&P/IFCG) are used 
as the benchmark stock market indices, except for Singapore where the Straits Times 
Index is used. These series are extracted from the World Bank’s Global Economic 
Monitor (GEM) database. Banking sector stock indices are sourced from Haver and 
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Bloomberg. In cases where banking sector indices are not available, the finance sector 
indices are used. Treasury yields are collected from International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) and the individual central bank websites. Foreign reserves (excluding gold) and 
bilateral exchange rates are also from the IFS. Singapore’s Nominal Effective Exchange 
Rate (NEER) is from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The variables used to 
compute the weights to construct the overall FSIs are from the BIS, IFS and World 
Federation of Exchanges. Appendix A contains a detailed description of the data used and 
their sources.   
3.2.2 Constructing the Financial Stress Index 
An overall FSI and 4 market specific FSIs are constructed for each ASEAN-5 economy 
to measure overall financial stress and stress in the banking sector, equity market, foreign 
exchange market and domestic bond market. The methodology for the overall FSI is 
broadly similar to Balakrishnan et al. (2011), with 2 key departures: First, an interest rate 
volatility indicator is used to reflect stress in the domestic bond market. This market has 
not been accounted for in existing emerging market FSIs. Secondly, the market-specific 
FSIs are weighted based on the relative sizes of their corresponding financing markets, 
instead of the equal weights approach by Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Yiu et al. (2010) 
or the principal component analysis based weights as in Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and 
Park and Mercado Jr (2014). In doing so, the impact of financial stress from specific 
markets at the systemic level is tied to the level of stress emanating from the market itself 
and to the financial structure of the economy, specifically, the liability side of the 
economy’s balance sheet. Financial stress that originates from larger financing markets 
will therefore have a proportionately larger impact on overall financial stress. 
Financial stress is defined as a period when the financial system’s intermediating 
functions are impaired which causes a decline in the supply of financing. Financial stress 
is associated with 3 attributes. First, is an increase in expected losses on risky assets. This 
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is reflected by declines in the prices of risky assets and occurs during periods of stress as 
market valuations on financial assets are lowered in accordance with lower expected cash 
flows and higher risk aversion. The second feature of stress is increased uncertainty in 
financial markets. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) differentiates the types of uncertainty into 
uncertainty over the fundamental value of assets, uncertainty over the behaviour of other 
investors and asymmetric information. This facet of stress manifests as volatility spikes 
in asset prices. The final feature of stress is increased demand for safe and liquid assets. 
This occurs as risk appetite falls and causes investors to reduce their holdings of risky 
assets in exchange for safe and liquid assets. This final feature of stress is reflected by 
volatile increases in sovereign bond prices and volatile declines in the prices of risky 
assets. 
The indicators used to construct the FSIs are derived from asset prices and bond yields. 
This means that the indices rely on the informational content of asset prices to reflect 
stress and are thus agnostic about their sources. The following 4 sub-sections describe the 
variables in detail. 
3.2.2.1 Construction of the Financial Stress Indicators 
(a) Banking Sector  
The banking sector index comprises of two variables that measure returns and volatility 
in the sector. They are defined as: 
B = CDE(F,H) EIJ(H)                (Equation 3.1) 
KLM_KLO = (100 +H) (100 + F)               (Equation 3.2) 
b and m are year-on-year percentage returns in the bank equity index and overall 
benchmark equity index. B reflects the level of volatility in the returns of bank stocks 
relative to the overall equity market. The covariance and variance are calculated over a 
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rolling one-year period. KLM_KLO measures returns in bank stocks relative to overall stock 
market returns. Higher values in both variables reflect higher uncertainty and lower 
returns in bank related equities relative to the overall market, thus indicating increased 
stress in the banking sector. 
(b) Equity Market 
The equity market index contains two variables that measure returns and volatility. They 
are year-on-year returns and the conditional variance from a GARCH22 (1,1) model of 
monthly stock market returns23. The returns are multiplied by -1, so that lower returns 
indicate higher stress. 
(c) Foreign Exchange Market 
Foreign exchange stress is measured by an index of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP). 
This index follows from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Balakrishnan et al. (2011), 
and is defined as: 
9PQ = R@STUT − V@SWUW                           (Equation 3.3) 
e and r are month-on-month changes in the nominal exchange rate and foreign reserves 
excluding gold. XR and XY are the means of e and r. ZR and ZY are standard deviations of 
e and r. The US dollar is used as the reference currency, as suggested by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005). Foreign exchange stress is thus reflected by faster exchange rate 
depreciations and depletion of foreign reserves. 
                                                
22  Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
23 The conditional mean equations are estimated as ARMA processes with lags selected based on the Schwarz criteria.    
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(d) Domestic Bond Market 
As previously mentioned, a characteristic of financial stress is increase demand for safe 
and liquid assets as investors adjust their portfolios away from risky assets. Government 
bonds usually assume the role of safe and liquid assets. This implies that volatile declines 
in their yields should occur during stress episodes. However, two issues arise within the 
context of this sample. First, government bond yields, particularly short-term treasuries, 
which is the only bond market data available for all countries during the period under 
study, are heavily influenced by monetary policy. This means that in addition to a higher 
demand for government bonds, volatile decreases in yields also reflect the deliberate 
easing of monetary policy. Secondly, treasury yields may increase if interest rates are 
raised to support the depreciating exchange rates, as was done by several ASEAN-5 
economies during the AFC. Furthermore, treasuries in countries in the midst of balance-
of-payments or debt crises carry substantial credit and foreign exchange risks that cause 
yields to increase, not decrease as if they were regarded as safe assets. 
Addressing these issues require distinguishing between movements in yields due to 
monetary policy influences and movements due to shifts in market sentiments. Following 
from Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010), this study uses 
overnight interbank interest rates as proxies of monetary policy and regresses treasury 
yields on interbank interest rates. The residuals from the regression are then used to 
construct the stress indicator, which is defined as the 12-month rolling standard deviation 
of the residuals. Doing so purges the informational content of monetary policy from 
treasury yields, as the residuals represent only the yield dynamics that are uncorrelated 
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with monetary policy24. A variable measuring returns is excluded from the bond market 
FSI because of the directional ambiguity of sovereign yields under financial stress. 
3.2.2.2 Forming the Financial Stress Indices 
All indicators are standardised prior to aggregation by subtracting them with their means 
and dividing them with their standard deviations. The market specific FSIs are simple 
averages of the standardised variables pertaining to their respective markets. The overall 
FSIs are weighted averages of the market specific FSIs. The weights are constructed to 
reflect each market’s share in the aggregate financial structure of the economy. Banking 
sector financing, or bank credit, is measured using domestic bank loans, equity finance is 
reflected by market capitalisation, foreign currency finance is calculated as the sum of 
international bonds and external loans. Finally, the size of the domestic bond market is 
measured by the sum of local currency denominated private and sovereign bonds. The 
weights are updated on a quarterly basis to account for changes in the financing profiles 
of the economies. A summary of the weights is displayed in Table 3.1.  
The shares are presented as averages over the period specified for each country. The 
figures reflect two key trends in the ASEAN-5’s financial structure. Firstly, there is a shift 
away from a reliance on foreign sources of financing. This is observed especially in 
external loans but also for international bonds to a smaller extent as well, as the decline 
in financing shares in the former tended to be much larger compared to the later. 
Secondly, there is a shift in the source of financing away from the banking sector towards 
domestic capital markets, as reflected by the decline in shares from banking sector loans 
and increasing shares in either the equity market, domestic bond market or both. Overall, 
                                                
24 This is done for all the countries with the exception of Singapore as its monetary policy is conducted via the exchange rate. In its 
case, the variable is computed as the rolling 12-month standard deviation in the treasury yield.    
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the banking sector and equity market have historically and remain the two largest sources 
of finance in all sample countries. This weighting method, originally proposed by Illing 
and Liu (2006), possesses several advantages. The resulting overall FSIs are driven by 
changes in the financial structure as well as movements in market specific stress. 
Furthermore, allowing for variability in the weights across countries and time means that 
the overall FSIs are adaptive to the diversity in the financial structure across countries as 
well as its changes over time. 
Table 3.1: Financial Structure in ASEAN-5 Economies 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations 
  Average Share of Total Financing (%) 
    1997-2004 2005-2013 1997-2013 
Banking Sector Indonesia 37.0 31.3 34.0 
Malaysia 33.7 29.7 31.6 
The Philippines 32.8 25.8 29.1 
Singapore 23.3 20.4 21.7 
Thailand 58.2 40.8 49.0 
Equity Market Indonesia 19.1 38.1 29.1 
Malaysia 36.2 35.9 36.0 
The Philippines 23.2 34.9 29.4 
Singapore 25.3 38.0 32.0 
Thailand 17.8 28.4 23.4 
Domestic 
Bonds 
Indonesia 17.8 17.8 17.8 
Malaysia 20.3 26.1 23.4 
The Philippines 18.7 20.1 19.4 
Singapore 4.9 6.4 5.7 
Thailand 8.0 25.6 17.3 
External Loans Indonesia 20.1 7.9 13.6 
Malaysia 5.2 3.9 4.5 
The Philippines 10.2 6.2 8.1 
Singapore 43.6 31.0 36.9 
Thailand 11.5 3.7 7.4 
International 
Bonds 
Indonesia 6.0 5.0 5.4 
Malaysia 4.7 4.4 4.5 
The Philippines 15.1 13.0 14.0 
Singapore 3.0 4.3 3.7 
Thailand 4.4 1.6 2.9 
   54 
3.2.3 Identifying Incidences of Financial Stress 
Having built the FSIs to monitor financial stress on a continuous scale, a practical 
consideration is how they can be used to identify what levels of stress are high enough to 
warrant closer attention. Two options are available: The first option is to use past crises 
as reference points. Here, values of the FSIs that are above the level observed on a chosen 
date are classified as “stressful”. The second option is to apply a statistical criterion to set 
a threshold. This is done by either choosing values above a set number of standard 
deviations above the mean or values that fall within a chosen percentile range. 
In both cases, a trade-off exists when setting the threshold. A high threshold increases the 
risk of missing out on less severe but nonetheless financially stressful periods. For 
example, setting the threshold for ASEAN countries at levels observed during the AFC 
period poses such a risk since most of them suffered their most severe banking and 
currency crises in recent history during that period. Meanwhile, setting the threshold too 
low will result in many false alarms. 
This analysis uses an 80th percentile threshold to identify incidences of financial stress. 
In comparison, Hakkio and Keeton (2009) use a 90th percentile cut-off for their US FSI. 
A less sensitive 80th percentile cutoff is chosen in this analysis because financial market 
volatility tends to be higher in emerging economies. This is noted in Patel and Sarkar 
(1998) when measuring and analysing equity market crises. In similar vein, Cardarelli et 
al. (2011) use a 1 standard deviation above the underlying trend as a threshold for their 
sample of developed economies, while Balakrishnan et al. (2011) use a less sensitive 
threshold of 1.5 standard deviations above the average for their sample of emerging 
economies.  
The percentile method of computing the threshold is preferred to the others as it is less 
sensitive to extreme values compared to the standard deviation method, and does not 
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require subjectively selecting a reference event for each country as “stressful”. To avoid 
double counting similar stress episodes, those occurring within a 3-month window are 
considered as the same episode25. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Stylised Characteristics of Financial Stress in the ASEAN-5 
Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.5 illustrate the FSIs for the ASEAN-5 economies from January 
1997 to December 2013, beginning with the overall FSIs and followed by the market FSIs 
for the banking sector, equity market, foreign exchange market and domestic bond 
market. Table 3.2 reports the frequency and duration of stress episodes across countries. 
Broadly, the figures and table show that periods of higher financial stress centre around 
3 periods, corresponding to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997, the technology 
bubble burst (tech bust) in 2000-2001 and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007-
2009. As expected, the FSIs rose to their highest levels and remained at “high stress” 
levels (above the 80th percentile threshold) the longest during the AFC period (Figure 3.1 
and Table 3.2). Trends among the country level overall FSIs broadly coincide with each 
other. A visual inspection of the overall FSIs reflects a similarity in the relative severity 
of the aforementioned episodes, in terms of magnitude and duration. The AFC is the most 
severe in magnitude and duration. Perhaps surprisingly, the tech bust ranks above the 
GFC in magnitude and duration in all countries except Singapore, which recorded a 
                                                
25 Defining “stress” episodes premised on setting thresholds in the indices is lends to a conceptual distinction in interpretation 
compared to how a “crisis” is identified in the financial crisis literature.  The financial crisis literature relies, in large part, on public 
sector bailouts to identify banking crises. For instance, Laeven and Valencia (2012) identify a banking sector crisis to be when there 
is “…significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system.” This definition lends 
to an interpretation of solvency or liquidity related stress from the banks’ balance sheet point of view, and is a useful indicator for 
decisions on whether and when bailouts are needed. On the other hand, the FSIs rely on indicators constructed from asset prices to 
reflect stress. They therefore reflect the financial stress as perceived by market participants. It is intuitive for market participants to 
perceive reduced stress on the banking system, even as many banks are facing solvency or liquidity problems if markets expect banks 
to receive a bailout. 
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higher magnitude of financial stress but over a shorter duration during the GFC compared 
to the tech bust. 
 
Figure 3.1: Financial Stress in the ASEAN-5 Economies 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: Shared areas indicate periods under financial stress 
Figure 3.1: Continued 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 3.2: Banking Sector Stress 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 3.3: Equity Market Stress 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 3.4: Foreign Exchange Market Stress 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 3.5: Bond Market Stress 
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Table 3.2: Duration and Frequency of Financial Stress 
  
Indonesia Malaysia The 
Philippines 
Singapore Thailand Average 
No. of Episodes 5 4 7 11 6 6.6 
Avg. Duration 
(Months) 
8.2 10.3 6.0 3.7 6.8 7.0 
Months Under Stress During Selected Financial Episodes 
AFC 20 26 20 15 21 20.4 
Tech bust 15 13 12 11 17 13.6 
GFC 2 1 6 7 2 3.6 
Other Episodes 4 1 3 8 1 3.4 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: Periods corresponding to the AFC, tech burst and GFC are 1997-1998, 2000-2001 and 2008-2009. Episodes that overlap with 
these periods before start or after the end dates are counted as the same episode. 
 
A total of 33 stress episodes occurred across all 5 sample countries over the period 
studied. On average, each country experienced between 6-7 episodes each lasting 7 
months long, although the duration is skewed by the AFC. Singapore experienced the 
highest number of episodes, 9, although the episodes also subsided the quickest; the 
opposite is true for Malaysia with only 4 episodes each lasting an average of 10.3 months. 
Aside from the three aforementioned notable financial episodes, the sample countries also 
experienced other more minor episodes. This reflects the fact that although financial stress 
episodes tend to possess regional (e.g. AFC) or global (e.g. GFC, tech bust) 
characteristics, idiosyncratic country-specific factors can also trigger higher stress in 
domestic financial markets. Nonetheless, the results suggest that such country-specific 
episodes tend to be relatively minor in amplitude and duration, especially when they 
remain isolated. 
3.3.2 A Historical Perspective of Financial Episodes 
This section recasts the experiences of the ASEAN-5 economies during the AFC, tech 
bust and GFC, when there was a notable synchronicity in the peaks of the FSIs. Figure 
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3.6 provides a succinct summary of the distinctions of these episodes in terms of the 
sources of stress. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 3.6: Contribution of Market Segments to Overall Financial Stress across 
Financial Episodes (Share, %) 
 
Financial stress during the AFC episode was mainly attributable to stress in the banking 
sector and foreign exchange market, each contributing shares of 32.0% and 30.9% of 
overall financial stress. Using the financial crisis database by Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
as a reference, this is consistent with the literature that, with the exception of Singapore, 
the ASEAN-5 economies all suffered from banking and currency crises during this 
episode. The banking sector also contributed the highest share to the increase in financial 
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stress during the tech bust period (2000-2001), with a share of 36.9%. However, it is noted 
that in many cases, the ASEAN-5 banking system had either just completed or was in the 
midst of restructuring as financial stress had just started to normalise after the AFC. 
Financial stress among the ASEAN-5 economies during the GFC was driven 
overwhelmingly by stress in equity markets, whose contribution of 35.6% was 
substantially higher than the next highest share of 26.0% from the banking sector. 
The remaining narrative is complemented by Figure 3.7 and Table 3.3. Figure 3.7 
provides a measure of synchronisation of financial stress in the region, by depicting the 
proportion of countries that are under stress. Table 3.3 presents the dates of peaks in the 
individual market and overall FSIs during the periods specified. The lower panel of the 
table shows when global peaks occurred. 
3.3.2.1 The AFC (1997-1998) 
Of the 3 financial episodes, financial stress during the AFC was by far the most severe. 
This episode lasted the longest, an average of 20.4 months, was the highest in magnitude, 
and encompassed stress in all markets. The crisis began with stress in foreign exchange 
markets after Thailand floated its Baht in July 1997 and peaked in late 1997. Stress in the 
banking sectors and foreign exchange markets emerged concurrently, but stress in banks 
generally lasted longer as the peaks in financial stress in most of the countries and the 
period when the stress subsided occurred after those from foreign exchange markets. 
Equity market stress intensified only in late 1997 as the crisis first spread from South East 
Asia to other developed Asian countries, then to the rest of the world (Sheng, 2009). 
Indeed, equity market stress in all countries peaked in the second half of 1998, often 
towards the end of the year, in the midst of turmoil in international financial markets, 
notably with the Russian crisis in August 1998 that prompted the collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) in the United States and a crisis in Brazil in September 
1998 (Table 3.3). Thus, the FSIs depict the AFC as a twin banking and currency crisis 
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that ended with stress in equity markets as the crisis transformed from a regional to an 
international crisis. The peaks in the FSIs also seemed to coincide with key country 
specific events. Focusing on the 3 most impacted countries: Thailand’s peak in August 
1997 coincides with its agreement with the IMF on 20th August 1997 for a US$17 million 
rescue package. Indonesia’s peak in January 1998 occurred when its president signed the 
country’s second agreement with the IMF on 15th January 1998 and the assets and 
liabilities of the country’s incorporated banks were guaranteed (26th January). Malaysia’s 
peak in January 1998 occurred as its ringgit fell to a record low and blanket guarantees 
on deposits were announced (20th January 1998). It is also worth noting that Malaysia’s 
FSI spiked in October 1998 after a period of moderating financial stress shortly after 
capital controls (1st September) and a peg on the ringgit (2nd September) were surprisingly 
imposed in September 1998, with further clarification notices published throughout 
September and October by the central bank26. 
3.3.2.2 The Tech Bust (2000-2001) 
Financial stress in the ASEAN-5 economies during this period lasted an average of 8.4 
months. There is a large variation in the peaks of the FSIs during this episode, occurring 
as early as April 2000 in Thailand, as late as May 2001 in Malaysia and Singapore and in 
October 2000 in Indonesia and the Philippines. This period roughly corresponds with the 
tech bust in the US economy when large declines in technology related stock prices 
occurred, with the NASDAQ composite index falling by over 50% by the end of 2000 
after peaking on 10th March 2000.    
  
                                                
26 The clarification of the control measures are published on Bank Negara Malaysia’s website. 
   66 
 
Sources: Author’s Calculations 
Figure 3.7: Proportion of Countries under Financial Stress 
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Table 3.3: Local and Global Peaks in Financial Stress 
  Bank Equity 
Foreign 
Exchange Bond Overall 
AFC & LTCM Collapse (1997-1999) 
Indonesia Jun-98 Oct-98 Jan-98 Oct-98 Jan-98 
Malaysia Nov-97 Sep-98 Jan-98 Jun-98 Jan-98 
The 
Philippines 
Jan-98 Dec-98 Dec-97 Apr-98 Dec-97 
Singapore Sep-98 Nov-98 May-98 Sep-98 May-98 
Thailand Jul-98 Jul-98 Jul-97 Feb-98 Aug-97 
Technology Bubble Burst (2000-2001) 
Indonesia May-00 Apr-01 Sep-00 Jan-00 Oct-00 
Malaysia Jun-00 May-01 Mar-01 Jan-00 May-01 
The 
Philippines 
Nov-00 Jun-00 Oct-00 Nov-00 Oct-00 
Singapore Sep-00 Oct-01 Mar-01 Aug-00 Mar-01 
Thailand Apr-00 Jun-00 Mar-01 Jul-00 Apr-00 
GFC (2008-2009) 
Indonesia Jun-08 Nov-08 Oct-08 Sep-09 Nov-08 
Malaysia Feb-08 Nov-08 Sep-08 May-09 Oct-08 
The 
Philippines 
Jan-08 Nov-08 Oct-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 
Singapore Feb-08 Nov-08 Jan-09 Jul-08 Jan-09 
Thailand Jun-08 Nov-08 Jun-08 May-09 Nov-08 
Global Peaks 
Indonesia Jun-98 Oct-98 Jan-98 Oct-98 Jan-98 
Malaysia Nov-97 Sep-98 Jan-98 Jun-98 Jan-98 
The 
Philippines 
Jan-98 Dec-98 Dec-97 Apr-98 Dec-97 
Singapore Sep-00 Nov-98 Sep-11 Sep-98 May-98 
Thailand Jul-98 Jul-98 Jul-97 Feb-98 Aug-97 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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This episode is most related with stress in the banking sector, which started to increase in 
the second half of 1999, corresponding with the Russian Crisis and LTCM collapse and 
only intensified during the tech bust. Indeed, the majority of peaks in banking sector stress 
occurred after the NASDAQ peaked, when most of the declines took place. 
3.3.2.3 The GFC (2008-2009) 
From the ASEAN-5’s perspective, the FSIs portray the GFC as an external shock that 
was mostly contained within the equity market. This episode played out in two distinct 
phases. Financial stress first surfaced in the banking sector in the beginning of 2008 and 
persisted through the first half of the year as US and European banks began reporting 
losses from securities linked to subprime mortgage loans and were faced with severe 
liquidity shortages. For instance, the LIBOR-OIS spread, an indicator of the health of 
banks, rose from roughly 10 basis points in August 2007 to a historical high of 108 basis 
points by 6th December 2007 (Sengupta & Tam, 2008). Globally, there was uncertainty 
among banks about the amount of exposure they had to products linked to such subprime 
mortgage related loans. Among the ASEAN-5 economies, banking sector stress was the 
first source of stress to emerge, compared to the other market segments. In all cases, the 
local peaks during this episode occurred in the banking sector during the first half of 2008, 
before the local peaks in financial stress from the other asset markets27 (Table 3.3). 
However, banking sector stress also tended to be brief and sporadic. At its peak, bank 
stress only surfaced in 3 out of the 5 sample countries for only a month before moderating. 
The second phase encompassed stress in the foreign exchange and equity markets, and 
began in earnest in the second half of 2008 in the midst of a global flight to US Treasuries 
                                                
27 The only exception is Thailand, where the local peak of financial stress in the banking sector occurred in the same month as financial 
stress in the foreign exchange market.   
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and a corresponding sell-off of emerging market assets. This phase played out during a 
tumultuous stage of the GFC which saw, among others, Lehman Brothers investment 
bank file for bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America and many other bank 
mergers and acquisitions, while the remaining US investment banks were transformed 
into bank holding companies. During this phase, financial stress tended to appear first in 
foreign exchange markets as the global flight to quality led to capital outflows which 
exerted depreciating pressures on the exchange rate, then spread to equity markets where 
the episode tapered off by the middle of 2009. Strikingly, equity market stress in all the 
sample countries peaked in November 2008, which strongly indicates that the GFC was 
a common shock for the ASEAN-5. Overall financial stress in the region peaked in 
conjunction with equity market stress. 
3.4 Robustness of the FSIs to other Weighting Methodologies 
The narration of how financial stress has evolved from 1997 to 2013, including the 
interpretations of the magnitude and duration of financial stress during periods of known 
episodes, is premised on the choice of stress indicators and the weighting methodology. 
While the former is broadly in line with existing literature, the main departure is in the 
weighing methodology. As discussed earlier and in Chapter 2, a majority of the existing 
FSIs are weighted either using equal weights or loadings from the first principal 
component. Ultimately, the different weighting options lend to differences in 
interpretation with no clear guidance on which is the best. Applying the economy’s 
financial structure as a guide, as done in the baseline construction, makes the most 
intuitive sense as financial stress in larger and more important markets are given larger 
weights. Using a principal component methodology is premised on financial stress being 
the underlying factor driving the common variation among all the stress indicators. 
Meanwhile, applying equal weights avoids having to place judgement and assumes all 
indicators are equally valid contributors of overall financial stress. Due to this lack of 
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clarity on the relative superiority of the various weighting methodologies, it is best to 
compare the performances of the FSIs constructed with alternative weighting methods, 
as illustrated in Figure 3.8.  
A comparison of the FSIs with the three weighting methodologies reveals that the index 
performances are qualitatively similar. The AFC remains the most severe, followed by 
the tech bust and the GFC. The largest departure is from the FSI constructed from 
principal components. The principal component analysis based FSIs depicts the ASEAN-
5 economies as experiencing higher and longer duration of financial stress during the 
AFC episode. All other key findings remain similar. 
 
Figure 3.8: Comparison of FSIs with Alternative Weighting Methodologies 
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Sources: Author’s Calculations 
Notes: “base” refers to baseline methodology where the financial structure weights are used, “pca” are principal component based 
weights and “eq” refers to equal weights. “IN”, “MY”, “PH”, “SG” and “TH” denote Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand, respectively.  
Figure 3.8: Continued 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter develops a methodology to measure financial stability conditions in the 
ASEAN-5 economies on a continuous scale, through the construction of indices called 
Financial Stress Indices (FSIs). Market specific FSIs are constructed to measure financial 
stress in the banking sector, equity market, domestic bond market and foreign exchange 
market, while overall FSIs are constructed to measure systemic financial stress in the 
broader financial system. The overall FSIs are weighted averages of the market FSIs, with 
the weights reflecting the relative sizes of markets represented by the market FSIs. 
The FSIs show that financial stress during the AFC was most severe, both in duration and 
magnitude, followed by the tech bust and the GFC. These findings are robust across all 
sample countries, except for Singapore, where the GFC was more severe in amplitude 
compared to the tech bust. A decomposition of the contribution of overall financial stress 
by asset markets reveals that the AFC encompassed stress mainly from the foreign 
exchange market and banking sector. In contrast, stress during the GFC emerged first in 
the banking sector and subsequently moved on to equity and foreign exchange markets 
where the majority of stress during this episode was felt. 
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 :  SOURCES OF MACR-FINANCIAL VULNERABILITIES IN 
ASEAN-5 ECONOMIES28 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The standard narrative from the literature on the Early Warning Indicators (EWI) of 
financial crises is that crises usually occur as economic growth starts to slow after a 
sustained period of high growth, loose credit conditions and over-valued asset prices29. 
While the findings are robust, they pertain only to crisis and do not provide a complete 
explanation of the entire financial cycle and of macro-financial vulnerabilities. This is 
true especially in small-open economies where financial conditions are also susceptible 
to spillovers from external sources. While such financial market disruptions do not always 
reach crisis proportions, they are often severe enough to have material adverse growth 
effects and, hence, warrant attention as well. For example, using a sample of 21 Asian 
economies, Hong et al. (2010) show that domestic financial stress often coincided with 
stress in major financial centres and that all financial episodes were associated with 
growth slowdowns.  
Against this backdrop, this chapter investigates the determinants of financial stress 
throughout the entire financial cycle, instead of just crisis periods, for 5 small-open 
economies - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN-5). 
Drawing on recent studies by Balakrishnan et al. (2011), Duca and Peltonen (2011) and 
Park and Mercado Jr (2014), this chapter uses the Financial Stress Indices (FSIs) from 
                                                
28 Findings from this chapter were presented at the 2014 Joint Meetings of the Australian Conference of Economists and Econometric 
Society Australasian Meetings (ESAM) in Tasmania, Australia, the 2014 ISI Regional Statistics Conference in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, and the Bank of Thailand and Bank for International Settlements (BoT-BIS) 8th Annual Workshop of the Asian Research 
Networks 2015. 
29 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Lowe (2002) are early influential studies.  
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Chapter 3 to estimate quarterly panel regressions of financial stress. Financial stress is 
modelled as a function of common global variables, regional financial contagion and 
country-specific indicators of financial vulnerability.  
This chapter makes four contributions to existing panel models of financial stress: First, 
regional financial contagion is measured explicitly to be in line with the financial 
contagion literature. Second, an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is used to estimate 
the panel model of financial stress, using lags of the domestic variables as instruments, to 
address endogeneity issues between financial stress and the explanatory variables. Third, 
using the overall FSIs, the panel analysis investigates the determinants of systemic 
financial stress and the role of trade and financial linkages in facilitating the transmission 
of external financial shocks to financial stress in the ASEAN-5 economies. Fourth, the 
panel analysis is conducted on the market-specific FSIs (representing stress in the banking 
system, equities, foreign exchange and bond market), to investigate if the sources of 
financial stress are similar across asset markets and to give insight to how financial stress 
spreads from individual asset markets to other asset markets. 
Using the FSIs offer two advantages: First, the FSIs facilitate an analysis of the financial 
cycle during tranquil and stressful periods in financial markets, as they are continuous 
measures of financial stress. This offers an advantage over the approach used in the EWI 
literature, where judgement is required to date and identify crises, which then take on 
binary states - crisis or no crisis. As such, the FSIs are useful for analysing the 
determinants of financial stress in countries with few historical incidences of financial 
crises, such as the ASEAN-5 economies. Secondly, the FSIs provide a consistent bottom-
up methodology to measure financial stress starting at the level of individual asset 
markets, which are then aggregated to reflect systemic financial stress. This facilitates 
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analyses of financial stress at the systemic and individual asset market levels within a 
common measurement framework. 
The results find that both external and domestic variables play significant roles in driving 
financial stress in the ASEAN-5 economies. Among the common variables, US financial 
stress and regional financial contagion are consistently significant across model 
specifications and estimation methodology. Bank credit is the only domestic determinant 
that was consistently significant, with a positive bank credit gap foreshadowing higher 
financial stress. While it was difficult to pin down the roles of trade and financial linkages 
in the transmission from external to ASEAN-5 financial stress, strong external banking 
sector ties - borrowings by residents from external banks and foreign bank subsidies on 
domestic shores - is associated with higher stress transmission across borders. Panel 
regressions of market specific sources of financial stress showed the importance of the 
domestic banking system and equity market for all other markets. High stress in either 
market is significantly associated with higher financial stress elsewhere. In particular, the 
results reflect a vicious cycle of stress transmission between the banking system and 
equity markets. Adverse conditions in either exacerbates stress levels in the other, which 
in turn worsens the originating source of stress, and so on.  
The remaining sections in this chapter proceed as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data 
used for the analysis. This includes how the variables are constructed and stylised 
observations of the variables. Section 4.3 details the panel model. Section 4.4 presents 
the baseline results. Section 4.5 examines the role of trade and financial linkages. Section 
4.6 investigates the presence of two-way causality between financial stress and the 
explanatory variables, and re-estimates the panel model through an IV methodology. 
Section 4.7 examines the sources of financial stress within individual asset markets. The 
final section concludes with the main findings. 
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4.2 Data 
The dataset consists of 5 ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. The series are in quarterly frequency and span from 1997-2013. 
To uncover the sources of financial stress for the ASEAN-5 economies, the analysis starts 
with a broad set of variables as candidates. These variables are drawn from the EWI 
literature30 and more recent studies that attempt to explain the sources of financial cycles 
using the FSIs31. Table 4.1 lists the variables and their sources. The dependent variable is 
the Financial Stress Index (FSI) for the ASEAN-5 economies from Chapter 3 and Tng et 
al. (2012). Since the panel regressions are in quarterly frequency, the FSIs are converted 
from monthly to quarterly frequency by averaging the monthly values within each quarter. 
The independent variables consist of common external, regional and country-specific 
domestic variables. 
There are four external variables: World Gross Domestic Product (GDPw) captures 
global economic conditions; a weighted index of primary commodity prices (GCP) to 
measure the global price level; a FSI of the United States (US) (FSIus) from Hakkio and 
Keeton (2009), which proxies for global financial conditions32. The last common variable, 
Cont., measures regional financial contagion. The next section details the methodology 
to construct this variable.  
  
                                                
30 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Lowe (Borio & Lowe, 2002) are early influential studies. 
31 For instance, Balakrishnan et al. (2011), Misina and Tkacz (2009), Duca and Peltonen (2011) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014). 
32 This index is quantitatively similar to other FSIs of the US economy in the literature, for instance, by Cardarelli et al. (2011) from 
the IMF and Kliesen and Smith (2010) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Table 4.1: List of Variables for Panel Estimation 
Variable Abbreviation       Definition       Source 
  Dependent Variable 
ASEAN-5 Financial 
Stress 
FSI Financial Stress Index Tng et al. (2012), 
Chapter 3 
Independent variables 
Global variables 
World Real Gross 
Domestic Product 
GDPw World Real GDP 
(log, sa) 
World Bank 
Commodity Prices GCP IMF Primary 
Commodity Price 
Index (log, sa) 
International 
Monetary Fund 
US Financial Stress FSI_US US Financial Stress 
Index 
Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) 
International Trade and financial linkages 
Export exposure EX Exports/GDP 
(deflated) 
Haver Analytics 
Bank  FLbank Consolidated foreign 
claims of BIS 
reporting banks/ GDP 
Bank for International 
Settlements 
Direct investment FLFDI External portfolio 
liabilities/GDP 
International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), Haver 
Analytics 
Portfolio  FLPL External portfolio 
liabilities/GDP 
IFS, Haver Analytics 
Regional variable 
Regional Contagion Cont See section 1.3 Author’s calculations 
Country Specific Variables 
Real Gross 
Domestic Product 
GDP Real GDP (log, sa, 
2005=100) 
World Bank 
Real Bank Credit Credit Domestic bank credit, 
deflated by CPI  
IFS, Haver Analytics 
Current Account CA Ratio of GDP (sa, %) Haver Analytics 
Foreign Reserves Res Ratio of GDP (sa, %) IFS, Haver Analytics 
Fiscal Balance FB Ratio of GDP (%) Haver Analytics 
 
Note: “log” and “sa” refer respectively to natural logarithm and seasonal adjustment (using the X12 
seasonal adjustment procedure). Real GDP and Bank Credit are indexed to 2005=100.  
 
Five domestic variables are considered as potential sources of financial stress: Real GDP 
reflects domestic economic conditions; Credit captures domestic bank credit. The current 
account balance, international reserves and the fiscal balance are variables that reflect 
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various facets of structural imbalances and policy space, and are thus considered as 
potential triggers of financial stress as well. 
The variables are initially tested for stationarity using the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) 
(IPS) panel unit root test. These tests are conducted on the variables in levels and de-
trended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Table 4.2). This method of de-trending 
follows from Borio and Lowe (2002), Cardarelli et al. (2011) and Duca and Peltonen 
(2011). An economic reason for applying a time-varying filter instead of taking the first 
difference to de-trend the variables is that it removes country-specific changes in financial 
market development and how economic agents utilise financial markets to facilitate real 
economic activity. Cardarelli et al. (2011) thus refer to this method of de-trending as a 
“time-varying fixed-effect” which facilitates cross-country analysis. All variables are 
stationary after HP de-trending. Variables that are not stationary in levels with statistical 
significance below 5% are de-trended for the panel estimations. 
Table 4.2: Panel Unit Root Test Results (Ρ-Value) 
  Levels 
Gap 
(HP filtered) 
De-trend in 
panel model 
Dependent 
variable 
FSI  
0.00 0.00 no 
External 
variables 
  
  
World GDP 0.96 0.00 yes 
Commodity prices 0.98 0.00 yes 
US Financial Stress 0.00 0.00 no 
Contagion 0.00 0.00 no 
Domestic 
variables 
  
  
GDP 1.00 0.00 yes 
Bank credit 1.00 0.00 yes 
International reserves 0.00 0.00 no 
Current account 0.00 0.00 no 
Fiscal balance 0.00 0.00 no 
Trade & 
Financial 
linkages 
Export dependence 0.00 0.00 no 
Bank linkages 0.01 0.00 no 
Portfolio linkages 0.39 0.00 yes 
Direct investment linkages 0.59 0.00 yes 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is the variables have a unit root. The alternative hypothesis is some of the series are stationary. The values 
in the table are ρ-values. The specifications include a constant. Lags are optimally selected using the Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC). 
   79 
4.2.1 Stylised Facts 
Prior to estimating the panel model, it is useful to begin by analysing the behaviour of the 
variables over time and compared with ASEAN-5 financial stress to establish ex ante 
expectations about the potential relationships. Figure 4.1 illustrates financial stress in the 
ASEAN-5 economies alongside financial stress in the US.  
 
Source: Tng et al. (2012) and Hakkio and Keeton (2009) 
Note: The US FSI was standardised using calculations of the mean and standard deviation from the sample period 1997-2013, similar 
to the ASEAN-5 FSIs, to equalize the units of measurement to facilitate ease in comparison. 
Figure 4.1: Financial Stress in the ASEAN-5 Economies and United States 
 
Three observations stand out: First, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998 for 
the ASEAN-5 economies was a substantially less severe financial event, compared to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-2009 for the US economy. This is gleaned from 
the level of the FSIs during these episodes - the FSIs for the ASEAN-5 during the AFC 
period tended to peak at around 2 standard deviations while the US FSI peaked at 6 
standard deviations during the GFC period. Secondly, financial stress in the US economy 
rose to substantially higher levels during the GFC compared to its technology bubble 
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burst (tech bust) episode in 2000-2001. However, financial stress among the ASEAN-5 
economies did not display a corresponding increase in financial stress across these two 
episodes. Except for Singapore, the ASEAN-5 FSIs rose to higher levels during the tech 
bust period compared to the GFC period, implying that ASEAN-5 financial markets 
withstood the GFC episode much better than the tech bust shock. Third, while there are 
clear distinctions between the US FSI and the ASEAN-5 FSIs, there seems to be a high 
degree of co-movement among the ASEAN-5 FSIs. This suggests strongly that regional 
level financial contagion plays an important role in stress transmission for the individual 
ASEAN-5 economies, and is a hypothesis that will be tested in this chapter. 
Figure 4.2 presents the output gap for the ASEAN-5 economies, which shows that higher 
financial stress tends to be preceded by positive output gaps, followed by movement 
toward negative output gaps as financial stress increases. This was especially the case for 
the AFC episode and the GFC to a smaller extent. Figure 4.3 displays the domestic credit 
gap. In contrast with the output gap, the credit gaps across the ASEAN-5 display a more 
heterogeneous pattern. The only consistent development across countries was the large 
positive gap during the AFC period. This was observed in all sample economies except 
in Singapore. Incidentally, Singapore was the economy whose level of financial stress 
was the lowest as its peak during the AFC period. Indeed, the presence of large credit 
gaps during the AFC period and the consistent lack of such gaps during the tech bust and 
GFC periods suggest that this is a reason the ASEAN-5 economies experienced much 
lower financial stress during the latter two episodes (tech bust and GFC) - there was a 
lack of excesses in the domestic banking system during key periods of larger external 
financial shocks. 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.2: Domestic Output Gaps in the ASEAN-5 Economies 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.3: Domestic Bank Credit Gaps in the ASEAN-5 Economies 
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Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show two facets of structural vulnerabilities, through the current 
account and fiscal balances. Trends on the current account balance are relatively mixed. 
In Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the balances improved substantially after the AFC, 
but experienced differing trends thereafter. In Malaysia, the positive balance remained 
relatively constant until the GFC episode, after which it has been on a moderating trend. 
In Indonesia, the balance also declined especially after the GFC episode, and experienced 
a negative balance since the fourth quarter of 2011. Singapore’s balance displays a 
relatively cyclical trend with a gradual upward sloping trend over the longer-run. The 
balances in Thailand and Indonesia have evolved in a similar pattern. It was negative prior 
to the AFC, increased to surplus levels after the crisis and deteriorated gradually since 
then to become negative again by the fourth quarter of 2011. The balance in the 
Philippines is the smallest on average throughout the sample period, indicating that it 
possesses the most internal-external balance compared to the other sample economies. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.4: Current Account Balance in the ASEAN-5 Economies (% of GDP) 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.5: Fiscal Balances in the ASEAN-5 Economies (% of GDP) 
 
Fiscal balances were generally positive before the AFC, except in Thailand who had a 
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-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
19
97
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
Indonesia
-10
-5
0
5
19
97
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
Malaysia
-6
-4
-2
0
2
19
97
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
Philippines
0
5
10
15
19
97
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
Singapore
-6
-4
-2
0
2
19
97
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
Thailand
   84 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.6: International Reserves (Excluding Gold) in the ASEAN-5 Economies 
(% of GDP) 
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the exposure increasing gradually over time, while the Philippines and Indonesia display 
broadly similar degrees of trade exposure. 
Financial linkages are measured through banking, portfolio and direct investment 
linkages. There are three notable observations: First, there has been a declining trend in 
resident borrowings from foreign banks and their local affiliates for financing. Second, 
there is an increase in external portfolio liabilities over time. Both of these trends imply 
that while the ASEAN-5 economies have become less vulnerable to disruptions in the 
international credit cycle, their gradual progress to open and develop their own capital 
markets have made them more exposed to disturbances in global capital markets through 
increased portfolio investment flows, which can exhibit bouts of higher volatility. Third, 
the trends in foreign direct investment linkages across countries is more eclectic. This 
likely reflects country and industry-specific motivations for foreign firms’ choices to 
invest in the individual ASEAN-5 economies. The FDI linkage in Singapore is the highest 
and has continued to increase over the sample period.  This linkage has also increased 
over time in Thailand. In Malaysia, the FDI linkage declined post-AFC, remained roughly 
constant from 2000-2005 and has been on an increasing trend since then. The recent 
uptrend in the FDI stock to GDP ratio is also visible for Indonesia. 
Thus, the trade channel remains ever present with little significant changes over time. For 
cross-border financial linkages, the region has pared down exposure to external bank 
credit, but the gradual development and opening of capital markets has resulted in higher 
foreign participation in domestic debt and equity markets. Singapore’s trade and financial 
linkages are the most extensive with ratios that exceed the other ASEAN-5 economies 
over most of the sample period, which is not surprising given its position as a trading hub 
and financial centre.  
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Source: Author’s calculations, Haver, Bank for International Settlements 
Figure 4.7: Trade and Financial Linkages in the ASEAN-5 Economies  
(Ratio of GDP) 
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4.3 The Panel Model 
This section presents the panel model that is estimated to assess the determinants of 
financial stress for the ASEAN-5 economies. Following Balakrishnan et al. (2011), 
Misina and Tkacz (2009), Duca and Peltonen (2011) and Park and Mercado Jr (2014), 
this model captures three main sources of financial stress - common external factors, 
regional financial contagion and country-specific sources.  
The baseline panel model is presented in equation 4.1: 
[\]A/ = ^A + B_9[/_?_`2 + 0aDbO/ + XcdDHA/cec`2 + :A/           (Equation 4.1) 
The dependent variable, FSI, is the Financial Stress Index for each ASEAN-5 economy. 
EF is a vector of three global variables - world Gross Domestic Product (GDPw), 
commodity prices (GCP) and US financial stress (FSIUS). FSIUS is taken as a proxy of 
global financial conditions. Dom is a vector of five domestic country-specific variables - 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), domestic bank credit (Credit), the current account 
balance (CA), international reserves (Res) and the fiscal balance (FB). αg is a time constant 
variable. 
Finally, Cont is a measure of regional financial contagion. Financial contagion is defined 
various ways in the literature33. This analysis uses the World Bank’s “restrictive” 
definition of contagion as a guide. This definition refers to contagion as the transmission 
of shocks to other countries for reasons that are not attributable to fundamentals or 
                                                
33 The World Bank definitions of contagion is available here: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTMACROECO/0,,contentMD
K:20889756~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:477872,00.html  
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common sources34. This suggests that regional contagion is empirically reflected as cross-
country co-movement in financial market variables after controlling for fundamentals and 
global shocks. Accordingly, Cont is estimated in two steps. First, regressions equivalent 
to (1), but without Cont, are estimated for each ASEAN-5 economy. The residuals from 
these five regressions are saved and interpreted as unaccounted movements in financial 
stress in each country35. Secondly, the common co-movement among these residuals is 
interpreted as a reflection of financial contagion. To identify this common factor, 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is conducted on the residuals. Specifically, 
eigenvectors (loadings) from the first principal component are obtained. The loadings are 
then used as weights for the residuals from step 1 to construct an index of financial 
contagion among the ASEAN-5 economies. The index is presented in Figure 4.8 with 
more detailed results from the principal component analysis shown in Appendix B. The 
index spiked to its highest level during the AFC period and, to a smaller extent, during 
the US tech bust in 2000-2001. Interestingly, regional contagion remained relatively low 
throughout the GFC episode. 
The panel model is estimated without cross-section fixed effects as joint significance tests 
of the null hypothesis that the restrictions are redundant could not be rejected36. The 
standard errors used are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. This analysis 
is most analogous to the annual panel model in Balakrishnan et al. (2011), but differs in 
several notable aspects. First, there are more country-specific explanatory variables, 
notably domestic GDP and bank credit. The latter, in particular, consistently emerges as 
                                                
34 This approach of stripping away variations in financial variables is also used, among others, in Hatzius et al. (2010) and Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011).   
35 In this case, the decision on whether to use the variables in levels or gap terms is premised on the Phillips-Perron unit root test. 
36 The associated F and χ7 statistics are 0.272 (Ρ-value of 0.896) and 1.12 (Ρ-value of 0.891). 
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a significant indicator of financial crisis/stress in related literature. Misina and Tkacz 
(2009) and Duca and Peltonen (2011) are two recent examples who use FSIs as their 
dependent variable. In both cases, bank credit is a statistically significantly predictor of 
financial stress. These findings are robust across most model specifications and countries. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.8: Measure of ASEAN-5 Regional Financial Contagion 
 
Second, financial contagion is measured more rigorously compared to other existing 
panel studies in the FSI literature. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) aggregate all the emerging 
economy FSIs except the dependent variable FSI and strip away variations that are 
attributable only to external factors (global industrial production, 3-month LIBOR, 
commodity prices and an index of financial stress for the advanced economies). Park and 
Mercado Jr (2014) measure regional effects by excluding the country under study. In 
contrast, this analysis strips away variations at the country level that is attributable to 
global and domestic determinants. Furthermore, the resulting residuals are aggregated 
using a methodology that is consistent with the financial contagion literature, as 
information on their co-movement is extracted using PCA.  
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Third, the model is estimated in quarterly instead of annual frequency. In addition to 
increasing the number of observations, the higher frequency allows for the inclusion of 
variables that may affect financial stress transmission with varying frequency ranges. For 
example, the role of financial channels such as portfolio rebalancing and herd behaviour 
in the transmission of financial stress from the US to the ASEAN-5 economies is likely 
better captured in higher frequency, while more fundamental determinants such as bank 
credit, the current balance or international reserves may determine domestic financial 
stress at relatively lower frequencies. 
Finally, this analysis complements the analysis on the determinants of overall financial 
stress with a similar analysis but within individual asset markets. This is done to see if 
market specific financial stress responds symmetrically to the variables considered and 
also to characterise how financial stress spills over across markets. 
4.4 Baseline Estimation Results 
Table 4.3 presents results from five permutations of equation (1). Specification 1 shows 
results from a model with only the global and regional variables; Specification 2 presents 
results from only the domestic variables; Specifications 3 and 4 includes all external 
variables and different combinations of the domestic variables; Specification 4 includes 
all the variables. 
Of the three global variables considered, US financial stress is consistently positive and 
statistically significant. This supports the view that because the ASEAN-5 economies are 
relatively small and open, stability in their financial markets are significantly influenced 
by financial conditions in major financial centres. Regional financial contagion, Cont, is 
also significant in all specifications, which is consistent with Park and Mercado Jr (2014), 
who find that regional financial stress levels have a positive and significant impact on 
domestic financial stress. 
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Table 4.3: Baseline Panel Regression Results 
Dependent Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Financial Stress 
World GDP 2.653  2.023 2.379 1.817 
(0.165)  (0.369) (0.143) (0.428) 
Commodity prices -0.246*  0.004 -0.273*** 0.011 
(0.064)  (0.980) (0.007) (0.929) 
US financial stress 0.077***  0.077*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 
(0.000)  (0.000 (0.000 (0.000 
Regional financial 
contagion 
1.409***  1.393*** 1.385*** 1.373*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP  -0.377 -0.294  -0.644 
   (0.876) (0.899)  (0.815) 
Bank Credit  2.087*** 2.017***  1.975*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) 
International 
reserves 
 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.274)  (0.378) (0.296) 
Current account  -0.001  0.000 0.000 
 (0.907)  (0.982) (0.962) 
Fiscal balance 
  
 0.012  0.009 0.008 
 (0.360)  (0.368) (0.470) 
Constant -0.070*** 0.118 -0.070*** 0.037 0.049 
(0.000) (0.508) (0.000) (0.767) (0.725) 
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.059 0.312 0.271 0.316 
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p-values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
 
Of the five country-specific variables considered, only bank credit emerges as 
consistently significant. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that loose credit 
conditions predispose financial markets to higher stress. This is consistent with recent 
findings from Misina and Tkacz (2009), Duca and Peltonen (2011) and Park and Mercado 
Jr (2014) 37. The significant relationship between boom/bust credit cycles and financial 
                                                
37 The authors estimate many different permutations of their panel model. The results on the estimated coefficient of global GDP 
growth vary in statistical significance and the sign. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient using emerging Asia as their sample, which 
is most similar to the ASEAN-5 sample in this study, is positive and statistically significant.    
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crises is also consistent with early warning indicator studies embodied, for example, by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Lowe (2002). 
The remaining three macroeconomic vulnerability indicators - international reserves, the 
current account balance and fiscal balance - are consistently insignificant. Nonetheless, 
this does not necessarily negate their significance in reality. A likely reason for their 
insignificance in these estimations is that the vulnerabilities associated with these 
variables are important only as triggers of high financial stress episodes. Since the panel 
model is estimated over low and high levels of financial stress, these vulnerabilities are 
averaged out over two phases - as the vulnerabilities accumulate but are insignificant 
determinants of financial stress and at high stress levels as market participants reach a 
tipping point and suddenly deem these variables to be significant sources of 
vulnerabilities. Another plausible reason is that these variables have largely remained 
above “safe threshold levels” during most of the sample period under study. 
4.5 Trade and Financial Linkages in the Transmission of External Financial 
Shocks 
This section now examines the role of trade and three financial linkages - bank, portfolio 
and direct investment - in the transmission of external financial shocks to ASEAN-5 
financial markets. To do so, consider the following expanded version of the baseline panel 
model: 
[\]A/ = ^A + B_9[/_?_`2 + ;i[\]_j\×l!bm/iei`2 + 0aDbO/ + XcdDHA/cec`2 + :A/   
                            (Equation 4.2) 
Equation (4.2) is like equation (4.1), except that the trade and financial linkage variables 
are added as interactions with US financial stress. The results are presented in Table 4.4. 
Specifications 1-4 present results from individually considering the trade and financial 
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linkage variables. The last specification includes all the linkages together. The results 
show that none of the linkages are significant factors in propagating the transmission of 
external to domestic financial stress. 
The seeming lack of empirical evidence of the presence of trade and financial linkages in 
propagating cross-border stress transmission may be because other variables in the model 
already capture these linkages. For instance, domestic and world GDP likely capture some 
aspect of trade and financial linkages. To test for this possibility, equation 4.2 is pared 
down to include only US financial stress, regional contagion and the trade and financial 
linkages variables, as shown in equation 4.3. Table 4.5 presents the results. 
[\]A/ = ^A + B[\]_j\/ + ;i[\]_j\×l!bm/iei`2 + 0aDbO/ + :A/         (Equation 4.3) 
When considered individually, the export, bank and direct investment channels are 
statistically significant with the expected positive association. When all the linkages are 
included together, only export and bank linkages are significant. However, the coefficient 
representing trade linkage, unexpectedly, becomes negative. Broadly, there is limited 
evidence for the role of trade and financial linkages in the transmission of financial stress 
across borders. However, the sensitivity of the regression results across model 
specifications highlights difficulties in empirically differentiating among the respective 
channels, a concern also echoed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). Nonetheless, the 
significance of bank linkages is the most robust and consistent with Balakrishnan et al. 
(2011) who utilise a substantially larger number of economies in their study.  
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Table 4.4: Panel Model with Trade and Financial Linkages 
Dependent Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Financial Stress 
World GDP 1.832 1.743 1.767 1.858 1.340 
(0.419) (0.462) (0.407) (0.431) (0.578) 
Commodity prices 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.043 0.094 
(0.971) (0.928) (0.937) (0.693) (0.509) 
US financial stress 0.067** 0.067*** 0.082*** 0.073*** 0.105** 
(0.024) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.027) 
US financial stress x 
Trade link 
0.010    -0.063 
(0.719)    (0.391) 
US financial stress x 
Bank link 
 0.006   0.024 
 (0.520)   (0.267) 
US financial stress x 
Portfolio link 
  0.028  0.076 
  (0.772)  (0.595) 
US financial stress x  
Direct investment link 
   0.074 0.108 
   (0.363) (0.370) 
Regional financial 
contagion 
1.373*** 1.374*** 1.372*** 1.371*** 1.372*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP -0.623 -0.584 -0.647 -0.580 -0.437 
  (0.824) (0.837) (0.814) (0.837) (0.879) 
Bank Credit 1.962*** 1.955*** 1.983*** 1.996*** 2.024*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
International reserves -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.285) (0.278) (0.300) (0.296) (0.283) 
Current account 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.959) (0.949) (0.961) (0.968) (0.929) 
Fiscal balance 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
(0.504) (0.533) (0.460) (0.504) (0.572) 
Constant 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.048 0.052 
(0.717) (0.713) (0.725) (0.732) (0.716) 
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.315 0.310 
 
Notes: Figures in italics are p-values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
  
   95 
Table 4.5: Pared Down Panel Model with Trade and Financial Linkages 
Dependent Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Financial Stress 
US financial stress 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.089*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
US financial stress x 
Trade link 
0.037***    -0.076** 
(0.000)    (0.084) 
US financial stress x 
Bank link 
 0.016***   0.041*** 
 (0.000)   (0.002) 
US financial stress x 
Portfolio link 
  -0.012  0.045 
  (0.878)  (0.704) 
US financial stress x  
Direct investment link 
   0.072* 0.033 
   (0.075) (0.742) 
Regional financial 
contagion 
1.400*** 1.404*** 1.401*** 1.401*** 1.409*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.070*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.272 0.268 0.269 0.267 
 
Notes: Figures in italics are p-values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
 
4.6 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
4.6.1 Panel Granger Testing to Investigate the Direction of Causality 
Conceptually, many of the macroeconomic relations in the panel estimations are 
endogenous with causality running in both directions or affected by a third variable. For 
instance, the causality between GDP and financial stress can run in both directions. 
Slower growth weakens banks’ balance sheets through higher non-performing loans, 
which in turn leads to higher financial stress. Weaker GDP can also affect financial stress 
through expectations, as dismal growth prospects are “priced-in” by investors, which is 
reflected through lower asset prices and, hence, higher financial stress. Meanwhile, the 
causality from financial shocks to economic activity occurs through many channels as 
well, for example, through bank capital, a financial accelerator mechanism and 
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uncertainty38. The relationship between credit and financial cycles may also be 
endogenous. Firstly, both variables are influenced in part by economic activity. Secondly, 
there are also self-reinforcing mechanisms - inflated asset prices and wealth are used as 
collateral to obtain credit, which further fuels asset prices, and so on39. Hence, as asset 
prices fall when financial stress increases, access to credit declines, which in turn 
depresses asset prices and causes financial stress to increase further. 
Meanwhile, sustainability concerns about policy space, as reflected by international 
reserves, to finance the economy’s foreign currency obligations may trigger a crisis or 
exacerbate one that is already under way. Similarly, a financial crisis that sparks a loss of 
confidence in the credit worthiness of the government’s fiscal position can substantially 
increase the cost of further borrowings, which further worsens the government’s fiscal 
position and, in turn, exacerbates the financial crisis that is already under way. The euro 
debt crisis is a recent example of two-way causality between the fiscal balance and 
financial stress. 
The results from Table 4.3 are biased if such endogenous relationships are present. To 
investigate the direction of causality, pairwise panel granger causality tests between 
financial stress and the domestic variables are conducted. Two methodologies are used. 
The first test stacks the dataset, but with data from each cross-section not allowed to enter 
as a lagged variable in another cross-section. Hence, this test assumes that all cross-
sections have common coefficients. The second test is based on Dumitrescu and Hurlin 
(2012) (D-H), which allows the coefficients to vary across cross-sections. Table 4.6 
                                                
38 See Chapter 5 and Tng and Kwek (2015) for a more detailed discussion and references of the transmission channels. 
39 See Gerdesmeier, Reimers, and Roffia (2010) and Bayoumi and Darius (2011) for recent investigations of the  inter-linkages 
between credit and asset prices.  
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presents the results. In the stacked based test, there is evidence of two-way causality only 
between financial stress (FSI) and bank credit. However, the D-H test shows some 
evidence for the presence of two-way causality for all domestic variables except 
international reserves. 
Table 4.6: Panel Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 Stacked Dumitrescu-Hurlin 
FSI causes: 
Domestic bank credit 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Current account 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Real GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 
International reserves 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Fiscal balance 0.001*** 0.000*** 
FSI is caused by: 
Domestic bank credit 0.008*** 0.003*** 
Current account 0.417 0.062* 
Real GDP 0.110 0.000*** 
International reserves 0.647 0.768 
Fiscal balance 0.192 0.000*** 
 
Note: Figures in the table are ρ values. 4 lags are used in the estimations. In the stacked granger causality tests of two variables, A and 
B, the null hypothesis is A does not granger cause B, the alternative is A granger causes B. For the D-H test, the null is A does not 
homogeneously cause B, while the alternative is that some cross-section units exhibit evidence of granger causality. 
 
4.6.2 Addressing Endogeneity with Instrumental Variable Estimation 
To address such endogeneity concerns, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Park and Mercado 
Jr (2014) lag their country-specific variables by one year in their annual panel model. In 
contrast, this analysis adopts an instrumental variables (IV) approach by using the 
previous four quarters (one year) as instruments for the country-specific variables and re-
estimating the specifications in Table 4.3. Only the country-specific variables are 
instrumented as the ASEAN-5 economies are taken to be small-open economies and 
hence cannot influence external conditions. For the variables that are subjected to 
instrumentation, validity is satisfied because the variables are correlated with their lag 
terms and are exogenous to financial stress. Using lags as instruments also reflects 
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information delays as investors use past information to form expectations of current and 
future conditions to arrive at current investment decisions. Table 4.7 presents results from 
the IV estimations.  
Table 4.7: Instrumental Variable Estimation of the Panel Model 
Dependent Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Financial Stress 
World GDP 2.653  8.171* 5.266 8.215* 
(0.165)  (0.093) (0.162) (0.084) 
Commodity prices -0.246*  -0.370 -0.627*** -0.265 
(0.064)  (0.114) (0.009) (0.320) 
US financial stress 0.077***  0.085*** 0.094*** 0.080*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regional financial 
contagion 
1.409***  1.034*** 1.057*** 1.023*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP  -4.530* -3.490  -4.963 
 (0.074) (0.452)  (0.298) 
Bank Credit  1.310* 1.450*  1.174** 
 (0.093) (0.100)  (0.049) 
International reserves  0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.521)  (0.743) (0.837) 
Current account  0.002  -0.001 0.001 
 (0.859)  (0.864) (0.909) 
Fiscal balance  0.009  0.012 0.009 
 (0.423)  (0.343) (0.426) 
Constant -0.070*** -0.068 -0.121*** -0.065 -0.110 
(0.000) (0.543) (0.000) (0.567) (0.211) 
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.132 0.322 0.207 0.327 
 
Notes: Figures in italics are p-values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
 
Specification 1 in Table 4.7 is similar as the equivalent specification in Table 4.3 because 
only the domestic variables are subject to instrumentation. The IV estimation results for 
specifications 2-5 are broadly similar to the equivalent baseline estimations (Table 4.3). 
Higher levels of US Financial stress, regional financial contagion and domestic bank 
credit are associated with higher financial stress. The only notable difference is the 
increased (negative) sizes of GDP’s coefficient in specifications 2, 3 and 5, and its level 
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of significance in specification 2 from non-significance to significance at the 10% level. 
There is thus tentative evidence that financial stress tends to occur after the peak of the 
business cycle, when growth is slowing, which exacerbates financial stress. 
4.7 The Sources of Financial Stress across Asset Markets 
The analysis thus far has sought to give insight to the determinants of financial stress. By 
using the overall FSIs as the dependent variable in the panel models, an implicit 
assumption has been a commonality in the sources of financial stress across asset markets 
and the banking system. 
This section now analyses stress transmission across individual asset markets and the 
banking system. Two issues are addressed: First, is whether individual asset markets react 
similarly to common global and regional shocks. Different reactions across asset markets 
to common shocks can occur if domestic asset markets have asymmetric access to 
international financial markets. For example, Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) show 
theoretically that international capital market interest rates will not co-move with 
domestic interest rates when investors possess more access to international markets 
compared to domestic bank depositors. Regulatory restrictions that restrict or impose 
costs on foreign participation differently across asset markets can also cause a divergence 
in the effects of common external shocks among the individual asset markets (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 2002). The second issue is to analyse how financial stress spills over across 
asset markets. Studies of financial crises document that crises often involve multiple 
markets40, but have yet to document how the financial stress spills over across asset 
                                                
40 For example, Laeven and Valencia (2008) document financial crises incidences from 1970-2007. They find that about 21% of the 
124 identified banking crises that occurred during this period involved another market. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that 
currency crisis tend to have a higher probability of occurring when there is a banking crisis already underway. 
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markets while controlling for global, regional and country-specific macro-financial 
variables. 
To analyse these issues, the baseline panel models are augmented in two aspects. First, 
the market specific FSIs replace the overall FSIs as the dependent variable. Second, the 
other market specific FSIs are included as independent variables. Consider the below 
panel model in equation (4): 
[\]_PIJmLOA/n = ^A + B_9[/_?_`2 + 0aDbO/ + XcdDHA/c
e
c`2 + ;o[\]_PIJmLOA/o
?
o`2 + :A/ 
                   (Equation 4.4) 
All variables are as previously defined. The only new variable, FSI_Market, denotes 
market specific financial stress in the banking system, equity market, foreign exchange 
market and bond market. The summation, ;o[\]_PIJmLOA/o?o`2 , in equation 4.4 holds 
true for all p ≠	j.	Similar to the previous section, an instrumental variable approach is 
used to avoid endogeneity issues, using the previous 4 quarters as instruments for the 
country-specific variables. The results are presented in Table 4.8. 
The results show that there are nuanced differences in the sources of financial stress 
across asset markets and compared with overall financial stress. US financial stress affects 
domestic overall financial stress with a positive coefficient (Table 4.8, specification 1). 
However, this positive relationship only applies to equity-related (Table 4.8, specification 
3) and foreign exchange-related (Table 4.8, specification 4) financial stress41, with the 
coefficient for the former being much larger compared to the latter. Indeed, the larger 
                                                
41 This positive relationship is consistent with Beirne and Gieck’s (2012) finding that the degree of interdependence to global markets 
is the highest for the equity market. 
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coefficient for equity stress is consistent with Beirne and Gieck’s (2012) recent finding 
that interdependence with global markets is more prevalent for equities and limited for 
the exchange rate. 
Table 4.8: Instrumental Variable Estimation of Market Specific Financial Stress 
Dependent Variable 1. 
Overall 
2. 
Bank 
3. 
Equities 
4. 
Foreign 
Exchange 
5.  
Domestic 
Bond 
Financial Stress 
World GDP 8.215* 2.190 10.824 -13.70*** 8.786 
(0.084) (0.769) (0.221) (0.000) (0.166) 
Commodity prices -0.265 0.248 -0.561 0.588 -0.337 
(0.320) (0.585) (0.139) (0.088) (0.237) 
US financial stress 0.080*** -0.135*** 0.256*** 0.081*** -0.158*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
Regional financial 
contagion 
1.023*** 0.393** 0.444*** 0.935*** -0.286 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.223) 
GDP -4.963 2.067 -13.398*** 8.635*** -0.799 
(0.298) (0.530) (0.004) (0.092) (0.825) 
Bank Credit 1.174** -0.101 -0.632 0.008 4.087*** 
(0.049) (0.954) (0.488) (0.994) (0.000) 
International reserves 0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
  (0.837) (0.062) (0.465) (0.687) (0.168) 
Current account 0.001 0.016 -0.005 -0.011* -0.001 
(0.909 (0.157) (0.226) (0.053) (0.923) 
Fiscal balance 0.009 -0.028 0.007** 0.017 0.024 
(0.426 (0.220) (0.046) (0.235) (0.098) 
Financial Stress (Bank)   0.147* 0.134** 0.317** 
  (0.071) (0.047) (0.030) 
Financial Stress 
(Equities) 
 0.157*  0.094*** 0.775*** 
 (0.088)  (0.001) (0.000 
Financial Stress 
(Foreign Exchange) 
 0.288 0.169  -0.305* 
 (0.167 (0.104)  (0.013) 
Financial Stress 
(Domestic Bonds) 
 0.181* 0.418*** -0.041   
 (0.079) (0.000) (0.574)   
Constant -0.070*** -0.255*** 0.012 0.025 0.188 
(0.00) (0.009) (0.876) (0.682) (0.263) 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.200 0.663 0.071 0.585 
 
Notes: Figures in italics are p-values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels. 
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The corresponding coefficients for the effects of US financial stress is negative for bank-
related (Table 4.8, specification 2) and bond-related (Table 4.8, specification 5) financial 
stress. Therefore, the findings show that external financial turbulence spills over to 
ASEAN-5 financial markets through the equity and foreign exchange markets. 
Interestingly, the negative coefficients for the banking system and domestic bond market 
indicate that these markets act to partially absorb and mitigate the impact of the external 
financial shock42.  
A possible interpretation of this result is that when external financial shocks occur, there 
is a wave of capital outflows that causes a decline in the values and volatility spikes in 
equities and the exchange rate. The lower value and volatile equity prices reduce the 
conduciveness to raise financing from equity markets. This induces agents to turn to the 
domestic banking system and domestic bond market, where financing supply is more 
assessable in comparison. 
Regional financial contagion is most prevalent in the foreign exchange market, followed 
by the equity market and the least for domestic banks, as reflected respectively by the 
highest to lowest sizes of the statistically significant coefficients. Regional contagion is 
not a significant determinant of bond market stress. 
The results also indicate that financial shocks are often pervasive. Sector or asset-specific 
shocks often transmit to other markets. Financial stress from the banking sector and equity 
market are the most pervasive as they are associated with higher financial stress among 
each other and in all other asset markets. This result is consistent with Kaminsky and 
                                                
42 Similarly, Beirne and Gieck (2012) find that adverse US equity shocks causes a lowering of domestic bond yields in Asian 
economies and that within market shocks are transmitted with negative association. They also interpret their results as evidence that 
agents turn to domestic bond markets when US financial conditions deteriorate.    
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Reinhart’s (1999) finding that the probability of a currency crisis occurring is higher when 
conditioned on the presence of a banking crisis. In addition, vicious cycles are an 
important aspect in the transmission of financial stress. Problems in the banking system 
make economies more vulnerable to currency depreciations or devaluations through 
sudden stops in cross-border capital flows from domestic debt and equity markets. 
Meanwhile, equity market stress reduces fee-based income from banks and can also cause 
loan portfolios to deteriorate as the negative wealth effects from lower equity prices 
lowers the ability of economic agents to service their debt obligations. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This analysis attempts to contribute to the understanding of the transmission of financial 
stress in the ASEAN-5 economies using a panel data estimation methodology. Three 
variables are found to be significant determinants and robust to model specifications and 
methodology: US financial stress, regional financial contagion and domestic bank credit. 
The findings are consistent with the narrative from the financial crisis and financial 
contagion literatures: Loose credit conditions are precursors of financial crises, financial 
markets in emerging and small-open economies are highly susceptible to spillovers from 
external conditions and financial episodes marked by large contagion effects are, in 
general, more severe. There is evidence that trade and financial linkages play important 
roles in the transmission of financial stress across borders. While pinning down and 
differentiating the individual channels was empirically challenging, cross-border bank 
linkages seemed to be the most important over the sample studied.  
The findings also point to extensive linkages of banks and equity markets with all other 
asset markets. High stress in either is significantly associated with higher financial stress 
elsewhere. In particular, there is a vicious cycle of stress transmission between the 
banking system and equity markets, where adverse conditions in either exacerbates stress 
levels in the other, which in turn worsens the originating source of stress, and so on.  
   104 
 :  THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STRESS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY AND MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION IN ASEAN-5 
ECONOMIES43 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There has long been recognition that macroeconomic and financial stability are 
interlinked. This is indeed the reason both mandates often lay within the same institution, 
the central bank, as policy efforts to achieve either mandate is complementary towards 
achieving the other. Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009, there was 
often a dichotomy in the approaches and analysis to achieve these goals. Monetary policy 
was tasked to achieve macroeconomic stability. This analysis usually centred around 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and macro-econometric models that 
embed a “Taylor rule”, in which a short-term interest rate that is controlled by the central 
bank is modelled to react to the inflation gap and output gap44. Frictions that arise in 
financial markets especially during crises periods were largely absent in these models. 
Thus the effects of financial crises were often underestimated (Mishkin, 2009) or 
discounted as outliers in these models. Meanwhile, the supervisory and regulatory 
departments would assess the risks of financial market misconduct, often at the 
                                                
43 The main findings in this chapter have been published in Tng and Kwek (2015). Earlier drafts were presented at the 2014 Joint 
Meetings of the Australian Conference of Economists and Econometric Society Australasian Meetings (ESAM) in Tasmania, 
Australia, the 2014 ISI Regional Statistics Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and the Bank of Thailand and Bank for 
International Settlements (BoT-BIS) 8th Annual Workshop of the Asian Research Networks 2015. This chapter benefited from the 
valuable feedback received at these conferences. 
44 The inflation gap is the difference between current and desired/target inflation, while the output gap is the difference between current 
and potential output. This is original and most often applied version as suggested by Taylor (1993). Subsequent studies have analysed 
monetary policy using augmented versions of the Taylor rule with other variables, such as asset prices and credit as done in Borio and 
Lowe (2004) and within a calibrated model with the exchange rate as in Svensson (2000). 
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institutional level and in isolation with monetary policy considerations or the 
consequences. This was the general approach before the GFC45.  
The GFC episode was a forceful reminder of the significant linkages between the financial 
cycle and macroeconomic cycle, and how disruptive episodes of financial instability are 
to the real economy. Although conventional empirical macroeconomic models were 
unable to forecast the true effects of the crisis, a separate literature that documents 
historical experiences in the aftermath of financial crisis finds that downturns from crises 
are often deeper with recoveries that take longer (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008b, 2014). When 
viewed through the lens of history, the scale and depth of the economic downturn during 
the GFC was therefore consistent with past financial crisis experiences. The inadequacy 
of empirical macro models to match these stylised facts is cause for concern because they 
are often used for forecasting and policy analysis. In addition to the problem of 
experiencing larger forecast errors during crisis periods, this shortcoming also highlights 
important but unanswered questions pertaining to the interactions between financial stress 
and monetary policy, such as whether monetary policy is influenced directly by financial 
stress and if monetary policy is effective during crisis periods. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to address these issues for five small-open 
economies - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (henceforth, 
ASEAN-5). While these economies were not at the epicentre of the crisis, the 
aforementioned issues remain. In addition, as small and open economies, the GFC served 
as a stark reminder that their growth and financial stability prospects are highly 
                                                
45 Some central banks also utilise macro-prudential policy to manage macro-level financial stability risks. However, these practices 
were more the exception rather than the rule before the GFC and became more widely accepted and applied after the GFC.  
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susceptible to both domestic imbalances and external spillovers. ASEAN-5 growth was 
significantly affected through a combination of weak exports and financial spillovers. 
A Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach is used to give insight to four 
questions: First, what is the impact of financial stress on real economic activity? While 
the spillover to growth from lower exports is well understood, relatively less is known of 
the growth effects from the financial spillovers. This is especially true for economies with 
few past incidences of financial crisis, such as the ASEAN-5, to infer the growth effects 
from. Second, does monetary policy respond systematically to increases in financial 
stress? This question arises from a notable observation that although the global policy 
responses during the GFC period were tailored largely to country-specific conditions, 
central banks globally reduced their policy interest rates (IRs) during this period. This 
held true irrespective of the respective central banks’ monetary policy mandates (inflation 
targeting or not). Third, is monetary policy effective in alleviating financial stress? 
Finally, do changes in the level of financial stress alter the transmission of monetary 
policy to the real economy? These last two questions allude to the current ongoing debate 
on whether monetary policy was effective in aiding the economic recovery during the 
GFC (Mishkin, 2009). 
The model builds from the existing open-economy Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
literature by integrating the Financial Stress Indices (FSIs) from Chapter 3 into the VAR 
model to capture the financial stability aspect of financial cycles in global financial 
markets and in the ASEAN-5 economies. Through the FSIs, the VAR models capture in 
a parsimonious manner distinct features of financial episodes, such as changes in the 
underlying risk appetite, information asymmetries and uncertainty. Using the FSIs has 
the advantage of facilitating analysis of macro-financial linkages during tranquil and 
stressful periods in financial markets, as they are continuous measures of financial stress. 
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The FSIs are thus useful for analysing issues pertaining to the financial cycle in countries 
with few historical incidences of severe financial episodes. 
The findings show that an increase in financial stress leads to tighter credit conditions and 
lower economic activity in all five sample countries. The estimated impact on the real 
economy displays an initial rapid decline followed by a gradual dissipation. In Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, the central banks reduce policy interest rates when financial 
stress increases, although there is substantial cross-country variation in the magnitude and 
time dynamics. The lower policy interest rates are found to have little significant effects 
in lowering financial stress, but are still effective in stimulating economic activity through 
other channels. Overall, this result is consistent with these central banks acting to achieve 
macroeconomic stability, as lower policy interest rates act to offset the contractionary 
effects of higher financial stress on economic activity.  
The remaining chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 details the methodology of the 
paper, including the data used, specification issues and the specification of the SVAR 
model. Section 5.3 presents the results. Section 5.4 presents results from robustness tests. 
The last section concludes. 
5.2 Methodology 
A Structural VAR (SVAR) approach is used to assess the impact of financial stress on 
the economy and the linkages between financial stress and monetary policy. This 
modelling approach draws primarily from the recent efforts to study the linkages between 
financial conditions and economic activity by integrating FSIs into VAR-based models. 
Representative studies are Li and St-Amant (2010), Davig and Hakkio (2010), Hollo et 
al. (2012), Mallick and Sousa (2013), Roye (2011), Afonso et al. (2011), Galvao and 
Owyang (2014) and Kremer (2015). Although the specific FSIs that are used for analysis 
vary across studies, all reflect stress in financial markets through a combination of 
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declining and volatile asset prices and higher bond yields/spreads. The existing analyses 
have thus far tended to focus on developed economies, particularly Euro Area economies 
and the United States (US), which is unsurprising given the recent financial episodes 
there. This study instead focuses on the ASEAN-5 economies. From a methodological 
perspective, the current analysis contributes to this emerging literature by adapting the 
model to be more suited for small-open economies through the model’s structural 
assumptions and inclusion of additional external variables to account for the large 
exposures to the foreign environment. 
5.2.1 Data 
The sample consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
(ASEAN-5). The variables are in monthly frequency and range from January 1997 to 
December 2013. A summary of the variables is presented in Table 5.1. Appendix C 
contains plots of the variables, details on data transformations and additional information 
on the variables, including the monetary policy and exchange rate regimes, how the 
monetary policy variable was constructed in cases where there was a regime change and 
other country-specific idiosyncrasies.  
Three variables characterise the external environment: A global commodity price index 
(GCP), a world industrial production index (IPIw) and a financial stress index for the US 
economy (FSIus). GCP captures global prices of food, fuel and metal commodities. IPIw 
captures global real economic conditions. This global measure is preferred to the more 
commonly used US focused indicator, as it abstracts from trade diversification away from 
the US. In addition, focusing on US demand alone risks mis-identification of commodity 
price shocks, as commodity price movements are increasingly attributable to demand 
from emerging markets, such as China.  
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The final external variable is an index of financial stress for the US economy, FSIus, which 
proxies for global financial conditions. To be sure, financial episodes occur in other 
countries as well, especially in emerging markets. However, Kaminsky & Reinhart (2003) 
find that financial episodes tend to remain confined within their regions unless they spread 
to major financial centres. This suggests that ASEAN-5 financial markets will remain 
unaffected by financial episodes that originate outside the region and major financial 
centres (such as the US financial market), and that financial spillovers to the region only 
occur when major financial markets are affected. Therefore, this analysis does not attempt 
to measure global financial stress and assumes that US financial stress aptly reflects 
global financial conditions. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Variables used in the Estimations 
Variable Abbreviation Definition Source 
External 
Commodity prices GCP Commodity price 
index  
International Monetary 
Fund 
World output IPIW World industrial 
production index  
CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis 
US Financial 
stress 
FSIUS US Financial stress 
index  
Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) 
Domestic 
Output IPI Industrial production 
index  
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 
Prices CPI Consumer price index  IFS 
Interest rate IR Short-term interest 
rate 
IFS 
Credit C Bank credit, deflated 
by CPI 
IFS 
Exchange rate EX Nominal effective 
exchange rate 
Bank for International 
Settlements  
Financial stress FSI Financial stress index Tng et al. (2012) 
 
 
Six variables characterise the domestic economy: the industrial production index (IPI) 
captures real economic activity; the consumer price index (CPI) reflects the price level; 
the short-term interest rate (IR) is the monetary policy instrument in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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the Philippines and Thailand, and a floating short-term money market interest rate for 
Singapore; Credit (C) is total claims from the domestic banking system, and; the exchange 
rate (EX) is the nominal effective exchange rate. The last variable, an index of financial 
stress (FSI), is a summary indicator of stress in financial markets from Chapter 3. 
5.2.2 Unit Root Testing 
The time-series properties of the variables affect how the VAR model is specified. 
Specifically, the trend component in a series may be deterministic or stochastic, and the 
appropriate action to control for the trend component depends on its nature. For instance, 
a series with a deterministic trend should be de-trended by regressing it on a polynomial 
trend of appropriate degree and obtaining the residuals. In contrast, a series with a unit 
root of order d should be transformed to a stationary process through differencing by a 
similar order.  Hence, unit root tests are conducted to ascertain the variables’ order of 
integration, using the test developed in Phillips and Perron (1988) (PP). All variables are 
subject to two specifications in the unit root tests, first with a drift (constant) and second 
with a drift and a linear time trend. The regression for the test can be expressed as: 
∆*/ = B1 + <*/@2 + B2O + :/                 (Equation 5.1) 
The null hypothesis, H0: δ=0, indicates that the */ sequence contains a unit root. An issue 
that arises when conducting the unit root tests is whether there are structural breaks over 
the sample period. If structural change occurred which changed the mean, trend or both 
in a stationary data generation process, not controlling for these changes in the unit root 
tests will bias the results in favour of a unit root (non-stationary). To the extent that there 
are structural breaks in the series over the period studied for the ASEAN-5 economies, 
they are most likely to have occurred during or close to the AFC period. In Malaysia, the 
banking system underwent significant consolidation shortly after the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Capital control measures were introduced and the Malaysian ringgit was pegged 
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to the US Dollar in September 1998. In Thailand, there were likely changes in credit 
intermediation between 1997 and 1999, brought forth by the closure of over forty finance 
companies. In Indonesia, financially insolvent banks were closed during the AFC period. 
There were also several unique events in 1998 and 1999, such as the removal of large 
food subsidies, significant social unrest, political uncertainty resulting from a leadership 
change and delayed disbursements of IMF aid on several occasions that likely affected 
the macroeconomic performance of the country. As shown in Appendix C, many of the 
sample countries also experienced changes in monetary policy regimes between 1997 and 
2013. These events and structural changes should be but are difficult to explicitly account 
for in the unit root tests and SVAR estimations.  
The unit root tests are conducted over the entire sample period, 1997-2013, and from 2000 
onwards, since many of the potential candidates of structural breaks occurred between 
1997 (when the sample starts) and 2000. A similar test result from the two sample periods 
will give more confidence on the underlying data generation process of the variables. A 
different finding across sample periods indicates that structural change may have occurred 
during the earlier period and hence biased the test statistics.  
The unit root tests are conducted on the variables in levels, with and without a constant, 
and in first difference to investigate the stationary properties after differencing the 
variables and controlling for the presence of a deterministic trend. Table 5.2 presents the 
unit root test results.  
The results between the full sample (1997-2013) and sub-sample (2000-2013) are mostly 
similar, but differ in some cases. The test statistics from the level regressions tended to 
be statistically significant with lower p-values in the full sample. In particular, this is the 
case for US financial stress (with constant); the exchange rate for Indonesia, Malaysia 
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and Thailand in the test regressions with a constant and with both the constant and linear 
time trend, and Singapore’s short term interest rate in the level specifications.  
Table 5.2: Summary of Phillip-Perron Unit Root Test Statistics 
 Full Sample (1997-2013) Sub-sample (2000-2013) 
Level Level 1st Level Levels 1st 
(C) (C,T) Difference (C) (C,T) Difference 
External         
Commodity 
price 
-0.611 -3.167* -10.718*** -1.047 -2.606 -9.722*** 
World output -0.912 -2.657 -10.195*** -0.758 -2.317 -9.003*** 
US financial 
stress 
-2.685* -2.649 -12.429*** -2.361 -2.373 -11.269*** 
Indonesia    
Output 0.146 -3.513*** -19.284*** -0.201 -5.251*** -21.993*** 
Prices -2.841* -2.723 -6.438*** -2.070 -1.078 -11.199*** 
Interest rate -2.488 -3.159* -7.510*** -1.523 -2.251 -6.315*** 
Real credit -0.429 -1.818 -14.792*** 1.254 -0.403 -11.111*** 
Exchange rate -3.508*** -3.567** -10.540*** -1.123 -2.783 -10.215*** 
Financial stress -5.523*** -7.004*** -30.238*** -4.052*** -5.091*** -29.065*** 
Malaysia    
Output -1.253 -2.724 -21.177*** -1.585 -2.625 -20.357*** 
Prices -0.509 -2.494 -11.004*** 0.441 -2.820 -9.939*** 
Interest rate -2.200 -1.885 -12.922*** -2.235 -2.194 -13.024*** 
Real credit 1.252 -0.562 -13.135*** 2.386 -0.729  -11.779*** 
Exchange rate -4.051*** -3.726** -13.393*** -2.093 -2.083 -11.017*** 
Financial stress -2.629* -3.606** -16.290*** -3.128** -3.564*** -13.608*** 
The Philippines    
Output -2.766* -2.729 -20.532*** -1.417 -1.360 -17.138*** 
Prices -1.564 -2.090 -8.489*** -0.937 -1.697 -6.354*** 
Interest rate -1.665 -4.814*** -20.001*** -1.456 -3.035 -8.293*** 
Real credit 0.598 -0.455 -13.158*** 1.435 -0.104 -12.860*** 
Exchange rate -3.686*** -2.485 -10.892*** -2.979 -2.668 -9.726*** 
Financial stress -3.686*** -5.007*** -19.039*** -4.233*** -4.952*** -19.656*** 
Singapore    
Output -1.033 -6.353*** -26.928*** -1.301 -5.700*** -24.590*** 
Prices 2.280 -0.748 -11.984*** 1.749 -1.215 -10.603*** 
Interest rate -3.485*** -4.987*** -22.717*** -1.952 -2.614 -16.888*** 
Real credit 0.506 -0.951 -13.392*** 1.797 -0.699 -11.295*** 
Exchange rate 0.825 -1.127 -11.638*** 1.111 -1.314 -10.658*** 
Financial stress -12.042*** -12.225*** -89.099*** -10.854*** -11.075*** -43.704*** 
Thailand    
Output -1.143 -2.864 -15.636*** -1.604 -2.565 -14.579*** 
Prices -0.709 -2.431 -11.100*** 0.377 -2.752 -10.470*** 
Interest rate -2.382 -2.444 -17.335*** -1.984 -1.909 -9.240*** 
Real credit 1.008 -0.596 -14.193*** 1.861 -1.953 -13.485*** 
Exchange rate -4.004*** -4.224*** -10.746*** -1.345 -2.990 -9.545*** 
Financial stress -4.417*** -5.154*** -31.528*** -3.536*** -3.625** -16.862*** 
 
Notes: “C” refers to the constant, “T” refers to the trend. Values are the adjusted t-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%. The tests are conducted in EViews 8.0 using the Newey-West bandwidth selection method and Bartlett kernel function 
to estimate the residual spectrum at frequency zero. 
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Focusing now only on the unit root test of the variables in levels with only a constant and 
with a constant and trend from the sub-sample (2000 onwards) to eschew from potential 
structural break issues during the AFC period, the test results are consistent in all cases 
with two exceptions46 - Output in Indonesia and Singapore. In both cases, output in 
Indonesia and Singapore became trend stationary after including a time trend. Financial 
stress is consistently stationary in level terms in all sample economies, indicating strongly 
that this series is I(0). For all the variables, the null hypothesis was rejected at the 1% 
significance level in first difference, indicating stationarity after this transformation. 
5.2.3 Specification Issues 
Two specification issues arise from analysing the data properties and unit root results. 
The first is how best to address the structural breaks that potentially occurred during the 
AFC period. Many VAR studies tackle this issue by conveniently splitting their sample 
into pre-AFC and post-AFC sub-samples47. In this analysis, the period before the AFC is 
relatively short since the sample here begins in 1997. This partially mitigates the need to 
control for pre-crisis conditions. In addition, a benefit from using the full sample period 
is that it includes the AFC episode, which for the ASEAN-5 economies is a major 
domestic financial episode to have occurred during this period. Having this variation in 
domestic financial stress during the AFC in the sample is useful to differentiate between 
domestic and foreign financial shocks, and hence their impact on the economies. In 
addition, while using a post-AFC sub-sample is a convenient way to avoid having to 
explicitly control for structural changes, a pitfall is that the smaller sample results in a 
lower efficiency in the econometric estimates.  
                                                
46 Excluding the different levels of significance.  
47 See Fung (2002), Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003), Hesse (2007) and Raghavan, Silvapulle, and Athanasopoulos (2012) for some 
references.   
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The second issue is how best to estimate a VAR model when there are both I(1) and I(0) 
variables, and whether to include a deterministic trend in cases where the trend is found 
to be deterministic instead of stochastic. The later issue is pertinent in cases where the 
trend component was found to be deterministic (output in Indonesia and Singapore). 
Many studies, following from Sims (1980), Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) and 
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997), estimate their VARs with the I(1) variables in levels under 
the premise that their interest is not in the parameter estimates but rather in the inter-
relationships. Moreover, parameter estimates are usually not focused on in VARs since 
they are often over-parameterised. These studies instead analyse the time dynamics of 
interest from the impulse response functions. In addition, from an estimation and 
inferential perspective, in cases when there is a cointegrating relationship among the I(1) 
variables, estimating the VAR model in levels is appropriate because the VECM can be 
expressed as a VAR model in levels. 
Therefore, the SVAR models in this study are estimated in levels, with the results 
focusing on the time dynamics from the impulse response functions. While 
acknowledging the potential pitfalls associated with estimating SVARs in levels, this is 
nonetheless a revealing way to examine the inter-relationships. 
5.2.4 The Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) Model 
A schematic that summarises the causality assumptions of the SVAR model is illustrated 
in Figure 5.1. Domestic output and prices are influenced by two groups of variables: The 
first is the external environment, consisting of commodity prices, world output and US 
financial stress. The second group characterises domestic financial markets with a short-
term interest rate, the exchange rate, credit and domestic financial stress. The ASEAN-5 
economies are modelled as small-open economies, and are thus assumed to be affected 
by but cannot affect external conditions.  
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Figure 5.1: Causality Assumptions in the VAR Model 
 
The external variables can directly affect domestic output and prices through global trade, 
price and financial channels, and indirectly through domestic financial markets. For 
example, external conditions may influence monetary policy, which in turn affects 
domestic financial conditions, output and prices. External conditions also influence the 
exchange rate and domestic asset prices through cross-border capital flows. This 
consequently affects the terms of trade, wealth and financing conditions, which in turn 
affect domestic output and prices. The financial accelerator mechanism may also amplify 
the direct effects of external shocks through a feedback effect from interactions between 
the real economy and financial markets. For instance, when faced with an adverse external 
demand shock, lower profits and deteriorating balance sheet positions of export-oriented 
companies’ may cause an increase in borrowing premiums and lower access to financing. 
This leads to moderating investment and credit-financed trade. 
To characterise these channels, consider the following SVAR model for each sample 
economy: 
tu/ = v l u/@2 + :/                 (Equation 5.2) 
External Environment 
• Commodity prices 
• World output 
• US financial stress 
Domestic Economy 
• Output and Prices 
Domestic Financial Market 
• Interest rate 
• Exchange rate 
• Credit 
• Domestic financial stress 
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u is a vector of variables of similar ordering as Table 5.1. A is a matrix of 
contemporaneous coefficients in structural form. v l  is a matrix polynomial in the lag 
operator, L. :/ is a vector of structural disturbances, such that: 
:/ = tL/                  (Equation 5.3) 
L/ is a vector of residuals from the corresponding reduced-form VAR. The equations can 
be organised into external and domestic blocks. Structural shocks are identified using the 
approach suggested by Sims (1986), Bernanke (1986) and applied by many others 
thereafter, by placing restrictions on the contemporaneous coefficients. The assumptions 
made on the matrix, A, are: 
 :wxy:zyz{:|}z~:zyz:xyz:zÄ:x:ÅÇ:|}z
=
I22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0I72 I77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0I?2 I?7 I?? 0 0 0 0 0 0Ie2 Ie7 Ie? Iee 0 0 0 0 0IÉ2 IÉ7 IÉ? IÉe IÉÉ 0 0 0 0IÑ2 IÑ7 IÑ? IÑe IÑÉ IÑÑ 0 0 0IÖ2 IÖ7 IÖ? IÖe IÖÉ IÖÑ IÖÖ 0 0IÜ2 IÜ7 IÜ? IÜe IÜÉ IÜÑ IÜÖ IÜÜ 0Iá2 Iá7 Iá? Iáe IáÉ IáÑ IáÖ IáÜ Iáá
LwxyLzyz{L|}z~LzyzLxyzLzÄLxLÅÇL|}z
 (Equation 5.4) 
 
Commodity prices are contemporaneously exogenous to all other variables. World 
production and US financial stress are identified recursively by assuming the former is 
contemporaneously affected by commodity prices, while US financial stress is 
contemporaneously affected by commodity prices and world production. The external 
variables are contemporaneously unaffected by the country-specific variables. The first 
four variables in the domestic block are ordered recursively in the following order - IPI, 
CPI, IR, C, EX and FSI. The short-term interest rate broadly follows a Taylor rule 
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principle, as it reacts contemporaneously to economic activity (IPI) and prices (CPI)48. 
The exchange rate is ordered before financial stress to model the narrative that a financial 
shock can trigger capital outflows and affect the exchange rate with a lag. 
To more strictly impose the small-open economy assumption, block-exogeneity 
restrictions are imposed on the domestic variables in the external equations. This means 
that the external variables affect each other in lags, but are unaffected by the domestic 
variables contemporaneously and in lags. This approach follows from Cushman and Zha 
(1997), Maćkowiak (2007), Genberg (2005) and Raghavan et al. (2012). The block-
exogeneity restrictions translate to the coefficient matrix for the lag structure, Bi, where i 
represent the lags, with the variables ordered similar to Table 5.1:  
 
v =
F22 F27 F2? 0 0 0 0 0 0F72 F77 F7? 0 0 0 0 0 0F?2 F?7 F?? 0 0 0 0 0 0Fe2 Fe7 Fe? Fee FeÉ FeÑ FeÖ FeÜ FeáFÉ2 FÉ7 FÉ? FÉe FÉÉ FÉÑ FÉÖ FÉÜ FÉáFÑ2 FÑ7 FÑ? FÑe FÑÉ FÑÑ FÑÖ FÑÜ FÑáFÖ2 FÖ7 FÖ? FÖe FÖÉ FÖÑ FÖÖ FÖÜ FÖáFÜ2 FÜ7 FÜ? FÜe FÜÉ FÜÑ FÜÖ FÜÜ FÜáFá2 Fá7 Fá? Fáe FáÉ FáÑ FáÖ FáÜ Fáá
                       (Equation 5.5) 
 
The estimations are carried out using four lags. Table 5.3 presents results from the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), with six lags 
set as the maximum length given the relatively short sample. The AIC chose a longer lag 
length with a wide range from three to six, while the SIC selected one lag for all countries. 
                                                
48 This reaction function is not exactly the same as the one originally suggested in Taylor (1993) as other variables enter the function 
in lags.
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Given these differing results, these test results are used as guides rather than a hard-and-
fast rule. The analysis chooses the average of the AIC lags of 4.  
Table 5.3: Lag Length Selection from AIC and SIC Tests 
 Akaike Information Criterion Schwarz Criterion 
Indonesia 6 1 
Malaysia 3 1  
The Philippines 4 1  
Singapore 3 1  
Thailand 4 1  
 
 
5.3 Results 
This section presents the estimation results from the SVAR models. The impulse 
responses are plotted over 60 months with the 95th percentile confidence intervals49. 
5.3.1 The Impact of Financial Stress 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the impulse responses of industrial production to a one standard 
deviation unexpected increase in financial stress. The impulse responses show that higher 
financial stress leads to a decline in output. A similarity in the output responses across 
countries is that the declines are initially rapid and followed by a more gradual dissipation. 
Most of the contractionary effects occur within the first year after the shock with a 
majority of the effects dissipating by the second year. There is nonetheless some cross-
country heterogeneity in the time dynamics. In Indonesia and Malaysia, there is a 
subsequent overshoot in IPI, which is indicative of the presence of an uncertainty channel 
in which firms subsequently react to pent-up demand for capital and labour. The response 
for the Philippines is the most persistent, with the largest effects felt approximately two 
years after the shock, followed by dissipation over the subsequent three years. IPI in 
                                                
49 The bootstrap methodology applied is from Hall (1992) using 100 replications. Increasing the number of replications to 500 does 
not materially change the results. 
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Singapore and Thailand recover quickly with their IPIs returning to baseline levels 
approximately one year after the shock. In general, the time dynamics - a sharp drop and 
gradual dissipation - are consistent with results from other similar studies, for instance 
Davig and Hakkio (2010) for the US economy and Hollo et al. (2012) for Euro Area 
economies. 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
Figure 5.2: Response of IPI to a Financial Stress Shock 
 
A main conduit in which financial stress causes a reduction in economic activity is 
through lower access to financing from banks. Figure 5.3 gives evidence of this channel 
by illustrating the impulse responses of real credit to a one standard deviation increase in 
financial stress. Real credit declines in all cases. Similar to the previous impulse 
responses, the initial declines in real credit are the sharpest during the first year after the 
shock, which is then followed by a more gradual dissipation. While deteriorating credit 
conditions contribute to moderating economic activity as financial stress increases, one 
factor that may limit the downward pressure on the real economy is if higher financial 
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stress causes higher cross-border capital outflows and depreciation in the exchange rate, 
which then stimulates the export sector. 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
Figure 5.3: Response of Real Credit to a Financial Stress Shock 
 
Figure 5.4 tries to provide some insight to how exchange rates tend to move when 
financial stress increases. The results display substantial cross-country heterogeneity. 
Exchange rate depreciation is observed in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, albeit 
with differing time-dynamics. In Malaysia, there is initially a depreciating effect followed 
by temporary appreciation. The estimated effect for Singapore is both economically and 
statistically insignificant from 0. 
The large variations in exchange rate responses across countries likely reflect differences 
in both institutions and policy regimes that are beyond the intended scope of this study. 
In Singapore, the NEER serves as the monetary policy instrument, indicating essentially 
that the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s monetary policy stance does not 
systematically respond to changes in financial stress. In Malaysia, the central bank 
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intervenes to reduce exchange rate volatility. This may explain why the depreciation is 
temporary - for example, upon experiencing sudden capital outflows and exchange rate 
depreciation as financial stress increases, the central bank intervenes to limit the abrupt 
exchange rate depreciation and hence, reduces the overall exchange rate volatility 
associated with capital flow movements. Malaysia’s exchange rate dynamics is likely also 
influenced by changes in the exchange rate regime during the sample period. 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
Figure 5.4: Response of NEER to a Financial Stress Shock 
 
Overall, the impulse responses indicate that financial stress has negative effects on real 
economic activity. It, nonetheless, begs the question of its overall influence on economic 
activity. Financial shocks may have significant negative effects on domestic output, but 
explain only a small fraction of the total variation in output if they occur infrequently. 
The variance decomposition of IPI is analysed next to derive the contribution of financial 
stress to the real economy. The decomposition results at the 24- and 36-month horizons 
are presented in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4: Decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance of Output (%) 
  GCP IPIW FSIUS IPI CPI IR C EX FSI 
  24 months 
Indonesia 1 3 3 25 2 4 7 17 39 
Malaysia 6 18 49 14 5 1 2 2 4 
The 
Philippines 34 18 6 25 2 0 10 2 3 
Singapore  5 39 24 28 0 0 1 1 1 
Thailand 6 42 17 31 0 0 1 0 2 
  36 months 
Indonesia 1 4 3 23 2 4 13 16 35 
Malaysia 4 25 49 10 4 0 1 2 3 
The 
Philippines 37 14 13 18 1 0 8 4 4 
Singapore  4 44 27 21 0 0 1 1 1 
Thailand 5 52 16 23 0 0 2 0 1 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
As previously suggested, the contributions from domestic financial stress (FSI) to real 
economic activity (IPI) are relatively small. Aside from Indonesia as an outlier with the 
highest contribution of 39%, the contributions in the other four sample countries are 
below 5%. This indicates that, at least for the ASEAN-5 economies, financial stress 
events have historically been tail risks to the real economy, but such events have 
significant adverse effects when they occur. Meanwhile, a large amount of the variation 
in output can be attributed to external factors, which account for an average of 54% and 
60% of the total variation in output at the 24- and 36-month horizons. The high external 
contributions validate the importance of including the foreign variables in VAR models 
when analysing open economies50. 
                                                
50 See Tng (2013) for an analysis of the impact of external shocks on output and inflation using a vastly similar SVAR model and 
sample.  
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5.3.2 Monetary Policy under Financial Stress 
Do ASEAN-5 central banks alter their monetary policy stance when financial stress 
increases? Is it effective? This section now explores the two-way interactions between 
monetary policy and financial stress. Singapore is excluded from this analysis because 
the exchange rate instead of an interest rate is used to conduct monetary policy. The result 
for Singapore is therefore not comparable with the other economies, due to differences in 
the policy instrument and identification of monetary policy shocks in the SVAR. 
Figure 5.5 analyses monetary policy behaviour when financial stress increases, by 
illustrating the impulse responses of interest rates to a one standard deviation increase in 
financial stress. The impulse responses show that interest rates in Malaysia and the 
Philippines are lowered when financial stress increase51. Their interest rates decline the 
most during the first year after the financial shock. In Thailand, the interest rate displays 
an initial spike, followed by an easing trajectory similar to Malaysia and the Philippines. 
To see if the initial interest rate spike in Thailand’s case is attributable to the brief period 
of high interest rate policy during the AFC, the impulse response function from the SVAR 
model estimated from 2000 onwards is also shown in Figure 5.5. The results show that 
removing the AFC period from the sample eliminates the initial spike in the interest rate, 
strongly suggesting that the spike is indeed a reflection of monetary policy tightening 
only during the AFC period. In Indonesia, the interest rate initially increases as well. 
Unlike Thailand, the initial increase in Indonesia’s interest rate lasts for a longer duration 
and does not disappear when the AFC episode is removed from the sample. However, the 
magnitude of the increase becomes statistically insignificant from zero when the AFC 
episode is removed from the sample. 
                                                
51 The initial spike in Malaysia’s case is small and statistically insignificant and is thus discounted for inference. 
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Source: Author’s estimates 
Figure 5.5:  Response of Interest Rate to a Financial Stress Shock 
 
A natural follow-up question is whether monetary policy influences financial stress 
levels. Figure 5.6 gives an indication through the impulse responses of financial stress to 
interest rate shocks. The responses of financial stress are heterogeneous across countries, 
and are often small and statistically insignificant. This reflects a limit in the use of 
monetary policy to alleviate financial stress and that direct financial sector intervention 
is likely necessary to restore financial stability during crisis periods. This result, however, 
is not a justification against monetary policy easing during periods of higher financial 
stress. As shown earlier, higher financial stress adversely affects real economic activity 
and central banks may still use monetary policy to restore macroeconomic (output) 
stability. A key premise, however, is that lower interest rates are capable of stimulating 
output not by restoring financial stability, but through other channels. 
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Source: Author’s estimates 
Figure 5.6: Response of Financial Stress to an Interest Rate Shock 
 
To give insight to this hypothesis, it is necessary to distinguish the effects of interest rates 
on output that is attributable to domestic financial stress as a transmission channel. This 
is achieved by comparing the impulse response functions from the baseline model to those 
from a restricted model. The restricted model is similar to the baseline model, except that 
domestic financial stress is exogenous. Doing so blocks off the responses of output to a 
change in the interest rate that passes through financial stress. The differences in impulse 
responses between the baseline and restricted SVARs reflect the degree of pass-through 
via domestic financial stress. This method of analysing the transmission channels of 
monetary policy follows from Morsink and Bayoumi (2001), Chow (2004) and Raghavan 
et al. (2012). To avoid specification issues due to well-known instabilities in the ASEAN 
economies’ monetary policy reaction functions during the AFC period, the impulse 
responses for this analysis are estimated using data only from 2000 onwards. Figure 5.7 
shows impulse responses of IPI to interest rate shocks from the baseline and restricted 
models.  
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Source: Author’s estimates 
Notes: The blue line and dotted lines are the responses and error bands from the baseline model. The red line is the response from the 
restricted model. 
Figure 5.7: Response of IPI to an Interest Rate Shock 
 
In all cases, the impulse responses from both models are largely similar and fall within 
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although lowering interest rates generally have limited effects in restoring financial 
stability, such policy moves are effective in stimulating economic activity through other 
channels. Easing monetary policy amid financial episodes is therefore a desirable policy 
strategy to offset the contractionary effects of higher financial stress on output. 
5.4 Robustness 
The assumptions made on the exogeneity of the domestic variables in the foreign 
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economies, it is reasonable to assume that they are affected by but cannot affect external 
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financial block is not as self-evident. Financial stress can have contemporaneous effects 
on the exchange rate since its value is partly determined by cross-border capital flows 
which can react quickly to changes in financial conditions. Monetary policy may also 
react contemporaneously to financial stress if central banks take it as a forward looking 
signal of macroeconomic prospects. 
To test the sensitivity of the baseline findings, the SVAR models are estimated with 
alternative orderings of the FSI within the financial block and replicate the impulse 
responses from the main findings of this article - Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.7. The results 
are presented in Figure 5.8. The responses generated from alternative specifications are 
broadly in line with the baseline model. The impact of FSI shocks on IPI are broadly 
similar. The initial fall in IPI is steep, followed by a gradual tapering off. Similarly, the 
responses of IPI to interest rate shocks are robust to changes in the ordering of the FSI 
variable. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter is to use a SVAR approach to contribute to the understanding of 
how financial stress affects the economy and monetary policy transmission. The 
estimations reveal that financial stress has negative effects on real economic activity, 
credit and, in some cases, the exchange rate. Although there is some heterogeneity in the 
responses, an empirical regularity in the responses of output is that the largest effects are 
felt within the first year of the shock. However, financial stress contributes a small share 
of the overall variation in output, which is likely attributable to the low frequency of high 
financial stress episodes.  
The findings also show that central banks in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines tend 
to reduce their policy interest rates when financial stress increases. Although lowering 
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the policy interest rates have mixed results in reducing financial stress, they can still 
stimulate economic activity through other channels.  
More generally, these findings suggest a necessity for monetary policy easing to help 
offset the contractionary effects of adverse financial shocks on the real economy. This 
helps central banks achieve their macroeconomic stability mandates. But monetary policy 
also needs to be complemented with direct financial sector interventions to restore 
financial stability. This may include, for instance, short-term loans to alleviate liquidity 
shortages, direct equity injections to financial institutions to reduce solvency risks and 
ensuring the sufficiency of trade credit to facilitate continued trade activities. In addition 
to a higher effectiveness to restore financial stability, another benefit of a targeted policy 
approach to restore financial stability is that it reduces time lag issues between the 
policies’ effects on output and the effect that higher financial stress has on output. While 
there is potentially such a timing mismatch for monetary policy, policy instruments that 
directly restore financial stress to normal levels reduces this pitfall. 
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Response of IPI to FSI shocks Response of IPI to interest rate shocks 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
Note: B refers to impulse responses from the baseline model. 2, 3 and 4 are impulse responses from specifications with the FSI ordered 
respectively before the NEER, the NEER and real credit, and the NEER, real credit and the interest rate. Other assumptions remain 
similar to the baseline model. 
Figure 5.8: Impulse Responses from Alternative Ordering Assumptions 
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 :  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The motivation of the study is to contribute to the field of financial crisis measurement, 
its sources, its effects on macroeconomic stability and how monetary policy effectiveness 
is affected during crisis periods. Before the GFC episode, there was no agreed on 
methodology to reflect the severity of financial crises as they unfold from the initial stages 
to when they becomes systemic events. There was also limited information on the 
dynamic effects of financial crises on real economic activity and guidance on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy during crises. Hence, as financial crises unfold and 
intensify, the forecast errors on growth become large. In addition, the monetary policy 
debate during crisis periods often reflect a lack of consensus over the best course of 
action.  
The review of existing literature in Chapter 2 highlights that these analytical shortcomings 
are attributable in large part to the state of progression in the relevant lines of literature. 
Especially before the GFC, there was no available measure of financial stability beyond 
the binary financial crisis indicator - crisis or no crisis. It was hence difficult to track the 
unfolding of financial crises in real time or analyse how changes in financial stability 
conditions affected macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy transmission. This 
study seeks to address some of these limitations and contribute to the current knowledge. 
The analysis in this study focused on the following three areas. First, in Chapter 3, a 
methodology was developed to measure financial stability conditions on a continuous 
scale through the construction of Financial Stress Indices (FSIs). Second, in Chapter 4, 
using the FSIs from Chapter 3, a panel model of financial stress was developed to 
determine the sources of financial stress throughout the entire financial cycle, instead of 
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just financial crisis periods. Third, in Chapter 5, a Structural Vector Autoregression 
(SVAR) model is developed and estimated to give insight to how adverse financial shocks 
are transmitted to the real economy and how monetary policy transmission is affected by 
financial stress. 
The analysis is conducted using data from the ASEAN-5 economies of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand over the period ranging from 1997-
2013. The reason for this choice of economies is that post-GFC, a majority of the analyses 
in broadly similar areas were concerned about the US economy and the Euro Area 
economies, where the epicentre of the crisis was. In addition to being a relatively unused 
sample in this emerging literature, as small-open economies, using the ASEAN-5 
economies as the sample also poses unique modelling challenges that differ from large, 
developed economies. 
The remaining chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 presents summaries of the 
findings and main contributions made to existing literature. Section 6.3 discusses the 
practical implications of the study’s findings. The last section discusses opportunities for 
further research.  
6.2 Main Contributions and Findings  
In Chapter 3, Financial Stress Indices (FSIs) are constructed for the ASEAN-5 economies. 
These indices measure financial stress in individual asset markets and at the overall 
systemic level. In contrast with existing ASEAN-5 FSIs, the FSIs constructed here 
incorporate stress in the domestic bond market, in addition to the usual equity market, 
foreign exchange market and banking sector. In addition, the weights that are used to 
aggregate the market specific indicators of financial stress to form the overall FSI reflect 
the financial structure of the economy. Hence, markets that provide a large share of 
financing to economic agents are assigned proportionately large weights. The FSIs are 
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then used to chronicle financial episodes among the ASEAN-5 from 1997-2013. This is 
done for the individual countries as well as from a regional perspective, by documenting 
the clustering of local and global peaks in the FSIs over time. Three notable financial 
episodes stand out - the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998, the technology 
bubble burst (tech bust) in 2000-2001 and the GFC of 2007-2009. The AFC ranks as the 
most severe financial episode. Financial stress was the highest in levels and lasted the 
longest. This is not surprising as this episode originated regionally and domestically in 
many cases. In addition, the FSIs indicate that the tech bust was a more severe financial 
episode compared to the GFC for the ASEAN-5 economies, except for Singapore. The 
latter finding is perhaps surprising, as the GFC was a substantially more severe financial 
episode regardless of whether the episodes are considered from a global perspective or 
solely from the origin of the crisis. 
In Chapter 4, the ASEAN-5 FSIs from Chapter 3 are used to estimate a panel model of 
financial stress that incorporates global, regional and domestic factors. Four main 
contributions are made in this Chapter. First, ASEAN-5 regional contagion is measured 
more rigorously compared to existing studies in the FSI literature. Taking guidance from 
the financial contagion literature, financial contagion is measured first by stripping the 
ASEAN-5 FSIs of the fundamentals based variations, then using principal component 
analysis to identify the common variation in the “non-fundamental” portion of the 
movements in the FSIs. Second, an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is taken to 
control for two-way causality between financial stress and its domestic-based 
determinants. Third, the FSIs are utilised to investigate the role of trade and financial 
linkages in facilitating the transmission of financial stress from external to ASEAN-5 
financial markets. Finally, the panel analysis is conducted on the market specific-FSIs to 
analyse whether the determinants are similar across asset markets and to give insight to 
how financial stress spreads across asset markets. The results show that of the 
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external/common variables considered, US financial stress and regional contagion are 
consistently statistically significant across specifications and methodology. Of the 
domestic variables, only bank credit emerges as significant, with a positive bank credit 
gap foreshadowing higher financial stress. Panel analysis of the sources of financial stress 
within individual asset markets reveals the importance of the banking system and equity 
markets for financial stress elsewhere. Of significance, there is a vicious cycle of stress 
transmission between the banking system and equity market - higher stress in either 
market elevates stress levels in the other, which in turn worsens the originating source of 
stress, and so on. 
In Chapter 5, the ASEAN-5 FSIs from Chapter 3 are used to estimate Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) models for each sample country. In contrast with existing VAR-
based studies with FSIs that tend to focus on large developed economies, the sample in 
this study comprise of small-open economies. The small-open economy assumption is 
reflected explicitly in the SVAR’s structure, where the global variables can affect the 
domestic variables, but not vice versa. Four questions are posed: First, what is the impact 
of financial stress on real economic activity? Here, the time dynamics and transmission 
are analysed. Second, does monetary policy respond systematically to financial stress? 
Third, is monetary policy effective in alleviating financial stress? Finally, do changes in 
financial stress alter the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy? The last 
two questions, in particular, give insight to the ongoing debate on whether monetary 
policy was effective in aiding the economic recovery from the GFC period. The findings 
show that higher financial stress leads to lower credit and real economic activity. The 
estimated time dynamics for the impact of higher financial stress on the real economy are 
an initial rapid decline, followed by a gradual dissipation. In Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand, the central banks tend to reduce their policy rates when financial stress 
increases, although the impulse response analysis reveal substantial cross-country 
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variation in the magnitude and time dynamics. Finally, lower policy interest rates are 
found to have limited significant effects in lowering financial stress, but are still effective 
in stimulating economic activity through other channels. 
6.3 Practical Implications 
There is a myriad of inter-linkages between financial markets and the real economy. A 
stable and well-functioning financial system is necessary to sustain growth in the real 
economy along a path that is both high and stable. As the GFC episode forcefully 
demonstrated, episodes of financial instability can have long-lasting effects on the real 
economy and labour markets. Yet, measures of financial stability and their incorporation 
in mainstream macro models that are commonly used for forecasting and monetary policy 
analysis were missing, especially pre-GFC. In this context, this study aimed to improve 
the surveillance of financial stability conditions through the construction of financial 
stress indices, to analyse what drives changes in financial stability, how they affect growth 
and how monetary policy transmission is affected by changes in financial stability. 
6.3.1 Improving the Communication of Financial Stress 
The FSIs constructed in this study can be updated monthly with relative ease and low lag. 
They can thus be added to the set of indicators that are monitored on an ongoing basis for 
macro-level financial market and monetary conditions. This applies to both the market-
specific and overall FSIs. The analysis of the sources of financial stress in small-open 
economies reveals that external and regional financial conditions as well as domestic 
credit are significant drivers. This implies that these indicators should also be added to 
the set of indicators for monitoring financial conditions. 
Uncertainty is often heightened during periods of financial crises. The uncertainty effect 
alone leads economic agents to hold off on planned expenditures until the uncertainty 
subsides. This is true even for financially viable firms and households (Bloom, 2009; 
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Bloom, Bond & Van Reenen, 2007; Carrière-Swallow & Céspedes, 2013). In this regard, 
effective communication becomes a key aspect of financial crisis management. This 
includes communication over the severity of crises, its effects and the policy steps that 
are being undertaken to address the adverse effects. An advantage of the FSIs developed 
in this study is that they are easy to interpret - higher values reflect higher stress. The FSIs 
can thus be used as an effective tool to communicate the state of the financial crisis to the 
public.  
As a complement to using the overall and market specific FSIs to communicate the stage 
of the financial crisis, “heat maps” can be utilised to illustrate vulnerabilities arising from 
the individual variables that drive financial stress, as found in chapter 4. Heat maps 
illustrate graphically the build-up of financial stability risks based on the performance of 
these indicators. Figure 6.1 illustrates a recent example of a heat map that was recently 
applied by the IMF to assess and illustrate financial stability risks in Asian economies. 
The top of the x-axis lists three indicators of focus: residential real estate prices, credit-
to-GDP growth and equity prices, which have been standardised and represented as z-
scores. The Y-axis illustrates time, while the colours reflect different levels of financial 
stability risks through different colours that represent varying z-scores over time and 
across indicators. Black represents the lowest level of risk while red represents the highest 
level of risk. 
In the context of this study’s findings, heat maps can be applied in two ways. First, it can 
reflect market-specific levels of financial stress using the market specific FSIs, and 
overall systemic levels of financial stress using the overall FSIs that were constructed in 
chapter 3. The colour codes can be similar with the example in Figure 6.1. Low levels, 
reflecting low stress, may be illustrated using black colour. As stress levels gradually 
increase, the colours turn blue, yellow, orange and eventually red, which represents a 
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systemic financial crisis. The second possible application of the heat map pertains to the 
sources of financial stress that were found to be statistically significant determinants in 
chapter 4. Of note, for small and open economies such as the ASEAN-5 economies, is the 
need to include global financial stress and regional financial contagion levels, in addition 
to the traditional domestic variables such as the output gap and domestic credit measures. 
 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook (Asia and the Pacific) 2015 
Figure 6.1: Sample Heat Map Applied to Asian Economies 
 
6.3.2 Reducing Forecast Errors of Economic Activity and Quicker Policy 
Responses 
A key benefit of integrating the set of FSIs and related indicators to the surveillance 
toolkit at central banks is that it helps to improve predictions about the future direction of 
real economic activity, since as Chapter 5 shows, shocks to financial stress affect the real 
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economy. This is important as the improvement in forecast capability brought forth by 
integrating financial stress into a standard macro model allows for quicker and more 
decisive policy responses. Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence that monetary policy is 
still effective during periods of higher financial stress, and should thus be used to offset 
the contractionary effect of higher financial stress on the real economy. 
From a broader perspective, these findings imply that monetary policy easing is a 
necessary but likely an insufficient policy response during episodes of higher financial 
stress. This is because although monetary policy easing offsets the contractionary impact 
of the adverse financial shocks on the real economy, it does not aid to restore financial 
stability to normal levels, which is the root cause of the economic downturn. Monetary 
policy easing should thus comprise of part of a broader policy response that includes 
measures that are targeted directly at improving financial conditions. This includes, for 
instance, providing short-term loans to alleviate liquidity shortages, equity injections to 
ailing financial institutions to reduce solvency concerns and ensuring the continued flow 
of credit to credit-worthy households and firms and the sufficiency of trade credit to 
facilitate continued trade activities. In addition to achieving a higher effectiveness in 
restoring financial stability, another benefit of policies that are targeted at reducing 
financial stress levels is that they avoid timing mismatch issues that arise due to the 
different time dynamics between the effects of financial stress on the real economy and 
the effects of monetary policy easing on the real economy. Notably, the former effects 
growth much quicker compared to the later. 
6.3.3 Combining Micro-Level Supervision with Macro-Level Surveillance 
The market specific and overall FSIs facilitate ease in communicating the level of 
financial stress from a macro-level. In addition, it is necessary to understand the sources 
of financial stress at the micro level, from individual institutions and investors, beyond 
what the macro-level data reflects. 
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Recognising the importance of micro-level information gathering, the Bank of England 
recently institutionalised this aspect of surveillance through the “Market Intelligence 
Charter”. This form of information gathering is regarded by the Bank of England as:  
“Providing the Bank with crucial insights beyond publically available data, 
which are essential in helping to identify actual and incipient sources of monetary 
and financial instability.” (Bank of England, 2015)  
While it is likely that many central banks already do engage individual financial market 
participants to seek their views and to provide a micro-level context of macro-level data, 
few have institutionalised and explicitly recognised this aspect to aid their communication 
and the policy decision making process.  
6.3.4 Need for Increased Corporation among Regional Central Banks and 
Supervision Authorities 
The significant role of regional financial contagion revealed in chapter 4 suggests that the 
cumulative stability of the region’s financial markets is an important pre-condition for the 
stability of individual financial markets within the region. During the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC), regional level contagion spiked and exacerbated financial stress among all 
the ASEAN-5 economies. In contrast, regional contagion levels remained low during the 
tech bust (20012002) and GFC (2007-2009), which is a key reason ASEAN-5 financial 
stress remained low, especially during the GFC. Overall, this raises the importance of 
corporation and policy coordination amongst the regional central banks and regulators, 
and suggests that there are benefits to incorporating a multilateral dimension in policy 
formulation and financial market surveillance for the ASEAN regional economies. 
Preserving financial stability at the regional level is complementary to efforts to 
preserving financial stability at the national level. 
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6.4 Further Research Opportunities 
This study contributes to a relatively young but rapidly developing literature of 
constructing indices that reflect systemic financial conditions in high frequency (at least 
monthly), analysing how such indices behave and how best to integrate them into 
mainstream models for macroeconomic and policy analysis. There are certainly further 
research opportunities going forward.  
The sample coverage in this study comprises of the ASEAN-5 economies over the period 
1997-2013. This sample includes a variation of financial stress episodes that originate 
from domestic, regional and global sources. There are, nonetheless, additional benefits 
from further expanding the sample period, especially backwards, to incorporate additional 
global and domestic episodes in the 1980s and early 1990s. Achieving this in this study 
was constrained by limited data given the methodology used to construct the FSIs. While 
the data that was needed to construct certain indicators was not available, a potentially 
fruitful way forward would be to develop a methodology, which allows the flexibility of 
including and excluding variables from the indices over time. This is done by Hatzius et 
al. (2010) in their construction of Financial Conditions Indices (FCIs) for the US 
economy. The weighting methodology used in this case is based on factor analysis, which 
allows for the inclusion/exclusion of variables over time.  
The estimation results for the sources of financial stress in chapter 4 will be more robust 
with a longer sample, at least for the case of the ASEAN-5 economies. A result of the 
panel methodology is that the estimated parameters are constant for all the countries, 
which can be perceived as a strict assumption. This study was constrained to a panel 
methodology by the rather limited number of observations especially for the instrumental 
variable estimations. With a longer time series, moving from a single panel model to 
country specific models will allow cross country variation in the parameters, which serves 
as a useful robustness check of the panel estimation results. In addition to a longer sample 
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period, there are also benefits to increasing the number of countries. This will ensure that 
the empirical findings are generalizable to other countries instead of just the ASEAN-5 
economies. 
Another potential area for improvement in the methodology in chapter 4 concerns the 
estimation of the regional contagion variable. This study constructs the variable in two 
steps. An alternative modelling strategy is to perform the analysis in one step by 
estimating the baseline model while treating contagion as a latent variable, either by 
modelling it as part of the disturbance term, which imposes a specific heteroskedastic 
structure on the overall disturbance term, or by treating the model as a kalman filter with 
contagion as the unobserved variable. Furthermore, financial contagion tends to occur at 
high frequencies. To incorporate this variable at higher frequency compared to the other 
variables, the baseline model can be specified and estimated using a Mixed Data 
Sampling (MIDAS) regression approach.   
In chapter 5, a natural extension of the SVAR model is to incorporate the possibility of 
non-linear relationships in the form of thresholds. Specifically, allowing for a threshold 
effect between low stress and high stress states (i.e. using the financial stress variable as 
a source of non-linearity in the macro model), as is done by Davig and Hakkio (2010) and 
Hollo et al. (2012) using more simplistic models. Another plausible area of inquiry is 
motivated by the fact that the impulse responses from the SVAR models reflect 
substantial cross-country variability in both the magnitude and time dynamics. While it 
is outside the intended scope of this study, it would be beneficial to delve deeper into the 
economic reasons for these variations and the implications. Giving more specific 
reasoning to the differing responses of industrial production to financial stress shocks 
across countries likely requires further detailed country level analysis of the structure of 
these economies and their financial systems. Another possible approach is to conduct 
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similar SVAR estimations for a larger number of economies, document the corresponding 
responses, and then see if they vary systematically according to plausible indicators such 
as financial market development and policy credibility.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Detailed Description of Data for the FSIs  
1. Financial Stress Indicators 
Variables Notes Source 
Benchmark 
equity index 
Indonesia (Jakarta Composite Index), Malaysia 
(FTSE Bursa Malaysia), the Philippines (Manila 
Composite Index), Singapore (Straits Times 
Index), Thailand (Bangkok SET Index) 
Haver 
Bank equity 
index 
Indonesia (Indonesia Stock Exchange IDX 
Finance Index), Malaysia (FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
Finance Index), the Philippines (Philippines 
Stock Exchange, PSE, Banking and Financial 
Services Index), Singapore (FTSE Straits Times 
Financials Index from February 2008 onwards, 
Datastream Bank Index before February 2008), 
Thailand (Bangkok SET Banking Index) 
Haver, 
Bloomberg 
Local 
currency/US 
dollar 
exchange rate 
Local currency per United States dollar  International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS) 
International 
Reserves 
International reserves excluding gold World Bank 
Global 
Economic 
Monitor 
(GEM) 
Treasury bond 
yields (3 
month) 
Indonesia (3-months SBI before August 2010, 
spliced with 9-months SBI after August 2010 
based on growth rate), Singapore (final issue of 3 
month bills was in June 2013. Figures from 
September 2013 onwards are spliced from the 6-
month bill based on growth from preceding 
period), Thailand (91 days treasury bills from 
February 2001 onwards, 3 month repo before 
February 2001) 
Bank 
Indonesia, 
Datastream, 
IFS, Monetary 
Authroity of 
Singapore, 
Bank of 
Thailand 
Overnight 
interbank rate 
Malaysia (figures from 1997 onwards are from 
Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin) 
IFS 
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2. Variables to Construct Weights 
Variables Notes Source 
Domestic bank 
credit 
Claims on the central government (net of 
central government deposits), state & 
local government, public non-financial 
corporations, private sector and other 
financial corporations 
IFS 
Equity market 
capitalisation 
Only includes domestic companies and 
excludes investment funds 
World 
Federation of 
Exchanges 
Foreign exchange 
market 
International debt securities (Table 12a), 
external loans (Table 7a) 
Bank for 
International 
Settlements 
(BIS) 
Domestic bond 
market 
Domestic debt securities (Table 16a) BIS 
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Appendix B: Results from Principal Component Analysis to Derive Weights for 
Measure of Regional Financial Contagion 
Eigenvalues 
Number Value Difference Proportion 
Cumulative 
Value 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
1 2.42 1.45 0.48 2.42 0.48 
2 0.97 0.04 0.19 3.38 0.68 
3 0.93 0.56 0.19 4.31 0.86 
4 0.37 0.04 0.07 4.68 0.94 
5 0.32 na 0.06 5.00 1.00 
Eigenvectors (loadings) 
 PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 
Residual 
(IN) 0.37 -0.64 0.42 0.52 0.07 
Residual 
(MY) 0.52 -0.24 -0.37 -0.28 -0.68 
Residual 
(PH) 0.43 0.21 0.64 -0.58 0.14 
Residual 
(SG) 0.49 -0.02 -0.52 -0.06 0.69 
Residual 
(TH) 0.41 0.70 0.04 0.56 -0.19 
Ordinary correlations 
 
Residual 
(IN) 
Residual 
(MY) 
Residual 
(PH) 
Residual 
(SG) 
Residual 
(TH) 
Residual 
(IN) 1.00     
Residual 
(MY) 0.40 1.00    
Residual 
(PH) 0.40 0.29 1.00   
Residual 
(SG) 0.26 0.66 0.24 1.00  
Residual 
(TH) 0.06 0.32 0.46 0.40 1.00 
 
Notes: IN, MY, PH, SG and TH refer, respectively, to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.   
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Appendix C: Data Appendix for the SVAR Models 
i. Data Description 
Variable Abbreviation Definition Units Transformation Source 
Commodity prices GCP Commodity price 
index  
Index sa, log International Monetary Fund 
World production IPIW World industrial 
production index  
Index sa, log CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis 
US Financial 
stress 
FSIUS US Financial stress 
index  
Index  Hakkio and Keeton (2009) 
Production IPI Industrial production 
index  
Index sa, log Haver Analytics, World Bank Global 
Economic Monitor 
Prices CPI Consumer price index  Index sa, log Haver Analytics,  
Interest rate IR Short-term interest 
rate 
Percent  International Financial Statistics, Haver 
Analytics, Bank Negara Malaysia, 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
Real credit C Bank credit, deflated 
by CPI  
 sa, log International Financial Statistics 
Exchange rate EX Nominal effective 
exchange rate  
Index log Bank for International Settlements  
Financial stress FSI Financial stress index Index  Tng et al. (2012) 
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ii. Compilation Notes 
Production Series for the Philippines from Haver started in January 1998. Monthly figures in 1997 were extrapolated using year 
on year growth rates of IPI from the World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor. 
Real credit Bank credit data was compiled from two surveys conducted by International Financial Statistics - the survey of “other 
depository corporations” from 2002 onwards and the survey of “banking institutions” prior to 2002. Comprises of net 
claims on the central government, and claims on state and local government, public non-financial corporations and the 
private sector.  
Short term 
Interest rate 
This corresponds to the 30-day Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI) rate for Indonesia, the overnight policy rate (OPR) 
for Malaysia, the overnight reverse repo rate for the Philippines, the overnight Repo rate in Singapore and the Central 
Bank policy rate for Thailand. In Malaysia’s case, the OPR series begins from April 2004 onwards. For prior 
observations, I use the 3-month intervention rate augmented with a one-time downward adjustment in the level of the 
series so that the March 2004 level is similar to the April 2004 level of the OPR. For Thailand, the policy rate series 
starts in March 2000. Prior observations are the monthly average of the 14-day repurchase rate. 
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iii. Time Series Plots 
External variables 
Commodity prices World production US Financial Stress 
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Domestic Variables 
 Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand 
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 Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Exchange 
rate 
     
Financial 
stress 
     
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
4
4
5
5
5
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
-1
0
1
2
3
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ja
n-
09
Ja
n-
11
Ja
n-
13
162 
A Summary of Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Regimes in the ASEAN-5 Economies (1997-2013) 
Monetary Policy Regime Interest Rate Framework 
Indonesia 
Pre-1999 
 
Crawling exchange rate peg regime 
1999-Jun 2005: Base money targeting framework; inflation targeting (starting Jan 2000) 
  
• Started announcing inflation target in 2000, monetary policy aimed to achieve inflation target 
• Base Money Target under the IMF programme  
 
Reference rate: 30 days SBI (Sertifikat 
Bank Indonesia) 
 
 
 
Reference rate: Overnight cash rate Jul 2005-present: Formal inflation targeting 
• Government to set the inflation target 
 
Malaysia 
1996-Sep 1998: Interest rate targeting 
• Base Lending Rate (BLR) framework 
 
3-month interbank rate 
Sep 1998-Jul 2005: IR targeting with fixed exchange rate 
• BLR framework (BLR linked to Intervention Rate) 
• Capital controls 
 
3-mth intervention rate 
(Aug ’98 - May ’03) 
Jul 2005- present: IR targeting with floating exchange rate 
• New interest rate framework with the OPR to signal MP stance 
• Gradual liberalisation of capital controls 
 
 
 
 
Overnight policy rate 
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Monetary Policy Regime Interest Rate Framework 
The Philippines 
Jun 1995-2001: Monetary aggregate targeting complemented with inflation targeting 
• Greater emphasis on price stability instead of rigidly observing the targets for monetary 
aggregates. The BSP can exceed monetary targets as long as the actual inflation is kept within 
programme levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reverse Repurchase Rate (%) Jan 2002-present: Inflation targeting 
• The BSP formulates and implements monetary policy through the BSP's policy rates 
Singapore 
1981-present: Exchange rate used as monetary policy instrument 
• Managed against a trade-weighted basket of currencies 
• Trade-weighted Singapore dollar index allowed to float within an undisclosed target band 
• Exchange rate reviewed on a half-yearly cycle 
 
Thailand 
Pre-Jun 1997: Pegged exchange rate regime 
• The Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF) set the value of the baht against the U.S. dollar daily 
 
 
Jul 1997-May 2000: Monetary targeting regime  
• Bank sets daily and quarterly monetary base targets, on which its daily liquidity management 
is based 
 
 
 
23 May 2000-present: Inflation targeting regime  
• The Monetary Policy Board sets monetary policy with price stability as the main objective 
• 14-day RP rate (until 16 Jan. 2007) 
• 1-day RP rate (17 Jan. 2007-11 Feb. 
2008) 
• 1-day bilateral RP rate (12 Feb 2008-
present) 
 
